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This thesis is a critical legal, feminist intervention in the discourse on artificial wombs 
and abortion. In 2016, embryologists grew human embryos in culture up to 13 days, 
ending the experiment to respect the contemporary legal limit of 14 days. In 2017, 
researchers gestated lamb fetuses from the equivalent of 23 weeks in a human through 
to term in the “biobag”, a highly advanced incubator replete with artificial amniotic 
fluid. The renewed discourse on ectogenesis (external gestation) following these 
developments has focused on how the technology might impact abortion rights. 
Bioethical and legal scholars have hypothesized since the 1970s that ectogenesis could 
allow unwanted fetuses to be extracted and reimplanted in an artificial womb instead of 
being terminated, thus protecting the pregnant person’s bodily autonomy while 
simultaneously protecting fetal life. Consequently, these scholars argue that ectogenesis 
will challenge contemporary legal justifications for abortion. I make two key 
interventions in this literature. Firstly, I address the hegemony of US-centric 
perspectives in which American abortion jurisprudence is frequently drawn on to 
conclude that artificial wombs universally challenge abortion rights. I apply a 
comparative analysis of challenges that scholars have alleged ectogenesis will pose for 
abortion law against existing regulations in three jurisdictions: the United States, the 
United Kingdom where the Abortion Act 1967 applies, and Canada. In so doing, I aim 
to understand whether this technology will threaten, bolster, or have no significant 
impact on abortion protections in context. Secondly, I strategically engage a feminist 
ethics of care (adapted with reference to reproductive justice and relational legal theory) 
to assess frameworks that have been proposed for regulating abortion and ectogenesis. I 
show that debates over these frameworks frequently fail to consider the relational 
entanglements that may be constituted through ectogenesis, abortion, and human 
gestation. I insist that any framework for regulating artificial wombs must attend to 
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1. MATRIX, BIOBAG, ARTIFICIAL WOMB 
A lamb fetus, pink-fleshed and self-evidently too small to survive on its own, is 
surrounded by liquid and floating in a transparent bag. At the equivalent of 
approximately twenty-three weeks human gestation, the lamb is just past the halfway 
mark of the forty weeks that make a full-term pregnancy. Metal rods hold the bag in 
place, and thick plastic tubes connected together like oversized veins pump nutrient-
enriched liquids to be circulated in movements triggered by the fetus’s own heartbeat 
(Partridge et al 2017, 3). A month later, the lamb is fully developed. Replete with fluffy 
white wool, it has grown big enough to be extracted from beneath the plastic surface 
against which its body now presses. 
 Though it may sound like science fiction, this is the biobag: a highly advanced 
incubator developed in 2017 that replicates the womb and is being prepared for trial 
with human fetuses. The liquid within is a synthetic replication of the amniotic fluid that 
surrounds growing babies. The vein-like cords that deliver this fluid imitate the 
placenta, which eliminates toxins and ensures that a fetus receives the sustenance it 
requires to flourish. The bag itself can be expanded or compressed to more closely take 
the physical shape of a given uterus. A completely closed system, the biobag “is 
translucent, sonolucent, and flexible to permit monitoring, scanning, and manipulation 
of the fetus as necessary” (3), containing a built-in scale to monitor the fetus without 
removing it. It should come as no surprise that this technology has prompted a new 
wave of speculation in both popular media and academic literature that the first artificial 
womb has arrived.  
 An “artificial womb” is a device that mimics the uterus and allows for 
“extracorporeal gestation” (Abecassis 2016, 6) to occur. A related term commonly used 
in social science literature is “ectogenesis,” a word generally understood to have been 
coined in 1923 by geneticist and author JBS Haldane to refer to the process of 
facilitating gestation in its entirety outside of the body. In the social sciences and 
humanities literature on ectogenesis, which spans from Haldane’s time through to the 
present-day, there is consensus that there are two scientific fields in which research may 
lead to the development of an artificial womb. At one end of gestation is work by 
embryologists and stem cell biologists that allows for the growth of human embryos in 
culture (“in vitro”). Growing embryos in vitro is considered by many to constitute 
“partial ectogenesis” (Cannold 2006, 47, see also Alghrani 2007, Gefland 2006, Tong 




like the work that led to the biobag, namely, projects on life support for neonates 
conducted by neonatologists, obstetricians, and medical engineers. It is agreed in the 
social science literature that it is from these two directions—embryos growing in 
culture, and technologies to sustain preterm infants—that total ectogenesis is likely to 
occur, and that partially ectogenic technologies, such as the incubator and the potential 
to grow an embryo in culture, already exist (Kendal 2015, Smajdor 2007 and 2012, 
Simonstein 2009, Alghrani 2008, Murphy 2006, Aristarkhova 2012, Bard 2006, Welin 
2004, Coleman 2004, Gefland and Shook 2006, Murphy 2012, Ho 2006, Sander-Staudt 
2006, Rosen 2003).  
The years between 2016 and 2019 have been significant for research that might 
one day lead to ectogenesis. The biobag was developed in 2017 at the Center for Fetal 
Research at Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia, and was replicated in a collaboration 
between the Women and Infants Fetal Research Foundation at the University of 
Western Australia and Tohoku University in Japan. Each of these research groups were 
successful in creating an incubator (first called the biobag) in which to gestate lamb 
fetuses from “the biological equivalent of the 22-24 week gestation premature human 
infant” (Partridge et al. 2017, 2) through to term. The current limit of “fetal viability” 
(the point at which a fetus has a chance of survival outside the womb) sits at around 22-
24 weeks of gestation. In spite of this, survival before around 28 weeks frequently 
continues to be accompanied by lung disease, organ damage, and further health issues. 
The biobag then, is not intended to “extend the current limits of viability” (Partridge et 
al. 2017, 11) but “to offer the potential for improved outcomes for those infants who are 
already being routinely resuscitated and cared for in neonatal intensive care units” (11). 
As of 2019, the team is still working with the US Federal Drug Association to prepare 
for a clinical trial with human fetuses, beginning likely within one or two years. The 
Australian-Japanese team, led by Usuda, published their work in October 2017. With 
slight differences in experimental design, Usuda et al’s research follows the same 
principles as the biobag in attempting to treat “extremely preterm infants [. . .] as 
fetuses, rather than as small babies” (Usuda et al. 2017, 2). Their iteration of the 
technology, called “ex vivo uterine environment (EVE) therapy” (ibid), allowed five of 
six tested fetal lambs to survive and grow normally outside of the womb. In October 
2019, a team led by Guid Oei at the Eindhoven University of Technology received 
funding to develop a prototype artificial womb building on the biobag research, set to be 




At the other end of gestation, research groups at Rockefeller and Cambridge 
universities respectively built on methods that had previously been used with mice to 
develop a culture that would allow human embryos to grow in vitro beyond the 
implantation stage. Releasing their publications in May 2016, the “two groups reported 
that they had sustained human embryos in vitro for 12-13 days” (Hyun et al. 2017, 169). 
As Hyun et al note, their discovery is significant for two reasons, first because “until 
now, no one had reported culturing human embryos in vitro beyond nine days, and 
rarely have they been sustained for more than seven” (169), and secondly, because the 
experiments showed that a human embryo could “self-organize” without the input of the 
mother. Up until this point, it was assumed that after seven days “the human embryo 
must implant into the uterus of the mother to survive” (Shabazi et al. 2016, 1). In both 
instances, research was halted at fourteen days in order to respect contemporary legal 
limits for embryo growth in vitro in both the United States and United Kingdom. I will 
provide further background on these legal limits in what follows, but I would note for 
now that both groups suggested that the embryos would be able to continue to develop 
for some time further in culture had the experiments continued. As Zernicka-Goetz, lead 
researcher at the Cambridge group, noted in an interview with Nature, however, “at 
some point, the embryo [. . .] depends upon the developing placenta for a supply of 
nutrients and for gas exchange” (quoted in Hurlbut 2017) and at this point, scientists 
would need to create something that could “substitu[te] for the placenta or develop[...] 
an artificial placenta in which the embryo can grow” (ibid.). Zernicka-Goetz describes 
this as a significant challenge, but does not dismiss it as impossible.  
This thesis falls within a growing body of literature that accepts the premise that 
ectogenesis will one day be possible. When I set out to begin this research, I learned 
that what is perhaps most compelling about writing on the artificial womb is the way in 
which this speculative body of literature is punctuated with visions of the future that 
replicate some of the most limiting configurations of the past. The example of this that 
was the most striking to me was the recurring claim in the legal and bioethical literature 
that by allowing fetuses to be removed from a pregnant person’s body to continue to 
grow in an artificial womb, this technology will one day “solve” abortion. Despite a 
partial desire to write about any aspect of reproductive care other than abortion, I found 
myself so intrigued and outraged by these arguments that this thesis has come to be an 
intervention in this literature. In chapter two, I will introduce the two features of my 




might challenge (or have no impact on) abortion regulation in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, and second, I employ a feminist ethics of care to 
normatively assess possible frameworks for ectogenesis and abortion.  
Before I come to laying out my argument, though, I want to offer a kind of 
history of how I arrived here, by laying out a review of the scientific, bioethical, legal, 
and feminist literature on artificial womb technology. Though the recent research 
developments I have described above have prompted a new wave of speculation that an 
artificial womb will soon be available, work on both growing embryos in culture and on 
incubators began over one hundred years ago. Claims that the artificial womb is 
imminent, and analyses of its possible societal impact have followed each major 
breakthrough in these areas. I will explore the debates that dominate the social science 
discourse on ectogenesis, but first, I want to contextualize these discussions by tracing 
some of this scientific history.  
 
THE INCUBATOR AS ARTIFICIAL WOMB 
Neonatologist William A. Silverman, the former head of neonatal-intensive care at 
Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, traces the origin of the incubator to 1878, when 
French obstetrician Stephane Tarnier “visited an exhibition, [...] and came across a 
warming chamber for the rearing of poultry [...] He asked the zookeeper to build a 
similar box, sufficiently ventilated and large enough to hold one or two premature 
infants” (1979, np). This device, introduced into the Paris Maternity hospital in 1880, 
was innovative as a “closed system” for the preservation of the small baby. While there 
were many attempts at incubation that precede Tarnier’s work, the novelty of Tarnier’s 
invention lies in his success at turning medical attention to the premature infant as a life 
worth saving (Baker 2000, 323). At the time, Tarnier “conclude[d] that he was on the 
verge of pushing back the medical definition of viability to its legal definition of six 
months (or 180 days) of gestation” (Baker 2000, 41). This marks the initial instance of 
the medical community considering the possibility that part of human gestation might 
occur outside of the mother’s womb, and inside of a machine.  
With the present day introduction of the biobag, there has been a notable discord 
between understandings of the technology that situate it as a bridge between parent and 
prematurely born baby (Romanis 2018, Partridge et al 2017), and those that situate it as 
a replacement for the human womb (Blackshaw and Rodger 2018, Mathison and Davis 




one side of the debate, “Just as physicians aspired to improve upon breast milk with 
artificial formula, they developed the incubator as an improvement upon the womb” 
(1996, 71), and on the other side physicians felt that “the idea of the incubator as 
artificial womb implied a potential challenge to the mother” (73) which was not a 
desirable outcome. Pierre Budin, Tarnier’s student who later took over his project at 
Paris Maternity Hospital, fell firmly in the second camp, “emphasiz[ing] breastfeeding 
more than the incubator” (2000, 323) as a means of caring for preterms, and introducing 
glass incubators to allow mothers to view their babies easily in hopes that this would 
encourage bonding.  
The other approach to the incubator was as a stand-alone machine. Aristarkhova 
notes of this camp that “incubators were rationalized by some doctors and scientists as 
‘artificial wombs’ that were safer than a ‘real’ uterus” (2012, 91). Alexandre Lion’s 
incubator typified this approach. Baker writes, “Though this type of design hampered 
observation, its defenders proposed a different advantage: it created a protective 
environment analogous to the womb” (1996, 71). Baker traces Lion’s work as the 
emergence of the “metaphor of the artificial womb” within medical literature.  
Likely fueled by the debates over the purpose of the incubator in the medical 
community, public interest in the possibility of growing babies from nothing also began 
in this era. Lion and fellow pediatrician Martin Couney popularized their research by 
touring the World’s Fairs with incubators bearing live premature babies. Baker notes 
that “The high point of Lion’s career was his opening of the Kinderbrutenstalt (“child 
hatchery”), an elaborate incubator baby show that became the surprise sensation of the 
Berlin Exposition of 1896” (2000, 324). One contemporary magazine, The Graphic, 
referred to the incubator as “An Artificial Foster-Mother,” and rumors that the 
technology was an artificial womb abounded.   
As Natalia Durbach writes, after “Making their British debut at the Victorian Era 
Exhibition at Earl’s Court in the summer of 1897” (2009, 23), incubator baby shows 
became a burgeoning fad. According to Durbach, “an article in a popular periodical 
explicitly described the baby incubator as a ‘hot-house,’ suggesting that infants could be 
cultivated like orchids” (24). She cites as well “An 1896 comic song [which] played on 
[...] nationalistic fears of depopulation with its lyric ‘I hope to breed a nation by the 
means of incubation’” (24). She writes that the incubators “were ventilated by holes, 
which one reporter described as ‘orifices,’ thus furthering the suggestion that the 




reproductive duties” (24). In both medical literature on “incubator babies” and in the 
popular writing which extrapolated on this, Durbach notes that the “rhetoric suggested 
that the final trimester of fetal development could now successfully take place outside 
the womb itself” (25). These early speculative treatments of ongoing medical studies are 
exemplary of the interplay between scientific developments and wild rumors in the 
popular press that characterize the history of ectogenetic research up to the present day. 
Each innovation in incubation technology has been met with enthusiastic declarations 
that the artificial womb has truly arrived. It is useful to note the origin of such claims in 
the 1880s as a caveat that though long-anticipated, the science of ectogenesis has yet to 
match the fantasy. 
Around the turn of the century, backlash against the incubator emerged amidst 
doubts over whether the technology actually worked (Durbach 2009, Baker 2000). 
Incubators primarily remained the project of individuals like Couney (who went on to 
exhibit premature babies at Coney Island) and did not return to popular use until after 
World War II (Baker 2000). I will skip forward in this history to discuss explicit 
research on the artificial uterus in the 1950s, but I want to note first a few key moments 
that occurred in the interim period. 
 In Babies in Bottles, Susan Merrill Squier analyzes a debate over the artificial 
womb in the 1920s to try to contextualize renewed interest in the technology in the 
1980s. She refers to what is often cited (Rosen 2003, Karp 1976, Aristarkhova 2012, 
Murphy 2006, Kendal 2015) as the origin of the term “ectogenesis”: geneticist JBS 
Haldane’s speech to the Heretics society at Cambridge, given in 1923 and later 
published in the Today and Tomorrow series. In “Daedalus; or, Science and the Future”, 
Haldane writes from the perspective of a “rather stupid” undergraduate student in the 
1960s giving an overview of the most significant scientific developments to date. He 
includes ectogenesis, reciting that “it was in 1951 that Dupont and Schwarz produced 
the first ectogenetic child” (1923, 14). He goes on to describe the introduction of 
ectogenesis as the primary mode of producing children, proclaiming, “ectogenesis is 
now universal, and in this country less than 3 percent of children are now born of 
women” (ibid.). 
As Squier discusses, Haldane was a scientist (studying genetics, physiology, and 
evolutionary biology), and though “Daedalus” was a work of science fiction, Haldane 
grounded his claims in research that had been conducted up to 1924 on animal embryos. 




following six years, five more essays were published specifically responding to 
Haldane’s essay: both to its central image of ectogenesis and to the principles on which 
it was based” (1994, 66).  
Eden Paul, a doctor, wrote favorably in Chronos, or the Future of the Family of 
Haldane’s predictions, asserting that ectogenesis could produce a beneficial dissolution 
of the family and the achievement of more balanced gender relations (Squier 1994). By 
contrast, J.D. Bernal, a crystallographer and molecular biologist, argued in The World, 
the Flesh, and the Devil, that ectogenesis was close at hand. He proposed that artificial 
wombs would be part of a movement toward making the perfect man, from gestating a 
fetus in a machine to ultimately producing a “cyberman” consisting of a brain in a 
beaker (ibid.). In Halycon, Or the Future of Monogamy (1929), the nurse and novelist 
Vera Brittain engages ectogenesis in an explicitly feminist project. Contrasting many of 
the more ominous (Ludovici 1924) and eugenics-focused (Haire 1927, Bernal 1929) 
visions of artificial wombs presented by other authors of the era, Brittain attends to what 
the technology might mean for women. While considering the potentially liberatory 
effects of ectogenesis for women’s sexuality (for if machines were responsible for 
gestation, sex need no longer be so linked to reproduction), she ultimately proposes that 
women would reject the technology, finding that it produced a negative impact on the 
significant relationship between mother and child.  
Three years later, in 1932, Aldous Huxley’s controversial novel Brave New 
World was published, which, as I will discuss, drew on actual work being done in 
embryology in particular. In Huxley’s vision, embryos were cultivated in test tubes and 
eventually transferred to artificial wombs. Sarah Franklin notes that the authors who 
engaged in the artificial womb debate of the 1920s, including Haldane, Huxley, Brittain, 
Bernal, and Wells, were all acquainted. Franklin writes, “these stories produced by a 
highly scientifically literate group of friends and kin (many of whom were closely 
biologically related as well as related through the study of biology) typically wove 
together elements from the history of embryology with science fiction, even sometimes 
very accurately predicting the future” (2013, 245). The bleak specter of ectogenesis as it 
is imagined in Brave New World in particular has long haunted research on artificial 







EARLY RESEARCH ON ARTIFICIAL UTERI AND PLACENTAS 
From 1960 through to 1969, multiple papers were released detailing unsuccessful 
attempts to create artificial uteri and/or artificial placentas in which to gestate premature 
lamb and goat fetuses (Callaghan et al. 1963, Goodlin 1963, Lawn and McCance 1962, 
Nixon et al 1963, Alexander et al 1964, Chamberlain 1968).  
It was not until many years later that Yoshinori Kuwabara, the former Chairman 
of the department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Juntendo University in Tokyo, came 
close to success in developing an artificial womb to address fetal prematurity. Later led 
by Nobuya Unno, the group published multiple papers on the “Development of an 
Artificial Placenta” beginning in 1984 and through to the early 2000s. Kuwabara et al 
extracted premature goat fetuses via c-section and incubated them in containers 
“containing artificial amniotic fluid warmed to 39.5 C” (Unno 2000, 64), with an 
“extracorporeal circuit” (64). In 1997, they reported “that a 17-week-old goat fetus, 
removed from its mother’s uterus, had survived for three weeks in an artificial womb” 
(Rosen 2003, 68). Though these goats survived until euthanized, they experienced 
serious complications due to drugs given to them to prevent movement while inside the 
artificial uterus (Coleman 2004, 12), something which had also caused issues in 
previous versions of the experiment.  
While some researchers in this field have been very careful to avoid discussion 
of the social implications of artificial wombs (see especially Partridge 2017) Unno 
explicitly referenced  Huxley’s vision of artificial wombs in a “child hatchery,” and 
commented that this would be “the true artificial uterus” (62). Unno notes that while he 
believes this outcome to be scientifically improbable, Huxley did manage to anticipate 
many of the challenges encountered by researchers working on artificial uteri and 
placentas. Further studies on artificial uteruses and placentas followed and occurred 
concurrently with Unno et al’s work (Sakata et al 1998, Pak and Song et al 2002). 
Thomas Shaffer, a neonatal physiologist in Philadelphia, began experiments in 
the 1980s that differed from Kuwabara and Unno’s approach but shared the same end 
goal of allowing a premature fetus to develop outside the body. Shaffer sought to 
establish a strategy of “liquid ventilation” (Knight 2002, 106), to help address the issue 
of failing neonatal lungs. His experiment involved “fill[ing] the lungs of 18-week old 
lamb fetuses” (ibid.) with a fluid mimicking the environment in utero and intended to 
allow the lungs to expand and oxygen to circulate normally. Shaffer trialed the method 




ventilation was removed. In 1996, a trial with “thirteen infants born after 24-34 weeks 
with severe breathing difficulties” (ibid.) resulted in the survival of seven seemingly 
healthy infants. However, Shaffer was unable to secure funding for further trials. As 
with both Unno and Kuwabara, Shaffer was firm that he “wouldn’t want to push back 
the gestational age limit” (quoted in Klass 1996), but instead wanted to improve the 
health of premature babies at the existing viability line. The next significant 
advancement in research on incubation technology was the 2017 introduction of the 
biobag, bringing us to the present day moment of anticipating approval for human trials. 
 
EARLY RESEARCH ON HUMAN EMBRYOS 
In many ways, the research timeline of work on human embryos mimics that of 
incubation research, with significant progress beginning in the late 1800s. “In vitro 
fertilization” refers to the fertilization of a mammalian egg with mammalian sperm in a 
culture cultivated in a laboratory. As Evie Kendal writes, while incubators “met with 
minimal opposition [. . .] IVF research has always been subject to rigorous ethical 
debate” (2015, 28). Immediately following the 1978 birth of Louise Brown, the first 
baby born through in vitro fertilisation, philosopher Stephen Toulmin summarized the 
ethical objections that had been made against embryo research to date. In so doing, he 
situated the debates over IVF in the context of the mythology of the artificial womb, 
writing that “the phrase ‘test tube babies’ had the power to make people’s flesh creep 
long before Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World; the medieval alchemist, for one, was 
often suspected of using his alembic to gestate an artificial homunculus” (1978, 9). 
Toulmin here refers to Paracelsus, who “provided the recipe for creating a homunculus, 
an artificial man with no soul, in an artificial womb” (Gefland 2006, 3) in the sixteenth 
century. This alchemical image of the man grown in a test tube, along with Haldane and 
Huxley’s respective ideas of ectogenesis, undergirded public response to the 
embryological progress of the 1970s.   
Cell biologist and embryologist J.D. Biggers places the first attempts at embryo 
growth and transfer in the 1890s with Walter Heape, who made claims that he had 
“successfully transferred mammalian (rabbit) embryos from one mother to another” 
(2012, 119). Robert Edwards, one of the scientists responsible for the first IVF birth in 
the UK, notes that “progress was very slow over many years” (1976, 368) as a result of 
the lack of availability of oocytes and embryos. Biggers attributes the “first successful 




Biggers writes that there were several attempts at further work culturing embryos in 
vitro in the 1910s, but suggests that “Little attention, if any, was paid to the 
manipulation of mammalian development in vitro during the next 18 years other than 
science fiction accounts of ectogenesis” (119).  
Edwards cites Pincus and Enzmann’s work at Cambridge in the 1930s as the 
point at which embryo research began in earnest. As Biggers describes, the interaction 
between scientific and fictive accounts of “ectogenesis” was significant during this 
period. Biggers notes in particular the link between Pincus’s research on embryos in the 
1930s, and Huxley’s Brave New World, writing that “A few years later the notion of 
ectogenesis became widely disseminated” (2012, 119) through the novel, and that the 
techniques Huxley described were “remarkably realistic” (119). Biggers describes as 
well the ways that an extreme negative media reaction to Pincus’s research was fueled 
by images of the artificial womb imagined by Huxley, as in a 1936 New York Times 
article in which Pincus’s work was described as opening the door to Brave New World 
coming true.  
Biggers notes that embryology research continued throughout the 1940s, 50s, 
and 60s, and affirms (along with Edwards) that “the first unequivocal achievement of 
IVF was done in the rabbit by Chang” (122) in 1959. In 1968, Biggers’s own work with 
Whitten establishing a medium in which to culture mammalian embryos allowed for a 
standard protocol for embryo growth. As Biggers notes, broader discussion of 
ectogenesis also continued at this time. In 1958, when Biggers and McClaren 
successfully transferred mouse blastocysts into foster mothers, Biggers writes that a 
Daily Telegraph article immediately followed, titled “Brave New Mice.” Where Pincus 
had refused to engage with concerns over his research, Biggers and McClaren sent a 
popular science article to Discovery Magazine, in which they wrote,  
it is inevitable that the thoughts of anyone who has worked on the subjects 
outlined in this article should turn to Aldous Huxley’s fantasy ‘Brave New 
World’, where he   describes completely artificial fertilization and development 
of human embryos. Fortunately we are far removed from this frightening 
prospect (cited in Biggers 2012, 122).  
 
From the 1960s through to the 1970s, embryologists continued to study embryos and 






IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND “TEST TUBE BABIES” 
In 1969, Edwards and Steptoe announced in Nature the successful “fertilization in vitro 
of matured human oocytes” (Biggers 2012, 123). In 1978 Louise Brown, the first “test 
tube baby” was born following the application of their method. In response to Edwards 
and Steptoe’s work, significant concerns were raised around the ethics of in vitro 
fertilization internationally. In the United Kingdom, Steptoe and Edwards were 
continually rejected for funding by the Medical Research Council. In the United States, 
hearings began to be held on the ethics of individual scientists’ requests to work on IVF, 
and in India, Subhas Mukerji, SK Battacharya, and Sunit Mukherjee, who successfully 
performed IVF concurrently with Edwards and Steptoe in the UK, were unable to 
publish a paper reporting their findings or to speak on their research at conferences due 
to government pressure (124). As Biggers notes, references to Brave New World, and 
“test tube” babies continued throughout this period and shaped the concerns of ethicists 
and policymakers.  
Ultimately governments in multiple countries commissioned reports on the 
ethics of embryo research. In the United States in 1979, the Ethics Advisory Board was 
assembled by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to consider the status 
of the embryo. In the United Kingdom in 1982, a committee led by Dame Mary 
Warnock began assessing whether IVF and embryo research were ethically permissible, 
and if they were, how they should be regulated. Looking back in 2016, Warnock noted 
that it was understood at the time that “scientists on the whole want to be left in peace to 
get on with their research and leave policy-making to others” (Hurlbut 2017), but that “a 
live embryo in the laboratory was a completely new object which had never existed 
before, and its moral status had to be discussed and clarified” (ibid). In Canada, the 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies was assembled in 1989 for the 
same purpose. Ultimately, over the course of committee hearings with the public, 
religious representatives, embryologists, geneticists, and academics, each committee 
arrived at allowing IVF and embryo research, but setting a limit for the period that 
scientists could keep a human embryo alive outside the womb in culture (in vitro) to 14 
days.  
Warnock, who led the UK report, and LeRoy Walters, a bioethicist working for 
the Ethics Advisory Board in the United States, independently proposed the 14-day 
limit, which has now been adopted as law in twelve countries including Canada and the 




including the United States (ibid.). Both committees agreed that IVF and embryo 
research should be permissible to some extent due to its capacity to help alleviate 
suffering caused by infertility. Both committees also agreed that some limit must be set. 
In brief, somewhere around 14 days, scientists note the arrival of the “primitive streak” 
in the embryo. This is the point at which cells begin to organize themselves into the 
outline of what will be the structure of the fetus, “marking the beginning of an embryo’s 
head-to-tail axis” (Hyun et al. 2017, 170). As the period in which the “embryo’s 
biological individuation is assured” (170), when it can no longer “split in two or fuse 
together” (ibid) the committees found that this was an appropriate marker of when the 
embryo became a significant entity. In interviews in 2016, Warnock and Walters 
respectively note that 14 days is somewhat arbitrary, in that the primitive streak’s 
arrival is not exact, but is understood to occur around this time. Warnock notes, 
however, that, “law requires the possibility of certainty” (unpublished data 2016), and 
while the limit could have been set at 13 or 15 days just as easily, it was felt 14 days 
would be easier to remember. As Coleman notes, Warnock acknowledges that fears 
over ectogenesis played a partial role in the “recommendation that the growing of a 
human embryo in vitro beyond fourteen days should be a criminal offence” (ibid.), 
ensuring a strong incentive against trying to grow babies outside the womb. This 
recommendation was passed into law with the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 
in 1990.  
In Canada, the recommendations from the Royal Commission report, published 
in 1993, explicitly suggest forbidding “‘experimentation which may lead to 
ectogenesis’” (360). As Frieda Simonstein writes, there is a potential contradiction here 
in that “the Canadian report on artificial reproduction regulations [. . .] simultaneously 
presses for better results in IVF cycles” (2009, 360), which Simonstein suggests might 
incidentally contribute to ectogenesis. The Canadian report also includes a suggestion 
that the 14-day limit might be reconsidered if compelling reasons should arise (Bayliss 
2017).  
Even following the adoption of the 14 day limit into legislation in some 
countries (including Canada and the United Kingdom) and a strict scientific guideline in 
others (including the United States), scientists throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s 
rarely succeeded in culturing embryos beyond seven days. This was less due to the 
guidelines than to challenges in creating a structure that would allow the embryo to 




The first attempts at growing embryos in artificial scaffolding have been placed 
in Italy and New York in the early 1980s. In 1988, Italian doctor Carlo Bulletti and his 
research team published a paper in Fertility and Sterility called “Early Human 
Pregnancy in Vitro Utilizing an Artificially Perfused Uterus.” In it, they detailed their 
research into an artificial uterus in which to grow human embryos. They are explicit 
about their intentions, writing, “the present study was undertaken to obtain the first 
early human pregnancy in vitro because future complete ectogenesis should not be ruled 
out” (1988, 991). Using donated uteri and leftover embryos from IVF patients, the 
researchers built upon previous work and injected embryos “into human perfused uteri” 
(993). Though the embryos did not survive beyond seven days, the researchers explain 
that the experiment both “demonstrates the possibility of obtaining human pregnancy at 
early stage in vitro” (994), and also showed that “human uterine perfused tissues” (994) 
could be kept functional for long enough to “carry out specific observation on embryo 
implantation” (994). Though, as noted above, the group is explicit in stating that 
ectogenesis could be an outcome of their research, their primary intention is studying 
the implantation period, as this “is the most important limiting factor for the pregnancy 
rate in the IVF programs” (991).  
Fertility and Sterility is an international medical journal, and an editor’s note 
was included with Bulletti et al’s paper to clarify that it was “the first report of an early 
human pregnancy attained in an in vitro model” (995) and warn against “serious ethical 
and legal concerns” (995) that would prevent the experiment from being replicated in 
the United States and which should subject it to further debate. Following the 
publication of the article, “ultimately the experimental program conducted in Italy was 
stopped because of the ethical issue raised and the strong and vociferous opposition 
from the political community” (Bulletti et al. 2011, 124). 
In New York, Hung-Ching Liu, an embryologist at Cornell University, also 
experienced significant opposition to her research. Beginning in 2001, Liu successfully 
“formed a matrix for [...] harvested endometrial cells to grow upon” (Carlston 2008, 
36). Once these cells had formed a uterine shape, Liu was able to grow mouse embryos 
up to seventeen days. In 2003, she successfully grew a mouse embryo “almost to full 
term” (36) before its death. Liu was able to replicate her experiment with human 
embryos, and eventually successfully reached 10 days (Carlston 36), though this work 




While Liu did not explicitly use the term “artificial womb,” when interviewed at 
the Congress of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine in 2001 (Simonstein 
2009, 362), she was asked “Is it [...] science fiction to say maybe in the far future you 
could have a real breathing embryo and have a child in the laboratory?” (quoted in 
Rosen 2003, 70), to which she responded “That’s my final goal [...] I call it an artificial 
uterus. I want to see whether I can develop an actual external device with this 
endometrium cell”’ (70). She went further to note that “we could possibly have an 
artificial uterus so then you could grow a baby to term” (quoted in Carlston 2008, 70). 
Liu’s explicit discussion of her work prompted significant media response at the time 
(Knight 2002, Carlston 2008, Newson 2005, Reynolds 2005, McKie 2002), with one 
reporter calling her “the nation’s premier womb-maker” (McKie). Speaking to a 
reporter in 2005, she explained “The medical ethicists were against it. Pro-life people 
were against it, and pro-choice people too—both sides. This came as a surprise to me.” 
(quoted in Don 2015, np). I will unpack precisely what it is about artificial womb 
research that causes strong reactions from both anti-abortion and pro-choice groups later 
in this chapter. Liu moved on to other areas of investigation, and discussion of 
“artificial wombs” in the media died down for a period.  
In 2011, Bulletti et al published a retrospective on their work, also referencing 
Liu, and discussed the ramifications and potential uses of creating an artificial womb. 
They discuss “the mastery of in vitro fertilization and improvements in the survival of 
premature infants” (124), that have occurred since their original publication, and 
suggest that these developments mean “new opportunities for ectogenesis” (ibid). In the 
present day, they write, “more advanced technologies are available and make possible 
the notion that an artificial uterus could support fetal development, at least for part of 
the pregnancy. Once perfected, however, an artificial womb would allow for the 
possibility to continue or initiate fetal development outside of the mother’s body” (125). 
They suggest that the backlash such work would be likely to receive must be weighed 
against its possible benefits, such as the possibility that “an artificial uterus could assist 
women with damaged or diseased uteri by allowing them to conceive and carry infants” 
(ibid), and could be an incubator for neonates born before 24 weeks.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Claims in the popular press, in fiction, and in the social sciences that ectogenesis is 




embryo growth. Some neonatologists and embryologists in the modern period, post 
1950s (Bulletti et al. 2011, Unno et al. 2000, Edwards 1976, Biggers 2012) have 
acknowledged the uses and possibility of ectogenesis and recognized the ways their 
own research might contribute. Others (Partridge et al. 2017,  Usuda et al. 2017, 
Shabazi et al. 2016, Deglincerti et al. 2016) have explicitly rejected such claims, 
dismissed ectogenesis as implausible or in the very far future, and asserted that their 
contributions are in the interest of sustaining premature babies and exploring early 
miscarriage respectively. Scientists in both of these fields have tended to take seriously 
both the scientific and the legal limitations that hinder progress toward a full artificial 
womb, and to carefully caveat discussions of this technology with reference to those 
limits. By contrast, as of researchers reaching the 14-day limit in 2016 and the biobag 
breakthrough in 2017, scholars in the social sciences have turned a renewed critical lens 
to the subject of ectogenesis, nearly always beginning with a belief in its imminent 
plausibility.  
 
1.2 THE SOCIAL SCIENCE LITERATURE ON ECTOGENESIS 
Much of this literature can be said to be interdisciplinary, and it is therefore difficult to 
clearly place it within disciplinary constraints. I am primarily interested here in 
providing an overview of the key debates about ectogenesis in the social science 
literature broadly speaking. But I do want to highlight three particular lenses with which 
scholars tend to approach considerations of ectogenesis. Namely, much of the 
scholarship can be said to foreground a “bioethical”, “feminist”, or “legal” way of 
analyzing the technology. Each of these approaches begin with a different set of 
concerns and questions for inquiry, and thus tends to yield varied perspectives as to the 
impact of artificial wombs. While bioethical, feminist, and legal methodologies overlap, 
I identify here some of the qualities that characterize each of these perspectives in order 
to critically consider how each calls attention to different possibilities for and concerns 
about ectogenesis, and in order to articulate where I place my own work.  
 
A BIOETHICAL APPROACH TO ECTOGENESIS 
Bioethics as a field brings together scholars with backgrounds bridging law, medicine, 
and numerous topics in the humanities. Scholars that approach ectogenesis using a 
bioethical lens tend to focus on broad questions about the moral and ethical impact of 




wombs may impact the moral status of the fetus. Some argue, as I will discuss further 
shortly, that the technology could mean social recognition of the fetus as a person 
(Singer and Wells 2006, Welin 2004, Kaczor 2006, Reiber 2010, and Pence 2006, 
Coleman 2004, James 1987). Others hold that even where we may conclude that a fetus 
is not a person, ectogenesis will force a renewed debate over what kind of entity we 
consider it to be (James 1987, Adinolfi 2004, Gefland 2006, Raskin and Mazor 2006). 
While some bioethical scholars (Singer and Wells 2006, Coleman 2004, Adinolfi 2004, 
Smajdor 2007/2012, Simonstein and Mashiach-Eizenberg 2006) propose that the 
technology could improve equality between men and women, few engage with critically 
assessing how these outcomes could be ensured given contemporary social barriers. The 
role of sexuality and gender identity, race, class, and ability on existing experiences of 
reproductive technologies and on the potential impact of or desire for ectogenesis is 
seldom mentioned. Similarly, the ways that existing laws and medical policies might 
shape or be shaped by the introduction of ectogenesis are secondary to philosophical 
reflections on whether the technology could be considered a social good.  
 
LEGAL APPROACHES TO ECTOGENESIS 
The legal literature, by contrast, is primarily interested in applied questions of how 
ectogenetic technology might challenge existing law. Where a bioethicist might weigh a 
series of possible ethical merits and concerns raised by ectogenesis (as Singer and Wells 
2006, Pence 2006, Kaczor 2005, Reiber 2010, Gefland 2006, and others do), legal 
scholars, giving consideration to the realities of contemporary legislation and legal 
practice, tend to ground these issues in what the law actually prevents or makes possible 
(Randall and Randall 2008, Alghrani 2007/2008, Schultz 2010, Steiger 2010, among 
others). Legal scholars consider the impact of ectogenesis on law governing parenthood 
(Randall and Randall 2008, Jackson 2008, Hendricks 2011, Abecassis 2016), surrogacy 
(Abecassis 2016, Hendricks 2011, Lupton 1997), and, with reference to the moral status 
of the fetus, abortion rights (Steiger 2010, Abecassis 2016, Schultz 2010, Favole 1979, 
Abel 1974, Goldstein 1978).  
 While the bioethical literature sometimes neglects to consider contemporary 
practices to a fault, the legal literature can remain mired in assessing what the law 
currently dictates rather than considering what could or should be. With the exception of 
a few legal scholars (Jackson 2008, Tribe 1990, Hendricks 2011), legal analysis is 




order to appropriately govern the use of ectogenesis. This is in contrast to a more critical 
approach to law, which might, for instance, find that existing legal frameworks are 
insufficient.  
 
FEMINIST APPROACHES TO ECTOGENESIS 
The feminist literature on ectogenesis spans disciplinary boundaries. While there are 
varied methodologies and priorities that characterize feminist approaches to ectogenesis, 
this literature broadly endeavors to centralize the impact(s) of this technology on 
women. Discussions of the feminist literature on the artificial womb tend to use broad 
brushes (Kendal 2015, Singer and Wells 2006, Tong 2006) to surmise that there are two 
distinct camps of feminist writing on the technology, those who argue that it will be 
fundamentally oppressive to women, and those who argue that it will be liberating. 
There is significantly greater nuance within these arguments than is often 
acknowledged. Some feminist scholars do assert that ectogenesis could be emancipatory 
in its potential to redress the unequal distribution of reproductive labor and relieve the 
social impact of pregnancy on women (Kendal 2015, Firestone 1970, Smajdor 2007). 
Equally, some argue that it is an inevitably dangerous cooptation of women’s bodies 
(Corea 1985, Rowland 1987, Brittain 1929). However, a far greater number of feminist 
scholars highlight that ectogenesis could free women from certain kinds of inequality, 
but remain undecided as to whether the technology would actually be liberating or 
would instead reinforce existing social problems and discriminations (Woolfrey 2006, 
Murphy 2006, Oakley 1984, Kamm 1992, Sander-Staudt 2006, Tong 2006, Adams 
1993).  
 There is a strong sense from a number of feminist scholars that what would 
establish whether or not the technology is negative or beneficial for women rests on 
who controls it and who has a voice in its design and application (Oakley 1984, 
Firestone 1970, Murphy 2006, Woolfrey 2006, Sander-Staudt 2006, Squier 1994). For 
these scholars, the most dangerous aspect of ectogenesis is not the technology in and of 
itself but the fact that in existing society, women may have little say or involvement in 
the development of the technology, resulting in it being used in ways that reinforce 
gender, race, and class disparities.  
 Several feminist scholars who write about the technology perform the same 
problematic flattening of differences between women that is evident in the broader 




Some authors acknowledge that ectogenesis might have different outcomes for women 
based on their class, race, abilities, age, and sexualities (Rowland 1987, Murphy 2006, 
Adams 1993, Woolfrey 2006, Sander-Staudt 2006, Aristarkhova 2012, Limon 2016), 
but these considerations are only rarely made imperative in assessing the technology 
(Limon 2016, Sander-Staudt 2006). With very few exceptions (Takala 2009, Lewis 
2019), the feminist literature on artificial wombs takes a binary, essentializing approach 
to gender and womanhood.  
  In this thesis, I characterize my approach to thinking about the artificial womb 
as critical legal and relational feminist scholarship. I am less interested in the broad 
questions about whether ectogenesis is a social good posed by bioethicists, and more 
interested in questions about how existing law might be adapted in response to this 
technology. I am also deeply interested in what artificial wombs could mean for 
gendered bodies. Breaking somewhat from the tradition of legal scholarship on this 
subject thus far, however, I am committed to a critical approach to law, that asks not 
only what the law as written demands, but ponders the social contexts and constructs 
that have shaped those demands, and remains open to how they might change. Breaking 
from the feminist tradition on this subject, I am also committed to a non-essentializing 
approach to gender, to considering the multiplicities of sex and gender, and to 
recognizing the differences between women across race, class, ability, and sexual 
identity, among other characteristics. I will expand on how these approaches shape both 
the subject and the methodology of my thesis in chapter two. But I will first turn to an 
overview of the key debates over artificial wombs that commonly arise across 
disciplinary bounds in order to trace how I arrived at formulating my own argument.  
 
1.3 KEY DEBATES IN THE LITERATURE  
 
ETHICS OF ECTOGENETIC EXPERIMENTATION  
Given that it is presumed that ectogenesis will emerge from the meeting of research on 
in vitro fertilisation and on incubation, it should be unsurprising that many of the ethical 
concerns raised around ectogenesis echo or extend earlier arguments about IVF and 
incubator research. One such example are the debates over whether and under what 
conditions the experimentation on pregnant people, embryos, and fetuses that will 




 Legal scholars Alghrani and Brazier, considering these issues from a legal 
perspective, note that in the past, experimental work done toward saving premature 
babies did not help the babies initially experimented on. Had this work not been done, 
however, “babies born at what is now seen as a pretty safe time, 28-30 weeks, might not 
survive today” (2011, 9). The authors suggest that since the initial danger to fetuses 
would be high, “doctors and ethics committees [may] prefer to embark on research 
using fetuses when a decision has been taken to abort” (10). Bioethicists Raskin and 
Mazor (2006), Kaczor (2005), and Reiber (2010) also argue that careful consideration 
will need to be given to where embryos and fetuses for experimentation in ectogenesis 
will come from. Kaczor and Reiber, writing from a Catholic perspective, raise concerns 
over the “human dignity of the embryo” (2010 518) in ectogenesis, but both conclude 
that since artificial wombs could ultimately used to gestate embryos that might 
otherwise be destroyed, this research could be morally justified.  
 Adinolfi, a scientist who takes a bioethical approach to ectogenesis, exemplifies 
points also raised by several other bioethical scholars (Rosen 2003, Coleman 2004, 
Gefland 2006) when he considers that “the absence of [. . . ] biological maternal 
‘contact’ could severely affect the mental and physical development of the fetus” (571). 
While not dismissing the possibility that ectogenic research could still be justified, he 
worries that there may be certain aspects of ectogenetic gestation that will not be 
immediately obvious but could result in negative outcomes for babies born through 
these means.  
Bioethicists Simonstein and Mashiach-Eizenberg’s 2006 study, is one of very 
few that have focused on public responses to whether research on ectogenesis might be 
justified. Interviewing 216 adults in Israel, they found that just 10.2 % of respondents 
thought that an artificial womb should be developed, compared with 76.8 % who 
disagreed (90). In general, their respondents were more receptive to ectogenesis being 
developed to address issues such as allowing gestation for women without wombs, and 
more likely to have a negative response to its development simply as an additional 
reproductive option or as a way to avoid the unequal burden of reproduction on women 
(90).  
 Singer and Wells triggered debate over whether ectogenetic research was an 
acceptable use of research funds by writing in the 1980s, “We, as a society, do not 
appear to have the same compelling interest in saving a child from sexual abuse or 




(131). This question of whether “there are more severe problems perhaps more 
deserving of our time and attention” (ibid) is roundly debated by scholars to follow. 
Some (Kendal 2015, Smajdor 2008/2012) explicitly argue that funding for an artificial 
womb is pressing due to the risks inherent in pregnancy and childbirth. For these 
scholars, investing resources to this project would be justified if it meant that “women 
[were] no longer unjustly obliged to be the sole risk takers in reproductive enterprises” 
(Smajdor, 337).  Others follow Singer and Wells’s suggestion that it might be unjust or 
ill-advised for such technology to receive priority, when resources might be better spent 
on existing infants in particular (Murphy 2012, Raskin and Mazor 2006, James 1987). 
Notably, these contentions are a continuation of a longstanding debate in literature on in 
vitro fertilization. As Charis Thompson writes, the question of whether “basic child and 
maternal health services for poor or minority women and children should be a greater 
funding priority than techniques of assisted reproduction” (2005, 62) was heartily 
debated with the introduction of IVF, particularly within feminist scholarship in the 
1980s. Ectogenesis no less then than now, is frequently considered as the logical 
extreme of investments in assisted reproductive technologies.   
 
ARTIFICIAL WOMBS TO REDRESS INFERTILITY? 
One of the primary justifications that has been proposed for funding ectogenesis is as a 
treatment for infertility (Singer and Wells 2006, Takala 2009, Smajdor 2007, Kendal 
2015).  Rather than putting women through often physically demanding and costly 
fertility treatments, a number of scholars suggest that ectogenesis could become a 
means of removing this struggle to reproduce from the body. Some bioethical scholars, 
including James (1987), have contested this suggestion, arguing that such extreme 
measures to support the desire to have a genetic child are unethical. James holds that 
“the prudent course of action right now would be to promote the adoption of living 
minority children, children with special needs, and children from overpopulated and 
poverty-stricken areas of the world (95). Here, again, are continuations of arguments 
made against research into in vitro fertilization.   
 Philosopher Julien S. Murphy (1989, republished 2006) offers a feminist take on 
James’s argument against ectogenesis. While sharing his concerns about privileging 
biological parenthood, she asserts “it is unfair for a feminist who has chosen pregnancy 
or who merely admits to valuing pregnancy, to find an infertile woman’s desire to 




to infertility, she argues, would mean insisting on feminist involvement in steering the 
priorities of research on technologies for treating infertility, including ectogenesis. 
Kendal (2015) too holds that “promoting ectogenesis research could serve to enhance 
equality between fertile and infertile women in striving to achieve the same goal of 
biological motherhood” (52).  
 By contrast, philosopher Woolfrey cautions that “ectogenesis, as a future 
segment of the reproductive technologies industry, is bound to increase the desperation 
of infertile women, encourage the views that [. . .] women are deficient unless they are 
mothers” (2006, 134). Tong (2006), while acknowledging these concerns, argues that 
society has come to recognize infertility as a significant concern for those who face it, 
and that it is unlikely that we could be justified in blocking the development of a 
technology that might ease this suffering.  
 
ECTOGENESIS TO REPLACE SURROGACY  
In 1984, Singer and Wells argued that “the medical case for ectogenesis [. . . ] would 
consist of the medical case for surrogate motherhood coupled with the claim that 
ectogenesis should be chosen in preference to surrogacy” (11). They argue that since it 
is already accepted (if discouraged) in many societies that a surrogate may be engaged 
where a person is unable to carry a pregnancy in their own body, research into 
ectogenesis could be justified as a means of avoiding the significant moral and legal 
issues presented by the practice of surrogacy.1 Several scholars remain wary of the use 
of ectogenesis to this end (James 1987, Corea 1985, Hendricks 2011). Legal scholar 
Abecassis (2016) makes no moral judgement as to whether ectogenesis in lieu of 
surrogacy would be advisable, but considers whether from a legal perspective, this 
model of surrogacy would be more effective. While the fact of the gestator in this case 
being a machine rather than a human would mean that there may be less cause for 
dispute between parents, she notes that legal and medical institutions might still 
intervene in ways that undermined the parental claims of the commissioning parents.  
 In the feminist literature, a number of scholars are wary of the idea that 
ectogenesis could be used in place of human surrogacy. Hendricks, a feminist legal 
                                                          
1 For a thorough engagement with some of the ethical and legal questions surrounding surrogacy, as well 
as its justifications, see Smietana, Marcin, and Charis Thompson, eds. Symposium: Making Families-
Transnational Surrogacy, Queer Kinship, and Reproductive Justice. Special Issue, Reproductive 




scholar, emphasizes that this is “consistent with trends in the surrogacy industry towards 
increasingly explicit commodification of pregnancy and control of gestational mothers” 
(2011, 438). She notes that investing in ectogenesis as “better surrogacy,” does the work 
of emphasizing gestation as “an essentially fungible service, rather than a form of 
parenthood” (438). Rowland (1987) and Corea (1985) for their part seem to assume that 
mothers whose birth children are adopted and women who engage in surrogacy are 
unilaterally tormented by these acts, and that primary parenting rights should be firmly 
engrained in an essentialised, gestating female body. More recently, human geographer 
Sophie Lewis (2019) has intervened to propose following Firestone (1970), that under 
the right social circumstances, ectogenesis as surrogacy could offer an emancipatory 
opportunity for communizing care labor, an idea I will discuss further with reference to 
Firestone in the next section.  
 
ARTIFICIAL WOMBS AS SAFER FOR FETUSES  
While Corea’s insistence that the end goal of research on ectogenesis is to eliminate 
women can be described as extreme at best, it is true that a long lineage of 
predominantly male bioethical scholars have extolled the artificial womb as potentially 
“safer” than a human uterus (Singer and Wells 2006, Gefland 2006, Pence 2006, 
Coleman 2004, Adinolfi 2004, Welin 2004, Kaczor 2006).  
 Pence writes “by raising the fetus in a uniform, stable, drug-free and controllable 
environment, the fetus is spared from risks associated with the mother using drugs 
(2006, 82). Gefland, too, argues that “ectogenesis would in all likelihood protect the 
fetus from second-hand smoke, alcohol, and an unhealthy diet” (102). Unlike Pence and 
others who make these claims (Lupton 1997, Singer and Wells 2006, Coleman 2004, 
Kendal 2015) however, Gefland does briefly acknowledge the dangers of this discourse 
leading to enforced use of artificial wombs under the banner of reducing risk to fetuses. 
Feminist legal scholar Jackson also acknowledges that “an artificial uterine environment 
would not be at risk of contracting rubella, it would not smoke, drink, or take drugs, and 
it would not be at risk of assault” (2008, 360). But like Gefland, she cautions that 
“advocating ectogenesis on the ground that it would be safer for fetuses would be likely 
to have negative consequences for women, since it carries with it the implication that 
the maternal body is a source of danger for the developing fetus [and] implies that 
women are not to be trusted with the serious job of gestating future generations” (361). 




1984) also express concerns that framing artificial wombs as safer for fetuses than 
human pregnancy “resonate(s) with a prevailing cultural view of pregnant women as 
threats to their fetuses” (Hendricks 2011, 411).  
ARTIFICIAL WOMBS AS BETTER FOR PREGNANT WOMEN 
A mirror-image to the argument that ectogenesis could be safer for human fetuses is the 
claim (most often arising in the feminist literature) that it could be safer for women. 
This particular argument is frequently traced back to Shulamith Firestone. Often 
misconstrued as a reproductive technology enthusiast (Singer and Wells 2006, Coleman 
2004, Kendal 2015), technology is in fact just one point of discussion in Firestone’s 
revolutionary manifesto, The Dialectic of Sex. More broadly, Firestone’s work is an 
attack on oppressive institutions and an assertion that a socialist revolution and the 
destruction of capitalism is necessary for women to achieve equality. After a revolution, 
however, Firestone imagines that ectogenesis might be mobilized in service of “the 
freeing of women from the tyranny of their reproductive biology by every means 
available, and the diffusion of childbearing and childrearing role to the society as a 
whole, men as well as women” (1970, 206).  
 For Firestone, “pregnancy is barbaric” (1970, 198) constituting “the temporary 
deformation of the body of the individual for the sake of the species” (198). This 
particular line of thought speaks also to Firestone’s class and race position in America. 
As several scholars have thoroughly documented (Roberts 1999, Ross 2017) the claim 
that women in general throughout history have been pressured to reproduce fails to take 
account of the impact of differences in race, class, ability, and sexuality. As Ross notes, 
in the very era in which Firestone wrote that American society is pronatalist to the 
degree that it is “dangerous” for women to choose not to have children, measures were 
being taken to try to prevent disabled women and women of color in particular from 
reproducing. While the pressure to reproduce and pressure to not reproduce are 
connected oppressive practices, they speak to different experiences, and I will argue that 
these nuances are vital to thinking through the implications of ectogenesis.  
Murphy, along with a number of other feminist scholars writing on ectogenesis, 
hypothesizes that while artificial wombs could relieve the physical and social impact of 
pregnancy on women, it may ultimately be significant social restructuring and not 
technological innovation that solve this problem (Oakley 1984, Kamm 1992, Sander-




wombs are in themselves a step toward producing a better world for women. Smajdor 
holds that “the fact that men do not have to go through pregnancy to have a genetically 
related child, whereas women do, is a natural inequality” (2012, 90).  
Aristarkhova (2012), alongside Hendricks (2011) also argues that a feminist 
approach to ectogenesis must certainly consider the different ways that women might be 
impacted by the technology, but writes, “it is important, however, not to oversimplify 
the diversity and heterogeneity of situations into a simple binary between ‘unnecessary 
waste of money on ectogenesis by rich, white, and privileged’ families and ‘poor 
minorities and countries with no basic health care and so no need for ectogenesis’” 
(113). Ultimately, as other feminist authors preceding her have affirmed, she finds that 
what is important is ensuring that women are involved in the development of the 
artificial womb and in discussions about its uses. On this point I am in agreement with 
the lineage of feminist literature on ectogenesis. In this thesis, I try to hold on to the 
tensions that emerge in these debates, arguing always that we must understand existing 
inequities and the differences they may produce in relation to reproductive technologies 
broadly and artificial wombs in particular.  
 
ARTIFICIAL WOMBS TO “SOLVE” ABORTION 
When I set out to review the literature on ectogenesis, I did not anticipate that so much 
of it would focus on exploring the claim that artificial wombs would mean the end of 
abortion. Nor did I expect that I would come to formulate my own thesis as a response 
to these claims. In chapter two, I will unpack how I arrived at this decision, and 
establish where my work fits within this discourse. But for the moment, I want to give a 
brief overview of the history of writing on ectogenesis and abortion. In an earlier part of 
this chapter, I noted that the biobag was significant primarily in its potential to improve 
rates of survival and healthy growth in babies born at the cusp of “fetal viability.” In 
medicine, viability is the point at which, weighing factors including gestational age and 
weight, medical professionals would judge a fetus to have a chance of survival. 
Currently, this point sits at around 22-24 weeks gestation (Partridge et al 2017). 
Viability, however, has also been translated into law in some jurisdictions where 
abortion is legal as the point at which the procedure can be heavily restricted or banned 
entirely. As I will discuss further throughout this thesis, the possibility that ectogenesis 
could continually lower and perhaps eventually negate this point of viability has been 




 The idea that ectogenesis will “solve” the political impasse of the abortion 
debate is most often associated with bioethicists Singer and Wells, who write in a 1984 
essay (republished in 2006) that 
If we could keep a fetus alive outside the body, abortions could be done using 
techniques that would not harm the fetuses, and the fetuses, or newborn babies 
as they would then be, could be adopted—if there were enough willing couples 
(2006, 12).  
 
They state that most people who support abortion access defend it on the grounds that 
forcing a woman to go through an unwanted pregnancy is a violation of her bodily 
autonomy. This position, they argue,  defends a right to end a pregnancy, not a right to 
kill the fetus, and “if [a woman’s] desire to be rid of the fetus can be fully satisfied 
without threatening the life of the fetus” (12), artificial wombs should be an appealing 
alternative to both anti-abortion and pro-choice advocates. This claim has provoked 
some of the most heated engagement with the artificial womb across the bioethical, 
feminist, and legal literature.  
 There is an overwhelming sense from most legal scholars that the artificial 
womb will inevitably force a reconsideration of existing abortion law (Abel 1974, 
Favole 1979, Goldstein 1978, Tribe 1990, Lupton 1997, Son 2005, Bard 2006, Randall 
and Randall 2008, Alghrani 2007/2008, Brassington 2009, Schultz 2010, Stieger 2010, 
Cohen 2017). A number of authors arrive at the conclusion that ectogenesis will render 
abortion illegal (Abel 1974, Favole 1979, Goldstein 1978, Cohen 2017, Blahuta 2017, 
Abecassis 2016, Randall and Randall 2008, Blackshaw and Rodger 2018, Mathison and 
Davis 2017, Colgrove 2019). Other authors in favor of protecting abortion rights argue 
that abortion regulations must be revised in order to ensure that the procedure is 
protected against the potential threat posed by ectogenesis (see Lupton 1997, Son 2005, 
Alghrani 2007/2008, Abecassis 2016, Jackson 2008, Bard 2006, Son 2005, Schultz 
2010, Steiger 2010, Blahuta 2017).  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the feminist literature on ectogenesis has roundly 
condemned the idea that the technology could be a suitable alternative to abortion or 
that this is a useful point to focus on when assessing the merits of ectogenetic research 
(Langford 2017, Overall 2015, Cannold 1995, Hendricks 2011, Jackson 2008, 
Abecassis 2016). In chapter two, I will unpack these arguments further as I establish the 






My intention in this chapter has been to show that ectogenesis has a long history as a 
scientific object, and that this history has always been closely followed by engagement 
in the media and in the social science literature that proclaims the arrival of the artificial 
womb. As Franklin (2013) reminds us, the story of ectogenesis is a story of the interplay 
of fantasy and scientific practice, sometimes intertwining and sometimes dramatically 
veering apart. To that end, there are many threads of the stories told about artificial 
wombs that I might have chosen to unpick. But it was the clash between the intentions 
of neonatal researchers (to create a life support system for anticipated and desired 
prematurely born babies), the uses imagined by bioethicists (an artificial womb to 
replace abortion), and the political moment in which we find ourselves (a wave of 
populism, a fight for reproductive freedom) that riveted me. In chapter two, I will 
explain where my work sits in the literature on ectogenesis and abortion, and how I 
hope to interrogate the legal fantasies that have been woven about artificial wombs and 






















2. A COMPARATIVE, RELATIONAL FEMINIST ASSESSMENT OF HOW 
ECTOGENESIS WILL IMPACT ABORTION REGULATION 
In the chapters to come, I make two contributions to the literature on ectogenesis and 
abortion. Firstly, I conduct a comparative analysis of the potential challenges 
ectogenesis poses for abortion law in the United States, Canada, and United Kingdom 
where the Abortion Act 1967 is in effect. Secondly, I engage a feminist ethics of care to 
normatively assess the legal frameworks scholars have proposed to address these 
challenges. Given that the potential impact of ectogenesis on abortion rights is well-
trodden terrain, a reader may ask why I have chosen this subject. The impact of artificial 
womb technology on laws governing both surrogacy and parenthood, for instance, are 
each fascinating areas about which there is much more to be written. The ethical and 
legal questions raised by incremental steps in research on partially ectogenic technology 
(see Romanis 2018) also pose a host of questions ripe for consideration. These are all 
subjects that interest me, and that I will touch on as I explore the overlapping territory 
of questions the technology raises with regard to abortion.  
 Placing abortion and ectogenesis at the core of my analysis allows me to 
synthesize numerous questions about this technology in relation to broader aspects of 
reproductive life. In this I am informed by a reproductive justice approach (Lewis 2018, 
Ross and Solinger 2017, West 2017, Mamo 2018). Reproductive justice as an activist 
movement began in response to the focus of mainstream reproductive rights 
campaigning on abortion in isolation from other issues in reproductive health and life. 
Focusing only on a right to end a pregnancy was a strategic practice for reproductive 
rights organizers. Yet as one of the founders of reproductive justice, Loretta Ross has 
emphasized, campaigns that understand abortion rights in conjunction with “the right to 
have a child; [. . .] the right to parent the children we have, [. . .] to control our birthing 
options [. . .]” and “the necessary enabling conditions to realize these rights” (2007, 4), 
may serve to secure more robust resources for reproductive health. In practice, applying 
a reproductive justice perspective to abortion law in particular means taking this holistic 
view of reproductive experiences into account, not simply focusing on a limited right to 
end a pregnancy.  
The siloing of reproductive experiences to the detriment of tracing the ways in 
which these experiences are importantly interlinked is also evident in the literature on 
ectogenesis. Abortion is implicated but not directly discussed in some arguments that 




articulate the possible ways in which artificial wombs could allow the work of gestation 
to be shared (Firestone 1970, Bennett 2008, Smajdor 2012) and how the technology 
might allow women to elect to end a pregnancy for health, social, or other reasons 
(Murphy 1989, Kendal 2015). Where these scholars explore these ideas, they frequently 
do so without attending to what I regard as the pressing question of where abortion sits 
in relation to these claims. While the possibility that the work of gestation could be 
shared through use of an artificial womb has emancipatory potential, it also raises 
questions about who, in this process of shared gestation, has a right to terminate the 
ectogenic pregnancy. Access to both abortion and to reproductive care more generally 
remains significantly unequal both across and within jurisdictions, and across race, 
class, ability, and sexual identity-based lines. I am concerned then, with who would be 
granted elective use of the technology, and how this might impact the abortion rights of 
others. Would elective use of ectogenesis in these circumstances be considered an 
abortion, since it would involve terminating a pregnancy even without the death of the 
fetus? If some women were able to choose to electively use the technology as an 
alternative to pregnancy due to health concerns, could other women with high risk 
pregnancies be coerced into using it too? In this thesis then, I not only consider issues 
immediately related to how the letter of existing abortion law could be impacted by this 
technology (chapters three and four). I also place this question in a broader context, 
looking too at the impact on existing inequalities in access to reproductive care as well 
as the possible impact on sharing or degendering gestation (chapters five and six). By 
placing consideration of abortion and ectogenesis within this broader spectrum of 
reproductive health concerns, I take the emancipatory potential of this technology 
seriously, but only in conjunction with sufficient consideration to the vital question of 
protecting against forced pregnancy. To put this another way, I wish to trace the 
possibilities for reproductive freedom that the artificial womb may hold, but I argue that 
we can only find these possibilities by beginning our analysis with recognition of the 
contemporary realities of social (in)justice.  
This brings me to the second impetus for turning my core focus to ectogenesis 
and abortion, which is a sense of political imperative. Abortion access remains 
contentious and inconsistent across a number of jurisdictions. While thousands 
celebrated in 2018 as the Republic of Ireland voted to repeal the criminalization of 
abortion, the same fight in Argentina was met with a refusal to lift severe restrictions to 




technology prompted a new flurry of interest in artificial wombs, I found myself 
attending several conferences and reading papers in which bioethicists argued that 
artificial wombs could “solve” abortion (Blackshaw and Rodger 2018, Mathison and 
Davis 2017, Colgrove 2019, Kaczor 2018). This recurring thought experiment, which 
decentralizes women’s health to frame abortion rights as a moral “problem” to be 
solved rather than as an essential medical service, ultimately solidified my focus on 
abortion and confirmed my feeling that a feminist intervention was essential.  
When I returned to the literature to formulate my response, I identified what I 
found to be two significant gaps in analysis in the work produced so far on ectogenesis 
and abortion. Firstly, in spite of political, religious and legal particularities of American 
approaches to abortion, I encountered an echo-chamber in the literature in which the 
United States was frequently presented as a primary case study for thinking about how 
artificial wombs could challenge abortion rights. Secondly, I found a significant lack of 
attention to the necessity of care for the emotional, physical, and social health of the 
pregnant person, and to the relationships constituted by and through ectogenesis, 
abortion, and human gestation. Taken together, each of these observations reflected a 
need for a more grounded, contextualized consideration of the impact of this 
technology. In this chapter, I give a thorough explanation as to why I find the focus on 
the American context and the lack of consideration of relationships of care to be 
problematic, and how I propose to make a contribution that begins to remedy each of 
these issues.  
 
2.2 THE NEED FOR A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBLE 
CHALLENGES ECTOGENESIS MAY POSE FOR ABORTION LAW 
Much of the scholarship on abortion and ectogenesis is written from an American 
perspective. This large body of literature includes both works in which authors directly 
discuss how American abortion jurisprudence might be impacted by ectogenesis (Abel 
1974, Favole 1979, Goldstein 1978, Tribe 1990, Son 2005, Sander-Staudt 2006, Randall 
and Randall 2008, Steiger 2010, Schultz 2010, Hendricks 2011, Cohen 2017), and 
articles in which American scholars speculate on the impact of ectogenesis on 
philosophical arguments about abortion broadly speaking (Sander-Staudt 2006, 
Woolfrey 2006, Gefland 2006, Bard 2006, Kaczor 2005, Reiber 2008, Blackshaw and 
Rodger 2018, Mathison and Davis 2017, Colgrove 2019). Something of an echo 




present for abortion law are frequently drawn from American jurisprudence, and 
represented as universally applicable (Favole 1979, Goldstein 1978, Tribe 1990, Kaczor 
2005, Reiber 2008, Sander-Staudt 2006, Schultz 2010, Hendricks 2011). Bearing in 
mind the significant ways in which the American abortion context differs from Canada 
and the United Kingdom, I find it crucial to consider whether the claim that artificial 
wombs “foretell [. . .] serious challenges to the law of abortion” (Bard 2006 149), which 
recurs in much of the literature, in fact holds true across each of these jurisdictions.  
The dominance of writing from an American perspective is also evident in the 
feminist literature on ectogenesis (Firestone 1970, Corea 1985, Murphy 1989, Squier 
1994, Kamm 1992, Adams 1993, Woolfrey 2006, Sander-Staudt 2006, Tong 2006). As 
in the broader discourse, the dangers and possibilities of artificial wombs that are 
explored by feminist scholars writing from an American context are often presented as 
universal, while in fact being shaped by political realities rooted in the United States. 
When Corea, Squier, Kamm, and Adams expressed significant concerns about 
patriarchal control of womens’ bodies being inherent in this technology, they wrote 
(without acknowledging their positionality) from the context of a privatized American 
healthcare system. When Woolfrey pondered in 2006 how “society [would need to] 
change in order for technological advances of this kind to have the effect [. . . ]—of 
freeing women from being undervalued and of being constricted because of gender by 
various interrelated barriers in our society?” (2006, 134), “society” and its existing 
“interrelated barriers” (134), though again generalized, referred specifically to an 
American context. To reframe her question, we might instead ask “in what kinds of 
existing societies [if any] might technologies of this kind have the effect of ‘freeing 
women from being undervalued’”?  
Of the common law jurisdictions in which abortion is legally permitted, the 
United States retains some of the most stringent restrictions to access2 on a state-by-
state basis. A vocal and well-funded anti-abortion lobby remains visible in mainstream 
politics, with many political leaders and public figures including the most recent 
Supreme Court appointee, Brett Kavanaugh, openly advocating for further restrictions 
                                                          
2 I discuss many of these restrictions throughout this work. For an in-depth analysis of issues around 
access to reproductive care in the United States, see: Ross, Loretta, and Rickie Solinger. 2017. 





to abortion access (Reilly 2019). More recently, at the 2019 State of the Union address, 
President Trump spoke in favor of implementing federal law against late term abortions 
(Matthews 2019). As of 2018, numerous states have begun the process of passing 
legislation which would criminalize abortion after the first trimester of pregnancy 
(North 2019). Finally, the United States’s privatized healthcare system and longstanding 
ban on the use of federal funds for abortion means financial obstacles to securing the 
procedure are particularly pronounced. Discourses around abortion from an American 
context are shaped by each of these factors. The preeminence of work on ectogenesis 
and abortion derived out of the particular context of the United States limits the possible 
breadth of discussion and debate on this topic, and fails to reveal the ways in which 
abortion law and attitudes toward the procedure, the woman’s body, and toward fetuses, 
act as fictive cultural constructs rather than universal realities. 
Yet, while consideration of ectogenesis and abortion is dominated by American 
scholarship, it is not exclusively American scholars that have produced important 
analysis on this subject. Scholarship on ectogenesis more broadly spans multiple 
countries, including the United Kingdom and Canada. Alghrani has written extensively 
in explicit consideration of what the technology may mean for UK legislators (2007, 
2008, 2011 with Margaret Brazier, 2018). Alghrani and Brazier themselves note a 
relative dearth of scholarship on ectogenesis and UK law, which I hope to help address. 
Alghrani’s thorough research provides me with an incisive place to begin analyzing the 
possible impact of ectogenesis on abortion in the UK context against its possible impact 
in American and Canadian contexts. In a 2008 article, Jackson also gave a balanced 
feminist assessment of some of the key issues that could arise around ectogenesis in 
abortion law generally and in the UK specifically, and indicated particular areas 
requiring further engagement which I take up throughout this thesis. 
While generating arguments rich for discussion and debate, some of the 
additional scholarship on ectogenesis and abortion written from within a UK context 
(Brassington 2009, Bennett 2008) also demonstrates the importance of accounting for 
context when considering the impact of this technology on reproductive rights and 
access. Bioethicist Brassington writes about the possibility that ectogenesis could 
produce greater equality in parenting in the United Kingdom by granting male and 
female progenitors equal say over the ectogenic fetus. Yet in order to support his claim, 
Brassington uses the example of an attempt to pass a law in Ohio which would force 




the caveat that at present, laws such as the Ohio statute are problematic invasions on 
women’s bodily autonomy. Yet he ultimately insists that if the requirement for abortion 
approval from the male progenitor were applied to ectogenesis, it would “simply reflect 
the view that an abortion without authorisation would be impermissible, for the same 
reason that it would be impermissible for one of the partners in a business to close it 
without the authorisation of the other” (2009, 199).  
Claims such as this demonstrate the limitations of an approach to considering 
ectogenesis and abortion that does not take account of legal, political, and cultural 
context. Brassington’s suggestion that ectogenesis could allow for equality in decisions 
made with regard to the fetus requires thorough consideration (which I will give it in 
chapter five). But contemporary American laws designed with the intent of limiting 
women’s autonomy by permitting a male progenitor to veto abortion pose a limited, 
unimaginative parallel. They are a problematically decontextualized place to look for a 
blueprint for a future framework in which ectogenesis allows male progenitors to take 
greater responsibility in reproductive decisions. In her article on ectogenesis and 
reproductive choice, bioethicist Bennett makes a similar argument for equality between 
progenitors by using the example of contemporary American cases of brain death in 
pregnancy. Bennett argues that as in ectogenesis, a brain dead woman’s bodily 
autonomy is not at issue, and a male progenitor should be granted decision-making 
powers. Giving reference to American case law, Bennett offers that “there seems to be 
good reason in the case of braindead pregnancy to question the supremacy of women’s 
interests and choices in this particular situation” (2008 7).  Reflecting the pattern 
inherent in much of the American scholarship on ectogenesis, Bennett represents her 
conclusion as universally generalizable. But concluding that greater reproductive 
decision-making might be provided to male progenitors holds a different valence in a 
UK context in which strong precedent currently protects pregnant people from 
unwanted medical procedures, even after death. In an American context, “pregnancy 
exclusion” statutes implemented by openly anti-abortion legislators exist across a 
number of states and invalidate any advanced directives where a woman is pregnant, in 
many cases even where the fetus has no chance of survival (Greene and Wolfe 2012). 
The crux of the argument that Bennett makes, that reproductive decision-making in 
ectogenesis need not be gendered, is worth exploring for the potential it opens for 
women to share or transfer reproductive labour. This is again a possibility that I will 




protecting womens’ bodily autonomy between the United States and United Kingdom 
that Bennett’s argument falls short. In drawing on American cases involving brain dead 
pregnant women to make her claims, she fails to identify the explicit anti-abortion 
ideology which has driven these disputes. These cases have been vociferously opposed 
by pro-choice American campaigners for the possible precedent they produce to 
dismantle existing abortion rights. Bennett’s use of these cases as an example of how 
ectogenesis could support parental equality in reproductive decisions undercuts her 
potentially emancipatory vision by neglecting the importance of context. Both 
Brassington and Bennett bypass the ways that the examples they borrow from the 
United States strip women of agency. In so doing, they render women as objects akin to 
the artificial womb, rather than positioning them (like male progenitors in the scenarios 
posed here) as agents in relation to the technology.  
There is little literature which explicitly takes up ectogenesis and Canadian 
abortion jurisprudence. Overall, who has written two articles on ectogenesis and 
abortion (1987 and 2015) writes as a Canadian scholar and draws on Canadian 
definitions of the beginning of human life to support her work, but focuses on 
philosophical arguments about abortion broadly, as opposed to discussion specific to 
abortion in Canadian law. Blahuta (2017) does write of ectogenesis in Canadian law, 
and while he gives an in-depth discussion of possible issues around maternal liability in 
tort, he only briefly mentions abortion to make the claim that current justifications for 
abortion would be moot, and to suggest that “if the artificial womb became a 
commonplace medical option, abortion would arguably become murder” (2017, np). 
While in some jurisdictions this claim may hold true, it is a curious point to make in the 
context of Canada, in which there is extremely strong precedent against treating the 
fetus as a legal person (Kaposy and Downie 2008), and in which I will argue that 
contemporary justifications for abortion may well still hold with the introduction of 
ectogenesis. 
 Abecassis’s article on ectogenesis and laws regulating reproductive 
technologies is unique as the only applied comparative legal analysis of the impact of 
ectogenesis that I have encountered. Abecassis’s work is refreshing for her 
acknowledgement of the ideologies that shape American legal responses to ectogenic 
technology. Comparing the United States and France, Abecassis sets out to trace the 
differences in how the technology might be received in a jurisdiction in which 




unregulated (the United States). Her comparison of “the status of the ectogenetic 
embryo, the concept of parenthood, and access to ectogenetic technology” (2016 5) 
between these jurisdictions reveals interesting contrasts. Yet in spite of differences in 
legal regulation, these two jurisdictions, as Abecassis notes, are broadly similar in that 
each is shaped by particularly conservative attitudes toward reproduction. As a result, 
while comparison works here to draw out contrasting challenges posed under a heavily 
regulated framework versus a loosely regulated one, it does not work to illustrate the 
ways in which the possibilities opened or foreclosed by ectogenesis are shaped by 
culturally ingrained social fictions. It is this second outcome of comparison that I am 
most interested in here.  
As Bradley argues, one particular use of comparison can be to explore why 
nations, “not least those with common legal traditions—vary in their response to social 
change” (2003 145). I am interested in engaging comparison to reveal the socio-cultural 
constructs that produce abortion as a legal concern in Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, and to identify the disparate tools used to create abortion law in these 
jurisdictions. In so doing, I hope to unpack how variations in the strategies applied to 
address abortion as a legal concern subsequently produce significant differences in the 
impact that artificial wombs may have on abortion regulation. My intent in conducting a 
thorough comparative analysis is ultimately to establish that contextual specificity is 
essential to identifying gaps in the existing law in anticipation of this technology.  
 
Why the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom? 
While comparative literature often draws together analyses of civil and common law 
systems, I have chosen three common law jurisdictions that share broad commonalities3. 
As Creutzfeldt, Kubal, and Pirie note, a necessary precondition of a comparative 
analysis “is the assumption of sufficient similarity in order to make the identification of 
difference meaningful” (2006, 379). The United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom are each majority English-speaking jurisdictions (though importantly, French 
is legislated in Canada as a dual official language). Abortion jurisprudence in each of 
these nations is rooted in the criminalization of procuring a miscarriage in English 
common law, and in each nation, campaigns for the legalization of abortion began in 
                                                          
3 The province of Quebec is governed by civil law. Where this impacts my discussion of abortion and 
ectogenesis in Canada, I will note this. However, abortion law in Quebec, as in all Canadian provinces, is 




earnest in the 1960s (see Sheldon 1997, Kaposy and Downie 2008, and West 2009). The 
United States, Canada, and The United Kingdom are broadly similar in that in each 
jurisdiction at the highest level, law permits abortion prior to viability, medical 
professionals (physicians in particular) are assigned as appropriate gatekeepers to 
determining access, and abortions must occur in approved premises. In each 
jurisdiction, the law makes clear that the state has an interest in the life of the fetus, 
though when this becomes legally relevant and the degree to which it impacts the rights 
of the pregnant person varies. In each of these nations, however, different religious, 
social, cultural, and legal factors led to disparate regulation of abortion. In the United 
States and Canada, abortion rights are protected at a federal level through case law 
precedent, where in the United Kingdom, these rights are protected through legislation. 
I will provide background on the contemporary laws and regulations of abortion in each 
of these jurisdictions in significant detail at the beginning of chapter three. Here, 
however, I want to briefly discuss my interest in these particular jurisdictions for 
comparison, given that in spite of their prescient similarities, it would have been equally 
possible for me elect to consider other nations.  
As a monolingual English speaker, I am limited in part by language. However, 
there are other Anglophone common law jurisdictions I could select. A number of key 
texts on ectogenesis are written from the context of Australia. These include Peter 
Singer and Deane Wells’ 1988 writing on the ethics of artificial wombs, Leslie 
Cannold’s interview-based work on whether women were likely to see ectogenesis as a 
suitable alternative to abortion, and Stephen Coleman and Evie Kendal’s full-length 
monographs on the technology. The comparison of possible challenges constituted to 
abortion law by ectogenesis in Australia and the United States, drawing on these texts as 
well as American work, might be especially generative. 
My choice to consider Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States is 
ultimately motivated by my position in relation to each of these locations. This thesis is 
a feminist engagement with the politics of abortion and artificial wombs, and these are 
the three nations in which both my work as a feminist academic and my personal life are 
entangled. I am a citizen of both the United States and Canada and have lived in each of 
these countries. I have also lived in the United Kingdom. In Canada, where I grew up 
and attended undergraduate studies, I learned about the limited reproductive health 
services in my home province of Nova Scotia through the experiences of myself and my 




accessible reproductive care network I came to understand that these services were not 
consistent across the country. In the United States, I had the privileged experience of 
living in New York City and having access to health insurance. Through my work with 
a legal advocacy organization fighting for reproductive justice for pregnant people in 
the Southern states in particular, I came to understand that many aspects of the 
American judicial and medical system, beyond restrictive abortion laws, made being 
pregnant in many parts of the United States precarious terrain. I visited abortion clinics 
and met clinic escorts and practitioners who confronted abuse and violence in the course 
of their everyday work, I sat in on phone calls with lawyers fighting against the 
criminalization of pregnant women who had used drugs, and I read and tracked 
countless cases across the nation which demonstrated efforts to use the law to enforce 
fetal personhood. In the United Kingdom, I have had limited exposure to reproductive 
health services as patient or activist, but it is here that my academic engagement with 
abortion has been the most grounded, and I have come to understand the context 
through talks, papers, and conferences addressing the Abortion Act 1967 and the repeal 
movement in Northern Ireland. These experiences ultimately foreground my choice to 
focus on Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom.4 
Beyond my personal positionality in relation to these three jurisdictions, and the 
similarities in their legal systems which mean that they have enough in common to 
make comparison significant, the differences between these jurisdictions also make this 
comparison generative. As Drew Halfmann argues in his comparison of abortion 
regulation within these same jurisdictions, the liberalizing of abortion access in Canada, 
Britain, and the United States in the 1960s and 70s also saw divergences in approaches 
to abortion at the level of law, medicine, and politics. A significant difference exists 
between the jurisdictions in the way in which funding for these services was 
established. As Halfmann notes, “In Canada, abortion services were located in public or 
nonprofit hospitals, and paid for by the state; in the United States, the vast majority of 
abortions were provided in single-purpose clinics divorced from mainstream medicine 
where women paid for their own abortions; and in Britain, approximately half of 
abortions were provided in the Canadian style and half in the American style” (2011, 2). 
                                                          
4 It is important that I make note of two key points here. Firstly, as I will address further, while the repeal 
movement in Northern Ireland helped spur the urgency of this project, the changing legal landscape on 
the ground was beyond the scope of what I could cover here. Secondly, as I will note throughout this 
work, there are significant variations in particular in the United States between how abortion is accessed 




This particular distinction, as I will trace further in the chapters to come, has produced 
variation in the accessibility of abortion across these jurisdictions. In the United 
Kingdom under the Abortion Act 1967, abortion remains a criminal offence with 
exceptions, and is subject to precise regulatory requirements. In comparison, abortion in 
Canada is decriminalized. This might lead one to conclude that access to abortion would 
be more difficult to obtain in the UK than Canada, and that medical and political 
attitudes toward the procedure would be more conservative. Yet, in the UK, abortion is 
broadly accessible under the NHS, while in Canada, uneven distribution of providers 
and differing policies at the provincial level mean that access to abortion in practice 
remains uneven across the nation (Johnstone and Macfarlane 2015). As Halfmann 
argues, efforts to roll back abortion rights built momentum across all three jurisdictions 
in the 1960s and 70s, but where in Canada and Britain “Prime Ministers, members of 
parliament (MPs), and political candidates ran away from the abortion issue” (2011, 3), 
the pro-life movement proved tenacious in the United States, with the consequence of 
rollbacks to the availability and quality of abortion services.  
The longstanding and clearly articulated regulatory framework for abortion in 
England, Scotland, and Wales means that while antiabortion sentiment remains in some 
quarters, abortion is broadly treated as a settled political issue (BMA 2017). In Canada, 
a vocal antiabortion lobby retains strong ties to some provincial governments, as in 
Prince Edward Island, where abortion was effectively inaccessible up until the 2010s 
(Johnstone and MacFarlane 2015). In the United States, aboriton remains a key issue in 
political campaigning, with politicians at the highest level of government courting 
support from religious conservatives by working to limit abortion access (see West 
2017).  
 
2.3 THE LIMITATIONS OF A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
In a review of critiques of comparative legal literature, Leckey establishes that there is 
much dispute over how “comparison” actually functions. He notes a general sense of 
frustration reflected in debates between scholars as to which forms of comparison are 
valid and which are not (2017 7). Leckey discusses two of the key limitations 
continuously flagged by critics. Firstly, he notes critical concern that comparison 
sometimes dissolves into a project of hierarchizing different jurisdictions while 
purporting political neutrality. Secondly, he describes anxieties expressed over the 




jurisdiction to another without acknowledging that these concepts may be particular to a 
given context. Below, I briefly address each of these limitations in relation to my own 
work.  
 
Hierarchy and Political Neutrality in Comparison  
Leckey considers that in critiques of comparative literature, “scholars [have . . . ] 
denounced the political or ethical posture of comparative law [pointing] to its lack of 
reflexivity and denied its ostensible objectivity or neutrality” (2017, 8). Gunther 
Frankenberg, whom Leckey notes as a key critic of this aspect of comparative work, 
argues that  comparative legal scholars “operate with and from a particular perspective 
and, therefore, not only describe but constitute whatever they see or read by translating 
and inscribing it into the normative Western matrix” (2014, 223). I appreciate 
Frankenberg’s criticism, and in particular, his point that “legal comparison [. . .] 
qualifies as an expression of cultural experience” (2014, 229) and that critical 
comparative legal scholars must “meet[] what is unknown and strange on its own terms” 
(2014, 231). In response to Frankenberg, Brenda Cossman argues that one way to 
confront the “unstated norm of ‘us/here’ against which others- ‘them/there’ are to be 
measured” (1997, 529), is in applying a feminist politics of positionality. As Cossman 
writes, “a politics of location or positionality insists on the historical, geographic, and 
cultural specificity of political definition and the production of knowledge” (529). I 
have acknowledged my positionality in relation to each of the jurisdictions I analyse in 
this thesis as a way of indicating that I am unlikely to have an entirely unbiased 
perspective. I have chosen these nations precisely because I am politically invested in 
how their abortion regulations may be impacted by artificial wombs. And while I argue 
my choice of jurisdictions is bolstered by their being nations that I “know” and hold 
political stakes  in through lived experience, a valid criticism of this choice would be 
that it fails to consider perhaps the more important and significant differences between 
these nations and developing ones. Cossman writes that “turning the gaze back upon 
itself can help make explicit the seemingly inescapable risk of ethnocentrism in the 
comparative project, while at the same time, deploying the comparison to challenge that 
ethnocentrism” (1997, 537), but as she notes, a pitfall of doing this work is “in turning 
the gaze back upon itself, we (the us/here comparativists located in the West) simply 
end up back where we started-focusing on ourselves” (357). I acknowledge the danger 




assess each. What I wish to highlight throughout this thesis is that there can be no 
“universal” when it comes to considering the impact of the artificial womb: this will 
vary across nations, and within nations across communities. Significant consideration 
should be given to the vast disparities in access to abortion globally, and to how 
technologies such as ectogenesis may interact with these disparities. This is not the 
focus of this particular thesis, but it is a question that should be taken up in future work.  
 
 The Problem of “Transplanting” Legal Concepts In Comparative Work 
The second key criticism that Leckey notes continuously arises in the literature on 
comparative law addresses the tendency toward unreflexive “legal transplant.” In brief, 
“transplant” in this instance refers to the attempt to take a legal construct that appears to 
work well within one context and propose that it should be applied in another context 
that may be fundamentally different, and in which the concept may not be workable. In 
his own consideration of the problems of “transplanting” ideas in comparative legal 
studies, Leckey notes that in fact, this criticism of legal scholarship may be short-
sighted given that in common law the judiciary engages in “transplant” work all the 
time, on variety of subjects, by referencing foreign decisions and ideas. Leckey notes 
that there is significant variation in how legal scholars transplant legal ideas from one 
context to another, and that there are ways of doing so that apply sufficient nuance and 
awareness of the limitations of such a project. 
I agree with Leckey here and would argue that being attentive to the fact that 
legal concepts cannot be straightforwardly transplanted from one context to another is 
of key importance to thorough comparison. The danger of decontextualized attempts to 
transplant legal ideas is in fact demonstrated in the work of both Bennett and 
Brassington on ectogenesis and abortion, which I have discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Creutzfeldt, Kubal and Pirie write that “socio-legal scholars regularly undertake forms 
of comparison in different ways, often without being explicit about their methods and 
purposes” (2006 286). Neither Bennett nor Brassington presents their work as 
comparative, yet each attempts to transplant ideas drawn from American jurisprudence 
without acknowledging the anti-abortion political, social, and religious project out of 
which these laws arise. In so doing, each neglects to answer important questions about 
the political and legal limitations of transplanting such concepts to the very different 
context of the United Kingdom. There are any number of questions that might work to 




that would ensure that reproductive rights would be protected even if shared parental 
rights in ectogenesis were introduced? What challenges might arise? Why is it useful to 
draw on a model of shared legal responsibility for a fetus that emerges from anti-
abortion discourse? Can we use frameworks intended to oppress in one context to 
imagine greater equality in another? Given the political climate of England, Scotland, 
and Wales, in which a vocal majority support abortion rights, would a model arising 
from an anti-abortion project in the US be accepted? 
In my own analysis, I will ultimately draw preliminary conclusions that weigh 
some frameworks as “better” models, and as a result, I too may run the risk of operating 
on an assumption that a framework which may effectively work in one context could 
successfully be transferred to another. I do not, however, expect to be able to offer a 
straightforward conclusion or to propose strategies that would work universally in any 
given legal context, but instead, to show how particular challenges may arise within 
particular jurisdictions, and how particular frameworks within a given jurisdiction may 
work best to mitigate these challenges. I appreciate that a model framework for 
ectogenesis and abortion that works in the context of Canada may not work “as is” in 
the context of the United States, but I do not regard this as a strong reason not to use a 
comparative praxis to try to consider whether there are some frameworks which might 
best uphold a feminist ethics of care. Here I follow Gillian Hadfield, who writes “it may 
be true that there is an ‘untranslatable abyss’ between the law of one place and the law 
of another [. . .] but this does not mean that we have no business seeking to understand 
why law here produces this effect and law there produces that effect” (2009, 224). In a 
number of areas of my work, I am engaging in speculative practice: I am assessing a 
technology that is not yet fully developed, considering existing abortion laws with 
reference to reforms that are attentive to a feminist ethic of care, and engaging legal 
fantasies of a relational future. This thesis is intended to allow for speculative thinking, 
even where there may be significant barriers to putting any of my recommendations in 
place. I argue that it is better to proceed in this way, with the caveat that context is vital, 
then to conclude that “we have no business” (224) pointing to best practice frameworks. 
 
Bridging Comparison and Care Ethics 
Before turning to the second aspect of my intervention in the literature, I want to briefly 
address how I see the comparative aspect of my research and my use of a feminist ethic 




relational factors on an individual, social, and institutional level that may shape 
experience and result in individuals or communities having different expectations, 
needs, and desires within a given context. As I will discuss further in what follows, a 
key aspect of a feminist ethics of care is that “justice in [the context of care] becomes 
understood as respect for people in their own terms” (Gilligan 37). Similarly, 
Creutzfeldt, Kubal, and Pirie argue that critical comparative work emphasizes that the 
legal and cultural concepts produced within a given nation must be “understood on their 
own terms” (2006, 386). In each instance, establishing a robust picture of how 
ectogenesis could problemetize abortion law and how we might mitigate against these 
challenges requires attention to specificity and to the relational entanglements that arise 
in context. Rather than taking a “one size fits all” approach to thinking about this 
technology, I am arguing here for first assessing the potential problems that ectogenesis 
may produce for abortion law within each jurisdiction “on its own terms.” Drawing on 
this analysis, it then becomes possible to produce a grounded consideration of legal 
frameworks that might address these challenges, against a feminist ethics of care. As a 
final point here, I want to acknowledge that both a feminist ethics of care, and the 
reproductive justice framework that informs my use of care ethics, are movements that 
first emerged from the context of the United States. Of my choice to engage this 
scholarship, I would note first that I do not regard drawing on frameworks initially 
borne out of an American context to be analogous with the dominance of US 
scholarship on ectogenesis that I am problemetizing here.The pattern I am tracing in this 
literature involves scholarship tending toward either using examples specific to a US 
context to conclude that what is true for the impact of ectogenesis there will be true 
everywhere, or drawing the conclusion that the impact of the technology will be the 
same everywhere, without giving reference to extremely varied social, legal, and 
political circumstances on the ground. Conversely, feminist ethics of care and 
reproductive justice are both frameworks that emphasize particular strategies for 
thinking and organizing, but both, as I will discuss further in what follows, are explicitly 
constructed to be attentive to and subsequently adapted to context. Having noted this, I 
have also consciously sought to establish a balance in perspectives by seeking out 
literature on feminist care ethics, reproductive justice, and relational legal feminism that 





2.4 THE NEED FOR A FEMINIST CARE ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED LEGAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR ECTOGENESIS AND ABORTION 
Carol Gilligan’s 1982 book In a Different Voice is often cited as the origin of “feminist 
care ethics.” Gilligan argued that ethical theory had been derived from the experiences 
and perspectives of men and could not account for womens’ moral reasoning. Basing 
her conclusions on a series of interviews, she hypothesized that while men tended to be 
motivated by justice in moral reasoning, women tended more toward an ethic of care. 
Gilligan proposed that a care approach to moral reasoning should be acknowledged as 
different but equally legitimate, writing, “psychologists and philosophers, aligning the 
self and morality with separation and autonomy—the ability to be self-governing—have 
associated care with self-sacrifice, or with feelings—a view at odds with the current 
position that care represents a way of knowing and a coherent moral perspective” (41). 
Where justice-oriented thinking was structured around individual choice, Gilligan 
argued, ethical practice motivated by care emerged from “the assumption that the self 
and others are interdependent” (36).  
Thinking about ectogenesis and abortion through the lens of a feminist care 
ethics can demonstrate that far from constituting the ultimate manifestation of 
autonomous subjectivity, ectogenesis is likely to impact (and/or produce) multiple 
relationships. Critics (see Tronto 1995, Lewis 2018), have long noted the ways in which 
a feminist care framework risks romanticizing gendered self-sacrifice, and the related 
way in which it can problematically and reductively essentialize “male” and “female” 
moral ontologies. As Audrey Thompson argues, a mainstream ethics of care has also 
centered a white, middle class woman as a default, and has neglected in many instances 
to address structural inequality. Later in this chapter, I will discuss how I intend to 
address these limitations by amending them with reference to feminist relational legal 
theory and reproductive justice scholarship.5 Before doing so, however, I want to justify 
                                                          
5The reproductive justice movement is a grassroots initiative led by women of color in the United States. 
The SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective defines reproductive justice as “the 
complete physical, mental, spiritual, political, social, and economic well-being of women and girls, based 
on the full achievement and protection of women’s human rights” (Ross 2007, 4). Reproductive justice 
organizers identified that for Black and Indigenous women and women of color who have been subjected 
to historical and contemporary sterilization abuses and white supremacist violence, “it is important to 
fight equally for (1) the right to have a child; (2) the right not to have a child; and (3) the right to parent 
the children we have, as well as to control our birthing options[. .. and the] necessary enabling conditions 
to realize these rights” (4). Reproductive justice, then, applies an intersectional approach to fighting for 
reproductive care, and arguing that abortion, access to prenatal support, the treatment of women in 
prisons, environmental harms, the separation of immigrant families, and the access of queer and trans 




the uses of a feminist ethic of care here by addressing the ways in which relationality 
has been excised from discussions of artificial wombs and abortion.  
The most pointed example of the excision of care from discourses on 
ectogenesis is in the recurring claim that the technology will end the need for abortion 
by allowing the fetus to be transferred into an artificial womb instead of being 
terminated (Abel 1974, Favole 1979, Goldstein 1978, Singer and Wells 1984, Welin 
2004, Kaczor 2008, Reiber 2010, Brassington 2009, Schultz 2010, Stieger 2010, 
Colgrave 2019, Blackshaw and Rodger 2018, Mathison and Davis 2017). These 
arguments negate the relational entanglements that emerge from and around gestation. 
No provision is made for who (or what) will ultimately be responsible for the 
dependency of the fetus and the resulting infant decanted to an artificial womb. Care for 
the pregnant person is also overlooked, as the abortion decision is divorced from 
personal, socio-cultural, and institutional influences, and reduced to a straightforward 
matter of simply not wishing to be pregnant.   
In a related suggestion that prospective fathers might take responsibility for an 
ectogenetic fetus that was not wanted by a pregnant person, the importance of 
relationships is again often ignored. Kaczor 2008, Reiber 2010, Brassington 2009, 
Räsänen 2017, and Welin 2004 each argue that a woman who did not wish to continue 
her pregnancy could transfer gestational responsibility to another progenitor by having 
the fetus extracted to an artificial womb. Yet none of these scholars address the risk of 
this alternative producing a continued connection between the pregnant person and 
another progenitor with whom they may not wish to be in relation, or between this 
person and the fetus. These authors also neglect or consider only as an afterthought the 
question of who will care for the ectogenic fetus (and how this care may be funded) in 
instances in which both progenitors ultimately reject responsibility. Some scholars do 
discuss the distribution of responsibility for an ectogenic fetus unwanted by both 
progenitors following its “birth” (Alghrani 2007/2008, James 1987, Coleman 2004, 
Overall 2015), but each concludes that this scenario would be problematic primarily 
because it would result in a surplus of ectogenic babies for adoption. This is certainly an 
                                                          
reproductive concerns. I do not contend that this thesis constitutes reproductive justice scholarship, but 
instead that my work is informed by reproductive justice practice. I am therefore indebted to the activism 
and intellectual labor of the activists and scholars of color who founded this movement. See: Ross, 





important legal and ethical consideration. I argue, however, that equally pressing issues 
to address here are the question of the fetus’s dependency on care while (and not simply 
after) it is gestating, and the inevitable and complex relationships produced between the 
fetus and caretakers, and between and amongst these caretakers as this ectogenic 
gestation occurs. 
While not always directly discussing abortion and ectogenesis (exceptions to 
this are Overall 2015, Cannold 1995, Langford 2017), many feminist scholars 
emphasize the significance of relational considerations with regard to pregnancy and 
artificial wombs. On the whole, these scholars critique the tendency in the dominant 
discourse on artificial wombs to imagine the ectogenic fetus as an autonomous entity, 
and draw attention to the reality that “regardless of where or by whom the foetus is 
gestated, it remains dependent upon someone” (Langford 2008, 267). In suggesting that 
ectogenesis could relieve women of taking sole responsibility for gestation, Firestone 
(1970), Smajdor (2008), and Woolfrey (2006) are attentive to the relational labor of care 
that is required in pregnancy. Rosen (2003), Kamm (1992), Oakley (1984), and Squier 
(1994), among several others, also acknowledge care and relationality by suggesting 
that there may be something significant about human gestation, immeasurable in 
scientific research, which occurs through the connection between pregnant woman and 
fetus. Overall (2015), Cannold (2006), and Langford (2008), each of whom directly 
focus on abortion and ectogenesis, specifically cite relationships and the perceptions of 
pregnant women toward their fetuses as crucial to understanding why ectogenesis as a 
replacement to abortion would be undesirable to many people and can be understood as 
explicitly anti-feminist.  
Focusing on the excision of nurses from writing on the history of incubators, 
womens’ studies scholar Irina Aristarkhova insists on the importance of reinstituting 
care labor in discourses on the artificial womb. Aristarkhova writes “the mother-
machine will need so many ‘empirical’ nurses (wet nurses, animals for providing milk 
and tissue for various surgeries, immediate family members or institutional substitutes, 
just to name a few) that calling it an ‘artificial womb,’ a matrix-incubator, will remain 
an example of ectogenetic desire that is indeed divorced from the real conditions that 
make ectogenesis possible” (2012, 119). Aristarkhova’s directive to think about 
incubators and ectogenesis in relation with nurses helped to shape my interest in the 




technology. While each of the scholars I have noted above inform my perspective by 
addressing (to varying extents) the work of gestating and the importance of 
relationships, they do not explicitly apply a feminist care ethics.  
Yet it is crucial to note that there are two scholars who have in fact identified the 
potential uses of a specific engagement with care ethics to assess artificial wombs. In 
their respective chapters in Gefland and Shook’s 2006 edited collection, bioethicists 
Gefland and Sander-Staudt each draw on care ethics to consider the implications of 
ectogenic technology. While they share my interest in relationality, there are a number 
of aspects of their respective definitions and applications of “care” that I find limiting, 
and that have provided a contrast against which I have developed my own 
understanding of what might constitute a feminist legal framework of care.  
Gefland and I hold the same perspective to the extent that he argues that “the 
ethics of care might be useful to policy makers considering legislation regulating the use 
of ectogenesis [. . . ] and provide guidance to the issue of abortion” (2006, 90). 
However, Gefland’s interpretation of “care” is not derived from the feminist relational 
ethics developed by Gilligan and others. Gefland instead adapts a “hypothetical agent-
based virtue ethics” in which he places the hypothetical intent of legislators at the center 
of his analysis, arguing “we can say that a law is just if and only if it is the type of law 
that might be passed by hypothetical caring legislators” (95). While I too argue that care 
must be a central consideration in analysis of ectogenesis, “care” to me does not refer to 
a potential quality which must be embodied by lawmakers. Indeed, I would caution that 
as Thompson notes in much of the literature on feminist care ethics, an unnuanced 
assumption that what constitutes “caring” action can be understood as universal simply 
replicates the “universal terms” (Thompson 1998, 526) that the ethic purports to 
critique. As Thompson argues, this assumption comes from within an unspoken place of 
white, middle class subjectivity in failing to recognize that for black and Indigenous 
people and people of color, alleged “caring” on the part of state actors has often been 
used for “politically oppressive functions” (527).  I regard “care” not as a quality of 
action that can be said to be universally applicable, but as an (imperfect) practice with 
which to centralize a particular set of concerns: namely, the health of the pregnant 
person, and consideration of relationships between fetus, progenitors, machine, and 
others. In centralizing these concerns, I do not seek to proscribe universal rules for what 
a given person needs in a given situation, but quite the opposite, to orient toward 




understandings of care to be imagined and enacted. Rather than attempting to assess or 
proscribe caring intent on the part of legislators as Gefland suggests, I propose that a 
care ethics be used strategically to assess the efficacy of a given framework according to 
whether it sufficiently acknowledges and addresses these concerns.  
I am also in agreement with Gefland that thinking about care need not be limited 
to gender-essentialist narratives that “assert that the paradigmatic relationship is that 
between a mother and a child” (95). As I will unpack below, I attempt to de-essentialize 
care through a focus on gestation as something that accounts for a multiplicity of 
genders. In contrast, Gefland addresses this point by arguing that his own engagement 
with care centralizes “both” parents in a traditional nuclear family form, writing, “I 
suggest that we use caring parents in a nuclear family as the paradigm and attempt to 
determine how they might act in a given situation” (95). This approach presumes that 
care in a nuclear family is exemplary, a presumption that I argue should be challenged. 
Limiting care to the nuclear family undermines the emancipatory possibilities of 
ectogenesis proffered by some feminist scholars by retaining the restrictive familial 
ideals they had hoped the technology might help redress (Firestone 1979). Further, it 
denies the ways in which in some instances, it is precisely the constraints of the nuclear 
family that cause the most harm.  
Gefland further strips feminist praxis from his own use of care ethics by 
focusing only on care for the fetus. He writes, “whether a legislator should permit 
insurance companies to financially coerce women to use ectogenesis would depend, to 
some extent, on how ectogenesis would affect the health and well-being of the future 
child” (2006 103). Here, we are in fundamental disagreement. I argue that a feminist 
approach to this technology insists that “financially coer[cing] women to use 
ectogenesis” (103), or coercing them by any other means, is straightforwardly 
unacceptable regardless of the impact on the future child. While a feminist ethic of care 
invites us to consider the fetus in relation to the pregnant person, this does not entail an 
imperative to “determine the moral status of a fetus” (103) in order to establish whether 
the pregnant person has a right to terminate it. In excising care for the pregnant person 
and the relationships produced through ectogenesis from his consideration, Gefland 
performs the same problematic erasure of relationships (and of the pregnant person’s 
agency) that I note in the broader literature on ectogenesis. 
By contrast to Gefland, Sander-Staudt specifically draws on a feminist ethics of 




Staudt’s understanding of feminist care ethics exhibits a key potential limitation of this 
framework that I hope to avoid, namely, a gender-essentializing analysis of ectogenesis 
and pregnancy. Sander-Staudt argues that “a feminist ethics of care reveals some 
potential dangers associated with the development of the artificial womb” (2006, 109). 
Her application of this framework primarily to expose the “dangers” of artificial wombs 
speaks to the roots of a feminist care ethic in a reification of the mother-child 
relationship (Noddings 1995, Ruddick 1989). In Sander-Staudt’s interpretation, a 
feminist care lens could only ever expose automated alternatives to gestation as a threat 
to this relationship, and therefore, as a threat to women. Sander-Staudt writes that an 
ethics of care is “likely to reject AWT because it seems yet another step towards not just 
mechanizing, but demeaning nature, birth, and women’s relations to them” (2006, 117). 
I follow Sander-Staudt’s call to be attentive to the relationship between the pregnant 
person and the fetus, and to how ectogenesis might alter this relationship. But I also 
believe that the assumption that ectogenesis could only ever be damaging to women 
problematically places a gendered mother-fetus bond on a pedestal. More importantly, it 
forecloses the possibility that the technology could have emancipatory outcomes for 
how we construct the family form and the gendered body. I regard this limitation not 
primarily as a problem with Sander-Staudt’s use of a feminist care ethics, but as an 
issue embedded within this praxis. In what follows, I provide an account of how I intend 
to address this and other limitations of the feminist care framework.  
 
2.5 ADDRESSING THE LIMITATIONS OF FEMINIST CARE ETHICS 
I am making strategic use of “care” as a tool for producing normative recommendations 
regarding how ectogenesis and abortion might be regulated. As Jennifer Nedelsky notes, 
selecting a strategic legal approach is a question of making “judgments about the 
probable consequences of different concepts” (1993, 344) and recognizing the 
limitations of the concept that one chooses to engage as a tool to further a legal cause or 
achieve a particular end. I am arguing for the importance of situating discussions of 
ectogenesis within a particular feminist discourse, but like all strategic tools, care ethics 
has significant limitations. I am going to attempt to attend to these limitations by 
drawing on perspectives from reproductive justice scholarship (including Ross, Roberts, 
Derklas, Peoples, and Bridgewater Toure 2017; Ross and Solinger 2017; Adams and 




Llewellyn 2012, Fineman 2017, Nedelsky 1993) to adapt my particular use of feminist 
care ethics.  
A number of branches of feminist relational theories have emerged following 
care ethics, some of which have divested from the term in recognition of the limitations 
I will discuss. In the introduction to their recent collection on health law and relational 
theory, legal scholars Downie and Llewellyn note that while relational theory is 
informed by a feminist ethics of care, they choose to distinguish their use of 
relationality from this framework. They write of their praxis that “it is not committed, as 
some take the ethic of care to be, to the affirmation of certain models or types of 
relationships or activities as inherently valuable” (2012, 6) and that their “focus, then, is 
not on particular relationships or types of relationships as might be supposed on some 
versions of care feminism [. . . ] rather, the focus is on the dynamics or characteristics of 
relationship that need to be supported and encouraged in order to foster human 
flourishing” (6).  
I understand and appreciate the reasoning offered by Downie and Llewellyn 
here. Creating new frameworks that also centralize relationality is one way of 
responding to the limitations of a care framework. I am taking a different approach, 
which is to persist in the use of “feminist care ethics” but to draw from other resources 
to adapt it. I argue that in this contemporary social moment, in which negotiating 
notions of gender and relationality have become increasingly imperative, retaining this 
terminology while also noting and addressing its limitations is a politically useful way 
to grapple with its difficult lineage, rather than replacing it with a new but similar term. 
I am also informed here by Thompson, who writes that we might use critiques of care 
ethics “not to dismiss theories of care but […] to inform and reorient them in ways that 
systematically account for race, class, gender, and other cultural differences” (1998, 
528).  
Ultimately, the relational legal theory and the reproductive justice scholarship 
and activism that have informed and inspired this thesis are importantly distinct from a 
feminist ethics of care, born from different contexts and political imperatives. However, 
I have found that each of these modes of thinking complement each other and diverge in 
useful ways. Relational feminist legal theory, reproductive justice frameworks, and care 
ethics share several common features. Each is rooted in a commitment to the idea that 
individuals are constituted through their relationships with others, and each recognizes 




their lives. But each calls our attention to a distinct set of concerns in pursuit of justice. 
Where relational legal theory attends to the restructuring of the law itself, care ethics 
emphasizes a need to orient toward formulating analyses that attend to how we depend 
on one another. Reproductive justice calls each of these frames toward an antiracist 
specific focus on lived experience, on the ways that the contemporary realities of race, 
class, gender, immigration status, and sexual identity and orientation shape access to 
care. Olena Hankivsky has similarly recently suggested the use of intersectionality 
theory in care ethics, to direct care theory toward “the historically rooted ties and 
mutually constituting processes and patterns of a broader range of oppression” (2014, 
253). In engaging reproductive justice work with care ethics, I hope to be attentive to 
these patterns. In what follows, I will discuss some of the key aspects of my use of a 
feminist ethics of care that I intend to adapt to address the limitations of this framework, 
and I will also address which bodies of work help shape my response in each instance.  
 
Specific Application to Evaluate Legal Frameworks 
Sophie Lewis writes, “too often, ‘care studies’ and ‘social reproduction’ scholarship 
merely draws attention to the unpaid love that glues everything together. A critical, anti-
violent politicisation of these processes would need to radically transform (and not just 
revalue, ‘as is’) these domains” (2018). By applying a feminist ethics of care to assess 
the efficacy of legal frameworks, I am attempting to actively employ this lens not as 
simply a tool for observation, but as “a practice and politics” (Lawson 2007, 5). This 
bears some unpacking of what I mean when I refer to both practice and politics. Putting 
this lens into practice, for me, is using it to make applied suggestions as to how existing 
laws might be adapted. As to politics, Loizidou (2007) invites us to consider whether 
there are “particular markers that allow a distinction between political and ethical 
conduct” (45), and questions the idea that that these realms can be easily disentangled, 
as in taking ethical action the “political side” (ibid) of that action emerges. Thompson 
notes one of the more problematic tendencies of initial uses of care ethics to be a 
tendency to emphasize the home and private sphere as a space of innocence, wherein 
caring could occur. Glenn, too, emphasizes that “the social organization of care has 
been rooted in diverse forms of social coercion that have induced women to assume 
responsibility for caring for family members and that have tracked poor, racial minority 
and immigrant women into positions entailing caring for others” (2012, 5). Thompson 




the next generation, and justice means creating the conditions under which all people 
can flourish” (1998, 533). I follow this call, and I take it to understand that the “ethics” 
and the “politics” of care are inherently intertwined. Identifying the multiple structures 
of oppression that may inhibit “flourishing”, which might constitute an activity 
informed by an ethic of care, is also a political action in that it identifies the systems in 
the public realm that oppress, inhibit, or enable life in the “private” realm. In other 
words, and as Loizidou suggests, “ethical” actions are also political in their doing. 
Under the contemporary legal and political circumstances in which debates over the 
uses of artificial womb technology are emerging as this technology is being developed, 
I feel a feminist relational legal intervention that at least begins to offer active strategies 
is imperative. In this, I am informed by the work of Robin West, Martha Fineman, 
Jocelyn Downie, and others who are committed to identifying the ways that a relational 
feminist praxis can be applied to rethink and reform existing legal structures.  
In actually assessing frameworks that have been proposed to govern abortion 
and ectogenesis, which I will do in chapters four and six respectively, I will be asking 
questions such as the following: does the suggested framework recognize the presence 
and importance of relationships? (Between the fetus and caretakers whether mechanical 
or human, between the prospective progenitor(s), the gestator, the machine, medical 
personnel, the state?) Is the work of care addressed in the suggested framework, or is it 
invisibilized? What resources are made available to those who are engaged in care 
labor? Does the framework protect against the forced constitution of relationships of 
care and/or dependency? Does the suggested framework sufficiently provide for care of 
the pregnant person? Does it offer the pregnant person sufficient resources to undertake, 
redistribute, or reject care of the fetus? What other entanglements may need to be 
considered in each instance?  
Undoing Gender in Care 
As I have introduced earlier in this chapter, much has been made of “the maternal” in 
relation to feminist ethics of care. As Sander-Staudt writes, “Care ethicists speculate 
that the physical aspects of women’s reproductive biology can contribute to the 
development of a relational ethical perspective” (2006, 117). This assumption, 
emphasized by some theorists in particular (Ruddick 1989, Noddings 1995) is perhaps 
one of the most glaring limitations of early iterations of feminist care ethics. This 
position is deeply gender-essentializing. The idea of a distinct “maternal power” 




relationships reinforces the limiting notion that those gendered female at birth are 
inherently more capable of enacting care. This reproduces a fallacy of reproductive 
biology as determining one’s capacity to love and to nurture, and undermines the caring 
relationships of trans, male, and non-binary people. As Friedman notes in an earlier 
(1995) critique of Gilligan’s work, there is a striking oversight in some of the 
scholarship on care to acknowledge the difference between genders being moralized in 
association with particular forms of moral reasoning (women with care, and men with 
justice), and there in fact being anything determinative about gender in association with 
either.  
I share the position that feminist care ethics takes on pregnancy as a deeply 
relational entanglement, and feel it is important to address the ways that care work 
continues to be gendered, raced, and classed. However, following human geographer 
and reproductive justice scholar Lewis, I consider “care” as work that need not be 
gendered. I will attempt to bridge this limitation by engaging Lewis’s call for a “non-
gynocentric gestational politics” (2018, 313). Lewis proposes that shifting the focus of 
feminist care ethics from the “mother-fetus” relationship to the relationships produced 
in and through gestation, whether human or automated, may be a means of retaining a 
relational focus without reinforcing a gender-essentializing purview. With regard to my 
use of a feminist care ethic, orienting in this way as I assess potential frameworks for 
ectogenesis and abortion may be a means of addressing the relational aspects of 
gestation (both human and machinic) without insisting on an un-nuanced veneration of 
the mother-fetus relationship.  
 
An Emphasis on Care for the Pregnant Person  
As Tronto, Friedman, and others have argued, a “feminist care ethics” as conceived by 
some scholars (notably Noddings and Gilligan) can often fall short of problemetizing 
gendered and racialized social pressure to serve and attend to the needs of others. 
Noting the way in which the framework emphasizes respecting other people on their 
own terms, Tronto asks, “how much must one disregard one’s own needs in order to be 
sufficiently attentive? ” (106). In my own application of feminist care ethics, I hope to 
avoid this potential shortcoming by emphasizing that care for the pregnant person, and 
provision to allow them to act out of care for themselves, are essential in discussions of 




balancing of the right to receive needed care with the right to provide care without 
excessive economic penalties or sacrifice of well-being” (2012, 11). In the context of 
proposals that have been made as to how the law should govern ectogenesis and 
abortion, I argue that a framework adequately informed by a feminist ethic of care must 
always provide the means to allow a pregnant person to “opt in” or “opt out” of 
providing care and of constituting a relationship with a fetus, the machine, or with other 
humans. Here again I draw from relational legal work by Robin West, Martha Fineman, 
Susan Sherwin, and others. While adopting different terminologies and approaches, 
these scholars identify the ways in which the “uncompensated labor of caretakers is an 
unrecognized subsidy, not only to the individuals who directly receive it, but more 
significantly, to the entire society” (Fineman 2000, 19). I follow these relational 
feminist legal scholars, who argue that sufficient redress for this labor is needed, and in 
addition, I add that provisions for the care of the pregnant person are also vital. 
 
Expanding Relational Thinking Beyond A Mother-Fetus Bond 
Beyond its potential to be essentializing, the traditional emphasis of care ethics on the 
relationship between mother and fetus limits the multiple relationships of care that are 
possible outside of this binary. I argue that when considering the issue of abortion and 
ectogenesis, it is important to begin with the relationship between pregnant person and 
fetus, as my position is that there are no circumstances under which it is ethically 
acceptable for anyone other than the pregnant person to elect to abort or continue a 
pregnancy that begins in that person’s body.  
However, once this provision is sufficiently attended to, looking beyond the 
pregnant person and fetus to other progenitors, other family members, and the ectogenic 
machine, allows for a broader consideration of both the possibilities opened by this 
technology and the potential dangers it constitutes. As feminist geographer Victoria 
Lawson argues, “care ethics begins with a social ontology of connection” (2007, 3), and 
understanding the potentially broad extent of these connections is important for 
assessing the actual impact of ectogenesis on abortion. Tronto and others have also 
commented on the way in which the ethic of care can fail to acknowledge relationality 
beyond the family, turning away from external structures of power and thus allowing 
“for the marginalization of class and race, and the perpetuation of heterosexual 
normativity” (Hankivsky 2014, 254). Reproductive justice perspectives (Ross and 




in that this framework emphasizes the need to consider multiple relationships of both 
oppression and care beyond the mother-child bond. Care ethics can run the risk of 
flattening race, gender, sexuality, ability, and the numerous other aspects of one’s 
identity which might impact their access to relationships of care, and the institutional 
relationalities that impact this access. Drawing on reproductive justice perspectives, 
which emphasize the importance of attending to these differences in access will help me 
nuance this limitation in care perspectives. How might a pregnant person’s relationships 
with her family, with her friends, with the other progenitor, and with the state and its 
agents impact her ability or desire to use ectogenesis rather than abort? What kinds of 
frameworks to govern ectogenesis and abortion might best serve to protect against the 
possibility of unwanted relationships being created? Conversely, what kinds of 
frameworks might best allow for the creation or protection of wanted relationships?  
 
CONCLUSION 
While my work builds on the important interventions made by feminist scholars, there 
has yet to be a feminist relational legal intervention on the issue of ectogenesis and 
abortion. By intervening in both the hegemony of US-centric perspectives on abortion 
and artificial wombs, and in the excision of care from the dominant discourse on this 
subject, I hope to contribute to building recommendations as to what a feminist 
regulation of this technology might look like.  
In chapters three and five of this thesis, I will closely analyze proposed 
challenges that ectogenesis may constitute for abortion law against existing abortion 
jurisprudence in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada respectively. Where 
chapter three will deal with issues quite specifically tied to abortion law as written (how 
ectogenesis may impact bodily autonomy and fetal viability), chapter five will take up 
broader concerns in relation to abortion (the possibility of degendering gestation and the 
issue of stratified reproduction). In chapters four and six, beginning from conclusions 
drawn in three and five, I will consider legal frameworks that have been proposed for 
addressing these challenges and assess the extent to which these frameworks uphold a 
feminist ethics of care for governing artificial womb technology. Where a given 
proposal does not give due consideration to relationships of care and/or to the necessity 
of care for the pregnant person, I will suggest amendments. 
Grounding my analysis in a comparative legal approach informed by a feminist 




can function as an emancipatory or a limiting (and even dystopic) technology. By 
producing a critical feminist assessment informed by an ethics of care and relationality, 
I am taking an explicit position on what I believe an ethical legal framework for 
artificial wombs should look like. In applying this critical and comparative lens both to 
the problems that scholars have suggested ectogenesis will pose for abortion law, and to 
the solutions they offer as a resolution to these problems, I will reformulate the 





























3. Comparing Challenges to the Status Quo of Abortion Law 
 
Contemporary Abortion Law In Canada, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom Where the Abortion Act 1967 is in Effect 
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The jurisdictions of the United Kingdom in which the Abortion Act 1967 applies 
(England, Scotland, and Wales) differ significantly from the United States and Canada 
in that abortion is protected through legislation, not case law precedent. As I previously 
noted, I have chosen to focus only on those jurisdictions in the UK in which the 
Abortion Act 1967 is currently in effect. My intent in undertaking this project is to 
compare the possible impact of ectogenesis on abortion across several common law 
jurisdictions in which abortion rights are protected but subject to regulation. To do so, 
particularly taking account of the differences between countries covered by the 
Abortion Act, and differing regulations across American states and Canadian provinces, 
is already a significant undertaking. A project also covering the history of abortion in 
Northern Ireland (where the political, social, and legal landscape in this regard is 
distinct from the rest of Britain) would certainly be enlightening but is beyond the scope 
of what can be covered here. 
 Abortion has long been a crime in English Common Law, with statutory 
provisions introduced in the early 1800s to criminalize abortion  after “quickening.” 
(British Medical Association 2017, 10). The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was 
introduced in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Section 58 establishes the statutory 
crime of a woman “unlawfully administer[ing] to herself any poison or other noxious 
thing” with intent to procure a miscarriage, or of aiding another person in obtaining a 
miscarriage, either through performing the procedure or providing drugs. In 1929, 
Section 1 of the Infant Life Preservation Act was introduced alongside the Offences 
Against the Person Act to establish an offence for aborting a fetus “capable of being 
born alive”, unless done in good faith to preserve the life of the mother. The Infant Life 
Preservation Act amended sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861 in providing for this exception to the criminal law where an abortion was 
performed in good faith to save the pregnant person’s life. Section 1 does not refer to 




eight weeks or more would be prima facie evidence that the child was capable of being 
born alive. Neither the OAPA nor the Infant Life Preservation Act apply in Scotland, 
and abortion jurisprudence in Scotland was defined by Scottish common law prior to the 
passage of the 1967 act (BMA 2017, 11).  
 The Abortion Act 1967 did not remove the crime of procuring an abortion, but 
operates alongside the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861, the Infant Life 
Preservation Act 1929, and common law, to establish a series of exceptions to the 
statutory criminal law in England and Wales and to the common law crime in Scotland. 
The Abortion Act 1967 establishes that:  
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence 
under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered 
medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed 
in good faith—  
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the 
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the 
pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or (b) that the 
termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman; or (c) that the continuance of the 
pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater 
than if the pregnancy were terminated; or (d) that there is a substantial risk 
that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.  
 
When determining whether to provide an abortion under grounds (a) or (b), medical 
practitioners may consider the pregnant person’s “actual or reasonably foreseeable 
environment.” As of 1990, the gestational limit for abortion under the Act is twenty-
four weeks. The Abortion Act also allows that abortion may be granted after twenty-
four weeks, if two physicians agree that continuing the pregnancy would put the 
mother’s life or health at risk, or if the fetus is found to be deceased or to have 
significant anomalies. The Abortion Act 1967 specifies that abortion must be performed 
at an approved premise (this includes NHS providers as well as providers such as the 
British Pregnancy Advisory Service). In 1967, most abortions were surgical or 
performed through vacuum aspiration. According to the Department of Health and 
Social Care, in England and Wales “since 2014, medical abortions have been the most 
common method of abortion” (2019, 14), and as of 2018, “86.1% of terminations” were 
medical in Scotland according to Scottish National Statistics (2018, 16). In medical 




vagina with a break of 24-48 hours in between (ibid). In light of this development, in 
the last two years (2016-2018), first in Scotland, then Wales, and finally in England, 
provisions have been made to begin allowing women to take the second pill at home.  
 
CANADA 
As a former colony disputed by French and English colonizers, abortion was initially 
criminalized under English Common Law in the majority of Canada, and by French 
civil law in Quebec. The Canadian Criminal Code made procuring an abortion a 
statutory crime in 1869, and in 1969, Section. 251 of the Criminal Code re-established 
performing an abortion as an indictable offence but made an exception where a hospital 
abortion committee signed a statement confirming that “continuation of the pregnancy 
of the female person would or would be likely to endanger (the pregnant woman's) life 
or health.” Following the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 
1982, Canadian pro-choice campaigners began to look for test cases to challenge the 
criminal law.  
 Abortion in Canada is now governed at the federal level by the landmark case R 
v. Morgentaler (1988). Henry Morgentaler, along with two other doctors who 
performed abortions in violation of the requirement for committee approval, challenged 
section 251 on the grounds that it violated women’s rights under the newly established 
Charter. In Morgentaler, a majority of three out of five of the Supreme Court’s sitting 
judges held that the requirement for committee approval violated women’s rights under 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which holds that “everyone 
has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Each of the 
three majority opinions (from Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Lamer, Justice Beetz 
and Justice Estey, and Justice Wilson respectively), varied slightly in their interpretation 
of the Charter. As McConnell argues, Justice Wilson’s opinion constitutes the one 
instance in in which a justice found that the stipulations violated a right to “liberty” in 
addition to a right to “security of the person.” Wilson found that “the right to reproduce 
or not reproduce [. . .] is properly perceived as an integral part of modern woman’s 




is truly being treated as a means--a means to an end which she does not desire but over 
which she has no control.”6  
 Each of the majority judges in Morgentaler noted that the state had a valid 
interest in the life of the fetus and in protecting the mother’s right to make personal 
decisions, but they established that balancing these interests was a question for 
parliament. To date, no federal legislation has taken up this question, and while in some 
provinces abortion is not available after viability,7 Canadian federal law sets no specific 
legal limit for abortion. Since medical abortion became commercially available in 
Canada in 2017, some provinces, including Alberta, Quebec, British Columbia, Ontario, 
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick offer it under their health care plans as a free service 
(Johnstone and Macfarlane 2015). As of 2018, the pill must be paid for by the 
individual or via private insurance in Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, Prince 
Edward Island, and Nunavut. While Morgentaler affirmed that Canadian women have a 
right to choose to end a pregnancy, as Johnstone and Macfarlane note, “most provinces 
enacted policies designed to limit abortion access in the immediate aftermath of the 
Court’s 1988 ruling” (105).  
   
THE UNITED STATES 
As in Canada, abortion in the United States was initially governed by English common 
law precedent. Today it is regulated through federal case law and legislation at the state 
level. The landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme Court case concerned Jane Roe, a 
pregnant single woman who alleged on behalf of herself and women similarly situated 
that a Texas statute criminalizing abortion unless the pregnant person’s life was in 
danger was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Due Process clause holds that “no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” The majority held that the state had competing 
interests in protecting a woman’s right to privacy and in the life of the fetus throughout 
pregnancy, and that state laws which mandated that abortion could only be provided 
where a woman’s life was in danger violated a right to privacy, identified as a key 
aspect of “liberty” under the Due Process clause. In Justice Blackmun’s majority 
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csc/en/item/288/index.do/ (accessed January 8 2019). 
7 As Johnstone and Macfarlane write “access is also restricted by gestational limits in each province that 
cut off services between twelve (hospital abortions in New Brunswick) and twenty-four weeks (Ontario)” 




opinion, he established that in the first trimester of pregnancy, abortion decisions should 
be privately made between a woman and her doctor. The court loosely applied a 
trimester framework for governing the state’s balance of interests, establishing that at 
“approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interests in the 
health of the mother, may [. . .] regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are 
reasonably related to maternal health”8 and following viability (then placed between 26-
28 weeks), “the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life [p165] 
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe” abortion unless necessary for the 
mother’s health or life”(ibid). As in the Abortion Act 1967 and the 1988 Morgentaler 
decision, the court affirmed that the procedure must be performed by a licensed 
physician on appropriate premises. While I will discuss further restrictions to abortion 
access in the United States throughout, I want to briefly note several other significant 
limitations at the federal level.  
 The Hyde Amendment, in place in different iterations since 1977 and made 
permanent in 2016, bans the use of federal funds for abortion except where the mother’s 
life is at risk or in cases of pregnancy resulting from incest or rape. The consequence of 
this amendment is that in five states (ID, KY, MO, ND, OK), insurance to cover 
abortion is limited in private plans, and in twelve states (CO, IL, KY, MA, MS, NE, 
DN, OH, PA, RI, SC, and VA) insurance coverage for abortion is restricted (Price 2010 
46). Women otherwise covered by Medicaid cannot access the service unless they can 
pay privately, and funding of abortion is banned for federal employees and their 
dependents, military personnel and dependents, and Indigenous people otherwise 
covered by the Indian Health Services Act (ibid).  
  In the years following Roe, a number of states passed legislation to further 
restrict abortion access. The 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme Court 
decision was the first substantive challenge to Roe9. It dealt with restrictions to abortion 
in a Pennsylvania statute passed in 1988, including “a mandatory 24-hour waiting 
period for all women seeking to have an abortion; a parental informed consent/judicial 
by-pass procedure for minor women seeking to terminate their pregnancy; spousal 
notification provisions; physician-only disclosure requirements; and various reporting 
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court/410/113.html (accessed January 8 2019). 
9 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Available at 




and disclosure requirements.”10 Planned Parenthood v. Casey was a class action lawsuit 
brought by clinics that performed abortions against these regulations. The appellants 
argued that the restrictions were too broad and infringed on the ability of medical 
professionals to care for their patients. The court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
carved out further specifications as to the boundaries in which a right to abortion should 
be protected. The majority held that Roe included three parts:   
(1) a recognition of a woman's right to choose to have an abortion before fetal 
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State [. . .] (2) a 
confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after viability, if the law 
contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering a woman's life or health; and 
(3) the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the 
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that 
may become a child.11  
 
The Casey court affirmed viability as the key point at which the state’s interest in fetal 
life became more pressing and states could ban or strictly regulate abortion procedures, 
but also placed further emphasis on the right of states to show interest in the fetus’s life 
throughout pregnancy by initiating state level regulations. To articulate this balance, the 
court established an “undue burden” standard, finding that “undue burden exists, and 
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial 
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability” 
(ibid). This standard, broad in its interpretation, has allowed for states to significantly 
restrict abortion both before and after viability. I will discuss these restrictions in more 
detail in what follows.  
 
3.2 A Challenge to Abortion Rights Based in Arguments for Bodily 
Autonomy 
At present, a fetus must be gestated in a person’s body. The first key challenge 
ectogenesis has been understood to pose for abortion law lies in the possibility that 
gestation could be separated from dependency on the human body. Scholars have 
argued that if the fetus could be removed from the body and grown in an artificial 
womb, defences of abortion based on the argument that forced pregnancy is an invasion 
of a woman’s bodily autonomy would no longer be sufficient to protect abortion rights. 
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In the 1978 article “Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right and State 
Obstacles to Choice in Light of Artificial Womb Technology,” Goldstein starkly notes 
that artificial wombs could make it possible for a woman to either “feticidally womb-
empty” or  “non-feticidally womb-empty” (880). Writing from the context of the United 
States, he argues that given that Roe v. Wade established that the state had competing 
interests in the woman’s right to privacy and in the life of the fetus throughout 
pregnancy, if technology made it possible to “non-feticidally womb-empty”, the state 
could compel women to do so. The argument that abortion law will be challenged by 
ectogenesis because the technology undermines a defence of abortion rights based in 
claims to bodily autonomy arises frequently in the literature (Favole 1979, Singer and 
Wells 1984, Tribe 1990, Kaczor 2005, Son 2005, Bennett 2008, Brassington 2009, 
Schultz 2009, Welin 2009, Reiber 2010, Steiger 2010, Abecassis 2016, Blahuta 2017). 
Notably, Tribe, Kaczor, Schultz, and Reiber each draw on American case law but 
present a potential challenge to abortion rights based on the way in which ectogenesis 
could undermine a justification through bodily autonomy as universally applicable. In 
what follows, I will consider the question of whether this challenge is in fact likely to 
apply in each jurisdiction.  
 
THE UNITED STATES 
Since the Roe v. Wade decision, the argument that ectogenesis will challenge abortion 
protections based in a claim to bodily autonomy has become well-trodden territory for 
those writing from an American context (Abel 1975, Favole 1979, Tribe 1990, Son 
2005, Kaczor 2005, Bard 2006, Gefland 2006, Randall and Randall 2008, Reiber 2010, 
Steiger 2010, Schultz 2010, Cohen 2017). With the exceptions of Kaczor, Gefland, and 
Bard, each of these scholars directly discuss American jurisprudence. Notably, and 
mostly because of the time of their writing, only a handful of American scholars 
(Randall and Randall 2008, Steiger 2010, Schultz 2010, Cohen 2017) who write on 
ectogenesis as a challenge to bodily autonomy-based protections to abortion engage 
with a case I argue is particularly relevant to this issue in American abortion 
jurisprudence, Gonzales v. Carhart.12 While I largely agree with the arguments by these 
authors as to how ectogenesis could undermine justification for abortion rights in an 
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American context, I will indicate further points for consideration pertaining to this most 
recent decision and the contemporary climate around abortion rights in America.  
 At issue in Roe v. Wade was whether a Texas state ban on abortion constituted 
an infringement of a woman’s right to privacy under the Due Process clause of the 14th 
Amendment, which holds that “no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”13 Reading the opinion of the majority, Chief 
Justice Blackmun drew on the Bill of Rights and case law dealing with issues in the 
family home in order to establish that “liberty” interpreted in the specific context of 
abortion dealt with “protect[ing] against state action the right to privacy, including a 
woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.”14 As I will discuss when I turn to 
Canadian abortion jurisprudence, the right to “liberty” may have been more broadly 
interpreted beyond simply referring to violations of the body, but in Roe v. Wade, the 
court expressly defined the violation of liberty through a right to privacy vested in 
security of the person.  
That a right to privacy in the context of abortion was to quite specifically refer to 
the way in which pregnancy impacted a woman’s bodily autonomy was made clear by 
the court’s affirmation that the state has competing interest in a  right to privacy and the 
fetus’s right to life throughout pregnancy. Blackmun’s majority opinion establishes that 
“in assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as 
long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the 
protection of the pregnant woman alone” (ibid). It is this phrase, at least potential life 
that is of particular importance with regard to the artificial womb. The court’s opinion 
here suggests that where there is a possibility that a fetus could survive, the state has an 
interest in the fetus’s life that can outweigh the pregnant person’s privacy in her body. 
This suggests a right to privacy applied in this context is quite explicitly not intended to 
extend to a right to the death of the fetus. As Tribe argued in 1990, the Roe court’s 
limited application of privacy to physical autonomy in the context of pregnancy 
suggests quite strongly that were ectogenesis available, under Roe v. Wade, a state 
might well legally require the use of artificial wombs in the interest of protecting 
“potential life.” Abel (1974), Goldstein (1978), Favole (1979) and Tribe, each writing 
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following Roe but before the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision, predict the 
Supreme Court’s further movement toward identifying abortion as a physical procedure 
in which substantive limitations to the exercise of bodily autonomy may be justified.  
 The Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey judgement 
reaffirms that privacy in the context of abortion is unique, with the majority finding 
“abortion decisions must be recognized as different in kind from the rights protected in 
the earlier cases under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy.”15 As Son 
(2005), Randall and Randall (2008), Steiger (2010), Schultz (2010) and Cohen (2017) 
duly note, the Casey decision made clear that states may infringe on a person’s bodily 
autonomy after viability in recognition of the state’s interest in protecting a fetus that 
has a chance of survival. On the basis of this balance, these scholars agree that given 
that the ectogenic fetus would have a chance of survival in an artificial womb without 
infringing on the pregnant person’s privacy by forcing her to carry the fetus, states may 
be justified in requiring the use of an artificial womb as an alternative to abortion. The 
Casey court also established the “undue burden” standard, finding that “undue burden 
exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place 
substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.”16 While a number of American scholars writing on ectogenesis and abortion 
write after the Casey decision (Son 2005, Randall and Randall 2008, Steiger 2010, 
Schultz 2010, Cohen 2017), only Randall and Randall and Cohen substantively engage 
with what the “undue burden” standard might mean with regard to the state’s ability to 
intervene in bodily autonomy. Further analysis of the extent to which measuring state 
intervention against “the undue burden” standard has allowed pregnant peoples’ bodily 
autonomy to be infringed on even prior to viability is important to understanding the 
possible impact of ectogenesis. Randall and Randall interpret the undue burden standard 
as follows:  
the Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence stands for the proposition 
that the woman’s autonomy interest outweighs the state’s interest in life until 
viability, after viability the state may exercise its interest so long as the health 
and welfare of the mother are provided for in any laws enacted (2008 16).  
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As Randall and Randall argue here, abortion jurisprudence clearly establishes stronger 
protections for the right to privacy prior to viability than after. Yet I want to challenge 
the extent to which they argue that “the state has little ability to protect the life of the 
fetus if it is not viable” (11). In fact, the undue burden standard quite clearly allows 
states to significantly limit the exercise of bodily autonomy in pregnancy prior to 
viability without these restrictions being considered “substantial obstacles in the path of 
a woman seeking an abortion.” 17 Regardless of whether an ectogenic fetus were viable 
from conception, then, interpretation of the undue burden standard could allow states to 
justify banning or significantly limiting abortion throughout pregnancy if ectogenesis 
were available as an alternative. Where currently, a full ban on abortion before viability 
would clearly be a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, if an 
artificial womb is available in principle (even if not always accessible in practice) an 
anti-abortion state legislature may accept that a full abortion ban is not a substantial 
obstacle because a pregnant person would still have the option of having the fetus 
extracted to an artificial womb. 
 To justify my position here, I want to turn to a particularly significant example 
of the interventions on bodily autonomy permitted by the undue burden standard prior 
to viability. Many American scholars writing on artificial wombs and abortion do so 
prior to the 2007 United States Supreme Court case of Gonzales v. Carhart. While 
Randall and Randall and Cohen do consider Gonzales in relation to ectogenesis, as I 
have noted above, Randall and Randall curiously do not acknowledge the extent to 
which the Court’s decision affirmed state intervention in a pregnant person’s bodily 
autonomy prior to viability.  
 In this class action suit, doctors who performed second trimester abortions (from 
twenty weeks on) challenged a federal statute called the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
(2003). The statute banned a second trimester abortion procedure called a dilation and 
extraction, in which a fetus is partially delivered and then excised. The complainants 
argued that the ban constituted an undue burden on a woman’s right to privacy, because 
it blocked physicians from using a procedure (prior to viability), that was least invasive 
on the patients’ bodily autonomy. Appellate courts found in favor of the physicians, in 
recognition that while the ban had an emergency exception for situations in which the 
pregnant person’s life was endangered, it had no exception to protect her health. The 





Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, finding that the ban was not an 
undue burden. This decision solidified that at both the federal and state level, the 
“undue burden” standard could allow for significant infringement on the privacy right 
applied in abortion both before and after viability. In the court’s majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy wrote, “the government may use its voice and its regulatory authority 
to show its profound respect for the life within the woman.”18 This decision allows for 
particular abortion procedures to be banned even before viability and even where, as 
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, the “procedure [was] found necessary and proper 
in certain cases by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists” (ibid). 
This ban sets a precedent that suggests that at both the federal and state level, even if the 
ectogenic fetus was not considered viable, the state may be able to ban abortion 
procedures that resulted in the death of the fetus (allowing extraction to an artificial 
womb instead) without this being considered an undue burden on the privacy right.  
Following the decision in Gonzales, anti-abortion state legislatures acted quickly 
to apply statutes to further limit the exercise of bodily autonomy prior to fetal viability. 
A particularly striking example of this is the extension of “chemical endangerment of a 
child” laws (introduced to protect children from exposure to drugs) to charge pregnant 
women who use drugs or alcohol with transferring dangerous substances to their fetuses 
(Paltrow and Flavin 2013). In cases such as these, which Paltrow and Flavin note have 
become increasingly common, women whose pregnancies are well before viability have 
been forcibly detained and subjected to invasive medical interventions. While Bard 
writes in 2006, prior to the decision in Gonzales, I find her prediction prescient here: 
that with reference to existing American case law precedent, “it seems a short leap from 
the ability to continue a pregnancy in an artificial womb to the requirement that every 
unwanted pregnancy must be completed in an artificial womb” (152).  
 Randall and Randall argue, as I do, that existing American abortion 
jurisprudence could allow states to force the use of artificial wombs in lieu of abortion 
because a pregnant person’s bodily autonomy may no longer outweigh the life of the 
fetus. However, where they hold that “pre-viability, the woman’s interest in autonomy 
and right to control her body trumps the state interest in the potential life of the fetus” 
(2008, 12), I argue that the decision in Gonzales v. Carhart and a number of statutes 
that have been allowed to pass at the state level following this decision suggest that 
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significant restrictions to bodily autonomy even where the ectogenic fetus is not 
considered viable may be permitted.  
 I find this an important distinction to make in the interests of establishing what 
needs to be considered in order to build appropriate, care-based frameworks for 
mitigating against these challenges. If abortion in the United States were  substantively 
protected as an essential exercise of bodily autonomy prior to fetal viability (as Tribe 
1990, Schultz 2010, Bard 2006, and Steiger 2010 among others argue), then a 
framework for ectogenesis which redefines viability to continue to protect autonomy 
prior to this point might sufficiently account for care of the pregnant person. But to 
imagine the steps that will be required to protect abortion if ectogenesis is introduced, 
we need to first be accurate as to whether contemporary protections to abortion rights in 
the United States are sufficient.  
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Whether ectogenesis may undermine abortion law in the United Kingdom by 
eliminating a defence of the procedure based in bodily autonomy requires consideration 
of the legislative intent of the Abortion Act 1967. Sheldon summarizes the impetus for 
reform as “the protection of medical discretion and autonomy and a desire to bring 
women out of the backstreets and into contact with their GPs” (1997, 17). It is certainly 
the case that under this legislation, many people have experienced and understood 
abortion in England, Scotland, and Wales as a protected right to bodily autonomy. But 
rather than being intended primarily to codify a state interest in the rights of women to 
make private choices, the passage of the Abortion Act served to ensure that medical 
professionals were not penalized for offering abortions, and to protect the health and 
safety of women and their families. 
 Alghrani distinguishes between assessing whether the UK would allow for the 
termination of fetuses that begin in an artificial womb and whether the law would allow 
the termination of fetuses that begin in a woman’s body. Pertaining to ectogenesis as an 
alternative to abortion where the fetus began in a person’s body, Alghrani contends that 
“at present, the surgical procedure that would have to be performed to transfer the 
foetus intact would probably be akin to a caesarean section after twenty-four weeks’ 
gestation” (2008 315). She argues that because of this, “to coerce women to continue 
their pregnancies until foetal transfer into an ectogenic chamber is possible is nothing 




law is clear [that a] competent pregnant woman ‘has an absolute right to choose whether 
to consent to medical treatment or refuse it’” (316), and concludes that it is likely that a 
claim to bodily autonomy would still protect access to abortion. Alghrani’s argument 
depends upon fetal extraction being invasive, and I believe she is right to suggest that 
based on existing technology, such a procedure could be akin to a c-section. But this is 
an unknown variable, and one which (as Brassington 2008 argues) may have 
increasingly less application as the technology advances and pushes back the point at 
which a fetus might be removed into an artificial womb. With this in mind, I want to 
consider whether based on the contemporary guidelines established by the Abortion 
Act, bodily autonomy needs to be defended against ectogenesis if bodily autonomy is 
not what currently serves to protect abortion access in the UK. To be clear before I 
embark on this analysis, I am not suggesting that legal protections which do not 
acknowledge the link between a pregnant person’s bodily autonomy and a right to 
abortion are preferable. Questions of alternative and appropriate frameworks based on 
feminist care ethics will be addressed in chapters four and six. In this chapter, however, 
I am simply following the thread of the arguments built by the scholars I acknowledge 
here, which is to analyze likely outcomes based on existing law.  
 The Abortion Act 1967 is quite specifically structured to protect doctors who 
perform the procedure from criminalization. Prior to twenty-four weeks gestation, 
Section 1 stipulates that a fetus may be “terminated by a registered medical practitioner 
if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith” that 
continuing the pregnancy “would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were 
terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any 
existing children of her family.” Rather than referring to a balance of privacy rights and 
the fetus’s right to life, as American jurisprudence does, the Abortion Act’s exceptions 
to the criminal law make it explicit that prior to viability, the decision is to be left to 
medical discretion. According to how the Abortion Act regulates the procedure, then, 
the fact that a pregnant person’s bodily autonomy may no longer be implicated need not 
mean that the law as it is written would be undermined. The availability of ectogenesis 
could certainly influence the opinion of “registered medical practitioners” as to whether 
continuing the pregnancy might have a negative impact on the woman’s physical or 
mental health. Early extraction to an artificial womb may be less of a physical burden 
than forced pregnancy, which may mean that some practitioners might feel “in good 




constitute a danger to the woman’s physical health. But others may reasonably find that 
neglecting to offer a termination could still produce “injury to the physical or mental 
health of the pregnant woman or any existing children.”This is a point on which I am in 
agreement with Emily Jackson, who notes that abortion on social grounds (meaning, 
consideration of negative effects on the pregnant person’s mental health or a risk to 
existing children in her family) could very well still apply even where ectogenesis was 
available as an alternative. Both before and after viability, physicians may take “account 
[ . . .] of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.” As 
Alghrani argues, the Abortion Act as written could extend to “a risk of injury to the 
mental health of the progenitors” (2008, 321) or in a situation in which the fetus “may 
suffer from [significant] physical or mental abnormalities” (321).  
Writing of abortion broadly speaking, Kaczor argues (2005, 2019) that “the most 
prominent defenders of abortion defend only a right to evacuation, not a right of 
termination” (287) and that therefore protection of an abortion right where the woman’s 
bodily autonomy is no longer at issue will be universally moot. But to reiterate one of 
the primary aims of this thesis, academic writing on abortion and ectogenesis is almost 
entirely drawn from a US context. Kaczor’s argument is a prime example of a pattern 
whereby American jurisprudence is used to draw a universal conclusion about the 
impact of artificial wombs. Looking beyond the specifications set out in the Abortion 
Act to interpretation and contemporary application of the Act, barring a significant (but 
possible) back-step in medical and political attitudes to abortion in England, Scotland, 
and Wales, interpretation of the Act in the context of ectogenesis is likely to err toward 
granting a continued right to termination. Artificial wombs may well shift the attitudes 
of medical and legal practitioners in the UK toward abortion. But given the gradual 
development of the technology, with the line at which a fetus could survive outside the 
body shifting back by a measure of only a few weeks over decades of time, 
contemporary practice is likely a good measure of how incremental shifts in this 
technology will be received.  
 It is precisely the medical paternalism inherent in the construction of the 
Abortion Act (and the subsequent way in which the legislation fails to centralize 
women’s autonomy) that many pro-choice reformers cite as problematic. There 




criminalized for self-administering abortion after viability.19 I am in agreement with 
critics of the Act that the continued presence of abortion as a criminal offence with 
exceptions, and the treatment of physicians as appropriate gatekeepers to access is an 
outdated and patronizing practice. These are vital concerns that I take up in chapter four 
where I consider frameworks for ectogenesis, abortion, and care. But while judicial 
interpretation of Roe v. Wade’s protection of abortion as a balance between autonomy 
and fetal life has moved in favour of increasing restrictions to access, paradoxically, 
though the Abortion Act does not enshrine privacy or autonomy, its shifting 
interpretation has allowed for increasingly greater autonomy for pregnant people in 
application. As Sheldon argues, in England, Scotland, and Wales, “broad support for the 
idea that it should be doctors who decide whether an abortion is justified has ebbed 
away, at least in earlier pregnancy when the overwhelming majority of abortions take 
place” (2016, 314). As Lee, Sheldon, and McVarish (2018) have argued, while the Act 
has not been updated since 1990, physicians in these jurisdictions increasingly 
recognize the abortion decision as properly being in the hands of the pregnant person.  
Sheldon’s engagement with how application of the Abortion Act has changed 
over time is not to suggest that significant reform is not required. I too, agree that 
changes should be made. However, when it comes to contemporary practice, I am 
attempting to establish that a challenge to the importance of bodily autonomy in the 
abortion decision introduced by ectogenesis may be unlikely to result in a 
corresponding attack on abortion rights in the UK context. In 2018, the British Medical 
Association expressed support for offering women greater autonomy and agreed the 
position of supporting full decriminalization of abortion, in instances where it is 
performed by doctors and where it is administered by pregnant people themselves 
(2018). That the association has taken this policy suggests that physicians would be 
unlikely to abruptly turn away from recognizing the decision as properly being a 
pregnant person’s choice even if technology would allow the fetus to survive without 
dependence on her body. Section 4 of the Abortion Act does allow for conscientious 
objection to abortion, “provided that in any legal proceedings the burden of proof of 
conscientious objection shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it”, and that medical 
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professionals must perform the procedure in spite of such objections if necessary to save 
a woman’s life or if she faces substantive medical risks if it is not performed. The BMA 
and Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists position on conscientious 
objection is firm that where physicians do not feel they can morally advise on or 
perform abortions, they should make this clear to the patient and make other 
arrangements for that patient’s care (BMA 2017). Therefore, even if in some cases 
physician opinions on abortion shifted due to the availability of ectogenesis, for this to 
lead to a similar shift among all doctors is improbable.  
 While doctors may apply the Abortion Act in practice in ways which offer 
greater autonomy to women, ectogenesis could shift their legal liability by altering 
whether they are able to justify the provision of abortion in “good faith.” However, an 
interpretive shift toward supporting greater autonomy for women is also evident in legal 
application of the legislation. Prior to 1990, the Abortion Act specified that “any 
treatment for the termination of pregnancy must be carried out in a hospital.” Section 1 
(3A) of the 1990 revisions to the Act qualified that the Secretary of State could “in 
relation to treatment consisting primarily in the use of such medicines” to induce 
abortion, “approve a class of places” in which these pills could be consumed. This 
change was made in anticipation of the possibility that abortion pills may one day more 
appropriately be consumed at home. Because the two pills in the medical abortion cycle 
are best taken with a space of twenty-four to forty-eight hours between them, the initial 
requirement that abortions occur at an NHS hospital or licensed clinic meant that 
women had to make arrangements to cover two visits, with the possible consequence of 
the termination completing while in transit. Existing laws allowed women who 
miscarried to take misoprostol in their homes to ensure completion, producing a 
situation in which women who aborted had to be supervised while consuming the pill 
but women who spontaneously miscarried did not. Campaigning began in the early 
2000s to push the Secretaries of State to use the power designated to them to approve a 
class of places for abortion and allow for women to take misoprostol at home when 
terminating. As of 2017, this power has been used in Scotland and Wales to allow 
pregnant people to take the second pill at home, and as of 2018, in England (BMA 
2017). This then, constitutes an example of how application of the Abortion Act, in both 
a legal and a medical sense, has adapted over time to allow women greater autonomy in 
the sense of choosing the location and the means of their abortion procedure in practice, 




reference to ectogenesis, the Abortion Act and the ways in which its interpretation by 
medical professionals and application in law has shifted over time may in fact continue 
to protect abortion access through not relying on a loosely defined and malleable right 
to privacy or bodily autonomy. 
As Jackson (2000), Sheldon (2016), and others argue, the medical paternalism 
enshrined by the act is out of step with contemporary legal protections to patients in 
other areas. The strongest criticism of the Abortion Act levelled by physicians and pro-
choice campaigners is that it retains abortion as a criminal offence with exceptions, a 
position which is unacceptable morally, medically, and legally, and continues to leave 
women and doctors in a precarious position (see Jackson 2000, Sheldon 2016). I share 
these criticisms, and I will take up each of these concerns in chapters four and six. It is 
also the case that in the absence of decriminalization and clearly stipulated protection to 
abortion on ones’ own terms, access remains open to be undermined by a shifting 
political landscape. However, a shift from abortion pills being available for women to 
use at home to women being required to subject their bodies to an extraction for the 
sake of saving an early stage embryo or fetus would require a significant leap. This is in 
clear contrast with a United States context in which the law grants that restrictions may 
be placed on abortion from the earliest stages of pregnancy in order to preserve the 
state’s interest in potential life.  
 
CANADA 
The text of the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms at issue in R v. Morgentaler 
was Article 7, which reads that “everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of 
the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice.”Article 7 is broadly similar to the text at issue in Roe, 
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, which holds that “no state shall 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Yet where 
“liberty” in the context of abortion is interpreted in United States’ Supreme Court 
jurisprudence through a narrow application of a right to privacy with reference to the 
physical body, Canadian jurisprudence offers a broader interpretation of the abortion 
right. The Canadian Charter distinguishes between “liberty and security of the person,” 
indicating that “liberty” is to be understood as distinct from physical autonomy vested 




Kingdom and the United States in considerations of whether ectogenesis is likely to 
undermine a bodily autonomy-based protection for abortion.  
In the limited Canadian scholarship engaging with ectogenesis and abortion, 
scholars affirm the position widely held in the American literature that abortion rights 
will be fundamentally challenged by the way in which ectogenesis may mean that 
bodily autonomy need no longer be implicated in keeping a fetus alive. While 
concluding that extraction to an artificial womb is an anti-feminist alternative to 
abortion, Overall argues that the extrication of the implications of forced pregnancy for 
a woman’s bodily autonomy will challenge abortion rights (2015). Similarly, Blahuta 
draws conclusions about abortion and ectogenesis which I will argue do not hold in 
Canadian abortion law in practice. Blahuta writes, “given that the fetus exists, and could 
be saved without imposing on the mother’s bodily integrity, self-determination, privacy, 
or other freedoms, it is unclear what arguments would warrant not saving a foetus that 
would otherwise be aborted” (2017 np). I argue that these defences for abortion (“bodily 
integrity, self-determination, privacy [and] other freedoms”) do need to be considered 
for their continued application with reference to ectogenesis, and in a Canadian context, 
a number of these protections to abortion may still hold. Though Canadian Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and case law precedent do in part protect abortion with reference to 
bodily autonomy, I argue that abortion rights in Canada are unlikely to be undermined 
by ectogenesis’s challenge to the applicability of bodily autonomy-based protections. In 
Canada, a broader interpretation of “security of the person” as well as an additional 
protection defined through a right to “liberty” suggest abortion may be more 
substantively bolstered against this particular challenge.  
 In the Morgentaler decision, three majority opinions were read in which 
divergent interpretations of the Charter rights were expressed. Chief Justice Dickson 
and Justice Lamer wrote in their opinion that “forcing a woman, by threat of criminal 
sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own 
priorities and aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman’s body and thus a 
violation of security of the person.” 20 While the Chief Justice and Justice Lamer 
focused only on “security of the person” and not “liberty,” their analysis of “security of 
the person” has scope beyond the limited rights to physical autonomy ascribed to the 
privacy protection of abortion in an American context. Dickson CJ notes that a state 
                                                          
20 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. (Canada). Available at https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-




infringement on this right also includes “the psychological effect of state 
action,”21including the psychological or emotional impact of state interference in 
decision making. Security of the person interpreted here beyond the context of physical 
assault on the body has more in common with the Abortion Act requirement that 
doctors consider a woman’s foreseeable physical and mental health when determining 
whether to perform an abortion than with Roe’s focus on protected rights to privacy 
limited to the physical body. As in the Abortion Act’s stipulations for a pregnant 
person’s emotional health, this interpretation of “security of the person” which also 
accounts for emotional impact, could well extend to protecting termination of a fetus 
were an artificial womb available.  
The second assenting majority opinion, delivered by Justices Beetz and Estsey, 
offers a more narrow interpretation of security of the person. The justices write that 
protecting security of the person “must include a right of access to medical treatment for 
a condition representing a danger to life or health without fear of criminal sanction,”22 
quite specifically construing a violation of bodily autonomy as referring to a physical 
procedure for life or health. Justices Beetz and Estsey devote more time to discussing 
parliamentary interest in fetal life, and note with reference to Roe v. Wade that there is 
likely some point in pregnancy at which parliament might reasonably infringe on 
security of the person to protect the fetus. Yet while the Roe judges articulated a 
timeline to balance the extent of such interests, and the Abortion Act also uses a 
gestational limit after which greater protections are to be offered to the growing fetus, 
all majority opinions in Morgentaler refrained from establishing specific guidelines. 
Blahuta writes of abortion rights and ectogenesis that “it is not certain that the privacy 
rights of the mother or the mother’s interest in controlling her genetic material would 
outweigh the right to life of a foetus that could be transplanted” (2017 np). But while 
Canadian jurisprudence acknowledges state interest in the life of the fetus, even in the 
most narrow (Beetz and Estsey) interpretation of security of the person, “a right to life 
of the fetus”23 is not balanced against the pregnant person’s bodily autonomy. This 
indicates that it is unlikely that “a right to life of the fetus” would outweigh a right to 
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security of the person even with the availability of an artificial womb, unless legislative 
steps were taken to establish a balancing test.  
 While Justice Beetz and Chief Justice Dickson “focused narrowly on the right to 
security of the person” (Downie and Kaposy 2008, 290), Justice Wilson found that both 
a right to security of the person and a right to liberty were violated by Section 251 of the 
Criminal Code. While in the context of Roe, constitutional “liberty” was narrowly 
interpreted with reference to abortion as a right to make private choices regarding one’s 
body, Justice Wilson’s reading of liberty in the Canadian Charter is significantly 
broader in scope. Wilson wrote that liberty “grants the individual a degree of autonomy 
in making decisions of fundamental personal importance,”24 as informed by “basic 
theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will respect choices made by 
individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid subordinating these choices to 
any one conception of the good life.” 25 Justice Wilson continues that “the right to 
reproduce or not to reproduce [. . . ] is one such right and is properly perceived as an 
integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a human 
being.”26 Notably, Wilson references a large selection of writings on liberty to support 
her definition, including quite specific references to “liberty” as discussed in Roe v. 
Wade. When Morgentaler was decided (1988), less than twenty years had elapsed since 
Roe. Casey, Gonzales, and other case law to follow had not yet further narrowed the 
privacy right. While Wilson did link “liberty” to private decision-making and bodily 
autonomy (as in Roe), she also more expansively interpreted it with reference to 
“dignity and worth as a human being.” Justice Wilson goes on to assert that Section 251 
is explicitly intended to take away rights from women, not simply to protect the life of 
the fetus. This analysis of liberty goes beyond the question of whether a state can 
intervene in or enforce a process that occurs in the body and takes specific account of 
liberty with reference to abortion as a feminist and humanitarian concern. Undoubtedly, 
whether a concept of “human dignity and worth as a human being” is sufficient to 
protect abortion access if ectogenesis is available is open to consideration. I will discuss 
this further with regard to frameworks for abortion and ectogenesis informed by a 
feminist ethics of care in chapter four.  
                                                          






 Justice Wilson also affirms that Section 251 is a violation of security of the 
person, for which she provides an interpretation in keeping with that offered by Chief 
Justice Dickson and Justice Lamer, noting that it refers to “both the physical and 
psychological integrity of the individual,”27 but going further in noting that barriers to 
abortion access resulting in forced pregnancy create situations in which a woman is 
truly being treated as [. . . ]a means to an end which she does not desire but over 
which she has no control. She is the passive recipient of a decision made by 
others as to whether her body is to be used to nurture a new life. Can there be 
anything that comports less with human dignity and self-respect?28  
 
This interpretation is consistent with Dickson and Lamer’s opinion and to some extent, 
with bodily autonomy interpreted in American jurisprudence, in that it refers 
specifically to the impact on the body of being pregnant against one’s will. However, in 
referring also to “human dignity and self-respect,” this interpretation of security of the 
person is also tied back to the violation of “liberty” and is once again more broad than 
the right outlined in Roe, Casey, and case law to follow.  
 In a major review of all Canadian case law dealing with reproductive rights up 
to 2008, Kaposy and Downie found that though Justice Wilson’s was the only opinion 
to emphasize that restrictive abortion regulations violated a right to liberty as well as 
security of the person, it is this more broad justification for abortion that is most “often 
cited and used to support legal rulings on reproductive choice in other areas of law” 
(2008, 290). Tracking these references in relation to reproductive choice, Kaposy and 
Downie note that the affirmation of abortion rights as essential to liberty in Canadian 
jurisprudence might “signal the embrace of a broader liberty-based justification for the 
rejection of criminal prohibitions against abortion” (294). The authors suggest that in 
the future, provincial legislatures wishing to restrict abortion could attempt to do so by 
weighing interest in fetal life against interest in security of the person. They argue, 
however, that Wilson’s recognition of a liberty right and the “citation and endorsement” 
(294) of abortion rights as fundamental to liberty in other areas of law could protect 
against such attempts, as “it would be more difficult to craft a criminal prohibition that 
does not infringe the section 7 right to liberty” (ibid) than to craft such a restriction 
balanced against a right to security of the person. Kaposy and Downie discuss the uses 
of the liberty-based defence of abortion in the context of their general consideration of 
                                                          






how to defend abortion against possible attempts to recriminalize the procedure in the 
future. While Kaposy and Downie do not give reference to ectogenesis, the 
development of artificial wombs is precisely the kind of shift that might occasion these 
attempts by anti-abortion campaigners. Abortion rights construed as essential to 
fundamental “human dignity” and a right to determine for oneself how a “good life” is 
to be defined may still justify the termination of a fetus causing its death rather than the 
forced use of an artificial womb.  
With this said, “the Charter is not generally regarded as requiring state action to 
help facilitate access” (Johnstone and Macfarlane 2016, 99), and as Kaposy and Downie 
argue, restrictions continue to exist at a provincial level. While federal restrictions to 
abortion may be unlikely to increase on the basis that bodily autonomy is no longer at 
issue where ectogenesis is available, provinces that have already shown a strong 
propensity toward creating barriers to protect fetal life (such as Prince Edward Island, 
New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia), might be inclined toward claiming the availability 
of artificial wombs as a justification for further restricting abortion access, even if this 
did not occur through criminal law. I will discuss provincial level barriers to access 
further in the chapters to come.  
 
3.3 A Challenge to Abortion Rights Based on Shifting Fetal Viability  
A second key challenge that scholars have suggested ectogenesis presents for abortion 
law is in shifting back the point at which a fetus is understood as “viable.” As I have 
discussed in my literature review, “viability” is a medical term that refers to the point at 
which a fetus has a chance of survival outside of the pregnant person’s body. As of 
2015, the availability of neonatal technologies and medical expertise at most Western 
hospitals has set fetal viability between 22-24 weeks gestation, with morbidity for 
infants “born before 28 weeks” remaining high (Partridge et al. 2017, 1). The biobag is 
intended for use to save fetuses born between 22-23 weeks gestation, and as I have 
discussed in my introduction, many scholars who write on ectogenesis anticipate this 
line moving back slowly as incubation technology improves. A number of legal and 
bioethical scholars suggest that by sustaining the fetus from earlier and earlier stages of 
gestation, the artificial womb will challenge abortion law by shifting back the point at 
which the fetus is viable, perhaps with viability ultimately beginning from conception. 




ectogenetic embryo [. . .] viability occurs at conception. It not only is capable of an 
independent existence; it maintains an independent existence’” (253). Assertions that 
artificial wombs might shift viability, and in so doing, undermine existing abortion law 
recur in the literature (Abel 1974, Goldstein 1978, Coleman 2004, Son 2005, Bard 
2006, Randall and Randall 2007, Alghrani 2008, Jackson 2008, Alghrani and Brazier 
2011, Abecassis 2016, Cohen 2017, Langford 2017). While Abel, Goldstein, Son, Bard, 
Randall and Randall, Abecassis, and Cohen all write from the context of the United 
States, Alghrani, Jackson, and Alghrani and Brazier specifically consider this challenge 
in the context of the United Kingdom. This potential challenge is importantly 
interrelated with the question of bodily autonomy that I have analysed in the earlier part 
of this chapter, and these two concerns are frequently discussed concurrently in the 
literature. I’ve chosen to parse them here, however, because doing so can help 
emphasize that “bodily autonomy” and “viability” are at issue to different extents and 
interact in abortion law in different ways in each of these three jurisdictions.  
Once again a number of American scholars in particular (Abel 1974, Goldstein 
1978, Kaczor 2005, Bard 2006, Reiber 2010) write of the moral significance of viability 
to abortion rights and the way in which this will be impacted by ectogenesis as though 
this is universally applicable. Catholic bioethicist Reiber is representative in this regard 
when he writes that “another aspect of abortion ‘rights’ which is invalidated by 
ectogenesis is the legal construct of fetal ‘viability.’ [. . .With] the development of 
effective ectogenesis, the relevance of fetal viability as a boundary would be 
eliminated” (2010, 523). Reiber expresses the sense that viability is a universal and self-
evident construct, for which a shift would naturally impact abortion rights. In what 
follows, I hope to demonstrate that in fact, differences in the applicability of viability as 
a legal timeline for abortion across these three jurisdictions suggests that a medical shift 
in viability will not universally challenge abortion rights.     
 
THE UNITED STATES 
American legal and bioethical scholars have been the most ardent, since the 1970s, in 
arguing that an artificial womb could fundamentally change the nature of the abortion 
debate by potentially rendering the fetus viable from conception (Abel 1974, Favole 
1979, Goldstein 1978, Tribe 1990, Pence 2006, Randall and Randall 2008, Cohen 
2017). These scholars are attentive to how Roe v. Wade establishes that the State’s 




of them write before Casey and Gonzales (Abel 1974, Favole 1979, Goldstein 1978, 
Tribe 1990, Pence 2006), they anticipate the affirmation of viability in these cases as the 
key point in pregnancy at which the state can significantly infringe on a right to privacy.   
 Blackmun wrote for the majority in Roe that while the court could not 
conclusively answer “the difficult question of when life begins,”29 and opinions on this 
timeline would widely vary, “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not include the unborn.” Balancing this against the sense that the moral 
significance of a fetus increased as it developed, the court established that the state’s 
interest in the fetus increased toward the later stages of gestation. To reflect this, the 
court held that at “approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting 
its interests in the health of the mother, may [. . .]regulate the abortion procedure in 
ways that are reasonably related to maternal health” and following viability, “the State 
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, 
and even proscribe” abortion unless necessary for the mother’s health or life.30 
Blackmun established viability as “the interim point at which the fetus becomes 
‘viable,’ that is, potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial 
aid. Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, 
even at 24 weeks.”31 In specifying that a fetus is viable even where it requires “artificial 
aid,” the Roe court clearly indicated that the viability limit was intended to protect 
fetuses that remained dependent on machines as well as those able to survive without 
significant intervention. As Abel, Favole, Goldstein, and Tribe argue, this constitutes 
compelling evidence that the legality of abortion would be limited at the stage at which 
a fetus could be transferred to and survive in an artificial womb. Goldstein (1978) 
rightly notes that “although the Roe opinion acknowledges that technological advances 
might raise difficulties in applying the viability concept, the opinion does not discuss 
the legal effect of such advances” (Goldstein 1978, 878). With reference to medical 
advances in viability, later decisions in both Casey and Gonzales offer further 
clarification to suggest the capacity of both partial and full artificial womb technology 
to shift legal application of viability and restrict abortion in American law. 
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In Casey (1992), the Supreme Court recognized that medical viability had 
shifted from approximately 28 weeks at the time of Roe (1973) to 24 weeks, finding that 
“advances in neonatal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier.”32 In 
spite of acknowledging that viability may move back still further as technology 
improved, the majority opinion of the court dismissed the trimester framework 
established in Roe in favor of affirming viability as the most pertinent marker of when 
abortion could be restricted. The justices found that  
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 
‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably 
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.33  
 
In her analysis of ectogenesis and abortion, Son focuses on the court’s justification for 
affirming the viability timeline in Casey. As Son notes, the Casey court first defends the 
viability timeline on the basis that it affirms the principle of stare decisis. To explain 
dismissing the trimester framework in favour of viability, however, the Casey court 
established that it was fair because given its significance as the point at which the fetus 
has a chance of surviving outside the uterus “there is no line other than viability which 
is more workable,”34 and because “it might be said that a woman who fails to act before 
viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the developing child.” 
Son focuses on this final justification for the viability timeline, arguing that if 
ectogenesis shifts back medical viability, the court’s justification of viability as both a 
point where the fetus could survive independently and “a normative quantity of time 
deemed sufficient for a woman to have thoughtfully pondered and carried out her 
decision to abort” (2005 214) would no longer align. While I agree with Son that if 
ectogenesis moved viability further back this second principle would not be fulfilled, 
the court’s decision in Casey makes it clear that this misalignment is unlikely to impact 
the use of viability as a definitive timeline in abortion rights. The decision quite clearly 
establishes with reference to shifts in medical viability that:  
The soundness or unsoundness of that constitutional judgment [viability as the 
key timeline in Roe] in no sense turns on whether viability occurs at 
approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it 
sometimes does today, or at some moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as 
it may if fetal respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future. 
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Whenever it may occur, the attainment of viability may continue to serve as the 
critical fact, just as it has done since Roe was decided.35 
 
 
The majority decision gives little consideration here to whether the already evident 
shifts in medical viability impact the timeframe given to women to make an informed 
decision about abortion access. But further, this statement appears to quite affirmatively 
suggest that the court anticipates that viability will continue to shift, and despite this, 
that the court will stand behind it as a decisive milestone in abortion rights.  
 The Supreme Court’s later decision in Gonzales affirmed the importance of the 
first principle of viability (the possibility that a fetus could survive outside the uterus) 
and did not acknowledge the second principle emphasized by Son. In fact, the ruling in 
Gonzales, and state-level restrictions to abortion that have followed it, emphasize the 
significance of viability and suggest that the Court is likely to allow states to 
significantly restrict or ban abortion with the introduction of ectogenesis both near to 
and after medical viability.  
 The court found in agreement with Congress that abortion via dilation and 
extraction “perverts the birth process,” and that “such abortions are similar to the killing 
of a newborn infant” by a medical professional. Congress’s intention in implementing 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, upheld by the Supreme Court, was to prohibit 
intentionally killing a fetus that was perceived to have a chance of survival. This 
strongly implies that if it were possible for a fetus to be extracted into an artificial 
womb and survive, courts would allow a ban on abortions done with the intention to 
cause the death of the fetus. The court’s decision to protect fetuses as early as 20 weeks 
“from a brutal and inhuman procedure,” 36  works on the presumption that fetuses that 
are near to viability (even by a quite medically significant margin of four weeks), can 
experience suffering.37 That the court would establish this boundary in spite of the 
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can also emerge from a situated feminist, justice-oriented perspective. See for example Kafer 2013, Chen 




absence of medical evidence38 to substantiate this claim suggests that even before 
artificial wombs are sufficiently advanced to actually allow an early stage fetus to 
survive, the perception that they could do so may be enough to justify a ban.  
 Precedent for restrictions on abortion near fetal viability is also evident in a 
number of state level statutes. “Fetal pain laws” that ban abortion from twenty weeks 
based on unsubstantiated claims that a fetus begins to feel painful stimulis “near” 
viability have successfully passed in “Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Nebraska, Louisiana and North Carolina [. . . ] except for the life or health of the 
mother” (Bird 2014 48). As of February 2019, the Ohio legislature has voted in support 
of passing a law which would ban abortion at six weeks, following research claiming 
that this is the point at which a fetal heartbeat can be detected. The success of these 
measures to extend the protection afforded to viable fetuses back increasingly earlier 
suggests that states with anti-abortion legislatures could utilise ectogenesis to argue that 
fetal viability had shifted and to defend bans at as early in pregnancy as possible.  
 While, “as of 2013, forty-one states prohibit abortion upon fetal viability, unless 
to save the life or health of the mother” (ibid), some states notably do continue to allow 
abortion post-viability, and to have legislatures that are broadly protective of abortion 
rights (such as California, Oregon, and Connecticut). In these states, it may be 
improbable that attempts would be made to curb abortion even if an artificial womb 
were to significantly shift viability, but these jurisdictions would still be impacted by a 
ban at the federal level.  
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
That the United Kingdom also limits abortions after viability could suggest that both 
partial ectogenesis (such as the biobag), and full ectogenesis might also pose a serious 
challenge to abortion law in the UK. Despite the shared history of the United Kingdom 
and United States around incorporating scientific and medical developments in fetal 
viability into law, however, there have been markedly different responses in these two 
jurisdictions toward attempts to use this research to restrict abortion access. According 
to the Infant Life Preservation Act, a fetus of twenty-eight weeks or older is 
presumptively “a child capable of being born alive.” Where federal precedent in the 
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United States has allowed abortion after 24 weeks to be banned in many states except to 
save the pregnant person’s life, the Abortion Act also provides exceptions for maternal 
health and fetal anomalies. While as Jackson (2008) and Alghrani (2008) each rightly 
note, the gestational limit for abortion could be significantly lowered with the 
introduction of ectogenesis, the current legal justifications given for abortion after 24 
weeks would still apply should the ectogenic fetus be considered viable from 
conception. I will discuss this further in chapter four, when I turn to assessing proposed 
frameworks for retaining the status quo of abortion rights against a feminist ethics of 
care. Here, I want to consider whether, based on the Abortion Act as written and 
contemporary discussion and debate over the gestational time limit for abortion, a shift 
in viability produced by ectogenesis is likely to challenge these rights in the context of 
the United Kingdom.  
 In 1987, the Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology organized a working 
group on fetal viability, and recommended that to reflect scientific progress, the upper 
limit of abortion should be lowered to 24 weeks (Sheldon 1997). Between the passage 
of the Abortion Act and the amendments made in 1990 by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, twelve private members bills were introduced which attempted to 
lower the upper limit for abortion (105). Of these, the Alton Bill, proposed by David 
Alton in 1988, generated perhaps the most attention. Alton argued for “reducing the 
upper time limit of legal abortion to eighteen weeks [from 28], based largely on the 
claim that technological improvements enabled an earlier age of foetal viability” 
(Franklin 2014, 110). As Sheldon notes, the Alton Bill was never put to a final vote, 
having “[run] out of time at the Report Stage” (1997, 107). The passage of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act in 1990, then, was preceded by thorough discussion 
and debate over whether and how to shift the gestational limit for abortion, with 
lobbying on both sides. Significantly for the consideration of ectogenesis, Sheldon 
argues that in the lead up to Parliament’s vote on the upper gestational limit, anti-
abortion MPs, including Alton, pushed for a lower time limit (of 18 or 20 weeks) 
largely based on the need to “legislate for the future, which will no doubt bring 
technological advances to lower the gestational age at which the foetus can be 
considered as viable outside of the womb” (110). Ultimately, while lower limits were 
tabled during the parliamentary debate, they were voted out, with the agreed upon 
change lowering the limit to 24 weeks. As Sheldon has noted, while this decision was in 




and abortion rights, potentially leaving abortion rights open to attack even by partially 
ectogenic technologies such as the biobag. Up to the amendment lowering the limit 
from twenty-eight to twenty-four weeks, the changes to legal viability in the United 
Kingdom based on medical research reflect similar changes initiated by the Casey 
decision during the same period in the United States (1992) at the federal level. Should 
the partially ectogenetic biobag successfully lower medical viability below 24 weeks, 
the codification of an upper limit for abortion access in the United Kingdom (barring 
the exceptions for post-viability coded in the Abortion Act) may be expected to produce 
further restrictions.  
 Yet in the United Kingdom, established precedent thus far is to resist attempts to 
lower the upper limit for abortion. While a number of legal restrictions to abortion in 
the United States (such as the “fetal pain laws”) are based on inconclusive or suspect 
scientific research, established practice in the United Kingdom is to reject attempts to 
lower viability without clear and conclusive evidence. Strongly substantiated evidence 
that suggests artificial wombs could significantly reduce viability, then, might lead to a 
lowering of the upper gestational limit. However, UK abortion law may also offer 
further protection against a challenge to abortion rights based on a lowered viability 
timeline by the way in which shifts in viability have been assessed in concert with other 
concerns, including how such changes might impact women.  
In anticipation of the amendments to the Human Ferilisation and Embryology 
Act in 2008, a 2007 parliamentary Science and Technology Select Committee was 
convened to advise Parliament on the possible justifications for and implications of 
lowering the gestational limit once again. The inquiry considered developments in 
technologies impacting fetal viability and assessed these developments alongside 
“neonatal survival rates and foetal viability, foetal consciousness and pain, and the 
reasons why women present for late abortions” (2007, 13), among other concerns. The 
cross-party committee assessed a wide range of data related to neonatal survival and 
viability, and found that “while survival rates at 24 weeks and over have improved they 
have not done so below that gestational point [and] we have seen no good evidence to 
suggest that foetal viability has improved significantly since the abortion time limit was 
last set, and seen some good evidence to suggest that it has not” (22). This 
recommendation does leave open the possibility that the upper gestational limit could be 
lowered in future were even partial artificial womb technology successful in 




alone as the determinative factor in the ultimate parliamentary vote against lowering the 
abortion time limit once again. However, in the same era in which the United State’s 
Supreme Court ruling in Gonzales (2005) set a precedent for significant infringements 
on abortion rights based on dubious scientific claims, the STS select committee 
cautioned that clear and coherent evidence, which would be difficult to gather, would be 
needed before suggesting fetal viability actually had moved back. The Science and 
Technology Select Committee also considered the fetal sentience research used to 
justify 20-week abortion bans in the United States. It found no indication that fetal “pain 
is consciously felt, especially not below the current upper gestational limit of abortion” 
(25). But more significantly, the committee advised that evidence of fetal pain “may be 
relevant to clinical practice but do[es] not appear to be relevant to the question of 
abortion law” (ibid). I am not attempting to claim a collective pro-choice position on the 
part of parliament and its investigative bodies. But I wish to emphasize an important 
contrast here with the United States pertaining to whether medical advancements in the 
area of fetal medicine are prima facie considered to be grounds for limiting abortion 
access. In the 2008 Parliamentary vote to update the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act and lower the gestational limit, parliament voted out calls to reduce the 
limit to 12, 16, 20, and 22 weeks respectively. That the Science and Technology Select 
Committee concluded that no research could be found to clearly substantiate that 
viability had shifted below 24 weeks, and that parliament did not move to alter the 
upper gestational limit does not indicate that parliament would never move to lower the 
limit, but rather that firm and demonstratable evidence of a shift would likely be 
required to prompt such a change.  
 As both Sheldon (1997) and Franklin (2014) have argued, the shift of the 
gestational limit from 28 to 24 weeks with the passage of the 1990 HFE Act affirmed a 
problematic linkage between developments in medical technology and access to 
abortion. But a challenge to abortion rights based on the potential of artificial wombs to 
lower the viability timeline may also be partially mitigated by the way in which shifts in 
medical viability have more recently been contextualized with consideration to broader 
social concerns in more recent discussions of the legal limit. While the undue burden 
standard in United States jurisprudence allows the interests of the state in the life of the 
fetus to be weighed increasingly more heavily than the interests of the pregnant person 
nearing viability, the STS report establishes that parliament should “consider what 




have on those women who present late for abortions” (28). As the research considered 
by the select committee (including data collected from the British Medical Association 
and Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists) indicates, the largest number of 
abortions in the United Kingdom happen in the early stages of pregnancy (prior to 12 
weeks), with significantly fewer happening near viability. The STS report includes 
research on why women seek abortion after 18 weeks, and notes that “many women 
who present for late abortions do so because they did not know they were 
pregnant,”(28) and that some “struggle to take the decision for abortion” (ibid). The 
inclusion of analysis of how lowering the legal limit might impact women suggests an 
inclination toward assessing what a shifting medical viability might mean for abortion 
regulation not in isolation but concurrently with broader social issues.  
It is important to note that in the 2008 vote, a number of MPs spoke strongly in 
favour of lowering the gestational limit. But one of the primary arguments that arose 
against lowering the limit was that restricting abortion access in this way was motivated 
by anti-abortion sentiment, not simply by progress in science. Should ectogenesis lower 
medical viability substantively, a significant corresponding legal shift to the upper 
gestational limit would mean that a much larger cohort would be impacted. The 1990 
parliamentary vote, the STS committee’s conclusions, and the 2008 vote suggest that 
the impact of a lowered gestational limit on pregnant people is a significant concern for 
parliament. This may be weighed against scientific evidence of lowered viability.  
Further evidence that impact on pregnant people may be weighed against 
substantial proof that medical viability has been lowered may be indicated by the fact 
that in medical practice in the United Kingdom there is already recognition that a fetus 
as young as 22 weeks could be viable. Alghrani and Brazier note that “when a 
termination of pregnancy is to be performed later than 21 weeks 6 days, the current 
threshold of viability, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
recommend that feticide be carried out before the initiation of labour to ensure that the 
fetus is not born alive” (2011, 10). Alghrani and Brazier discuss this practice with 
reference to the question of whether it would be permissible to perform ectogenetic 
research on a fetus intended to be aborted. This practice is also significant, however, in 
evidencing that from a medical perspective, it is in fact already the case that at least 
some fetuses at significantly less than 24 weeks are potentially viable, yet it is common 
practice to actively terminate these fetuses to cause their death. Where it is already 




response to this in the mainstream in recent years has not been, as in the United States, 
to attempt to further restrict abortion rights. While anti-abortion campaigners were vocal 
in pushing for the updates to the HFE Act to include lowering the gestational limits, and 
pro-choice campaigners were hopeful that the 2008 amendments would involve re-
visiting the Abortion Act to institute more autonomy for women, parliament, informed 
by the Select Committee, concluded that no action would be taken to alter the Abortion 
Act.  
 It remains true that shifts in viability as partial ectogenic technology, and 
perhaps eventually full artificial wombs, are developed, could impact abortion rights 
under the Abortion Act. Under existing law, women have been criminalized for 
abortions procured after the gestational limit (BMA 2017), and even the possibility that 
in moving back the viability timeline ectogenesis could lead to the criminalization of 
more pregnant people for seeking abortion is an unacceptable outcome. I will address 
the problematic nature of the use of a gestational limit to restrict abortion access in the 
following chapter. However, as discussed above, precedent suggests that given the 
rejection in the UK, with the exception of a lower timeline in 1990, of attempts to 
significantly lower the gestational limit, it seems likely that incremental steps toward 
lowering viability will at least be less likely to interfere with abortion rights in the 
United Kingdom than in the United States.   
 
CANADA 
A consideration of viability in Canadian abortion law demonstrates that universalizing 
arguments arising in the American literature which hold that “abortion ‘rights’ [will] be 
invalidated by ectogenesis” as the technology collapses “the legal construct of fetal 
‘viability’” (523) must be understood as contextually specific.  While in each majority 
opinion in Morgentaler, the judges acknowledged state interest in the life of the fetus, 
no viability limit was set in the landmark case. Chief Justice Dickson held that “the 
Court is not called upon in this appeal to evaluate any claim to ‘fetal rights’ or to assess 
the meaning of ‘the right to life’,”39 and that the court need not consider criteria that was 
“unrelated to the pregnant woman’s own priorities and aspirations.”40 While in both UK 
and American law, “viability” deals with a fetus that could live independently of 
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another person, and that is therefore a potential life worthy of more protection than an 
earlier stage fetus but less than a born person, in Canadian law, the absence of a 
viability timeline at federal level means that consideration of moral status at the federal 
level begins at birth. According to Section 223 of the Criminal Code of Canada: 
(1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has 
completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother, whether or 
not 
(a) it has breathed; 
(b) it has an independent circulation; or 
(c) the navel string is severed 
 
The lack of gestational limit at the federal level, and the corresponding presumption of 
personhood beginning at birth suggests that abortion law in Canada is unlikely to be 
undermined by shifts in viability. American bioethicists have surmised that “artificial 
wombs as envisioned are [. . .] the means that would enable the survival of a viable 
fetus without additional hazard to the health of the mother” (Kaczor 2005, 286), and that 
as a result, governments could compel their citizens to use this technology. Yet that 
Canadian law does not set a viability timeline for abortion demonstrates that legal 
“viability” is not a quality naturally vested in some fetuses, but a fictive construct 
designed to act as a limitation on abortion. I will take up further considerations of the 
limitations of the use of viability to protect abortion with the introduction of ectogenesis 
where I consider care-based frameworks for governing the technology in chapter four. 
For the moment, I will note that while in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
amendments have been made already in how the law delineates fetal viability in relation 
to abortion (from 28 to 24 weeks in both jurisdictions), in Canada, while these changes 
have been reflected in medical practice, they have not impacted the precedent set in 
Morgentaler. Numerous attempts have been made in Canada by anti-abortion 
contingents to institute a viability timeline or establish a legal recognition of fetal rights, 
including private members bills presented from 1988 onward, all of which have failed 
(Johnstone and Macfarlane 2015). Several cases in which claimants attempted to have 
fetuses recognized as legal persons (Tremblay v. Daigle 198941, R v. Sullivan 199142) 
have reached the Supreme Court, with the court reaffirming that rights are not vested 
until a child is born. Consistency on the point of the state’s interest in fetal life at the 
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federal level commencing at birth has positive implications for abortion rights even as 
partial and then full ectogenesis may introduce incremental shifts into viability. With 
this noted, as in the United States and the United Kingdom, there is a further question to 
explore here as to when the ectogenic fetus will be considered “born.” Referring back to 
the definition of a person in the Criminal Code, could an early stage fetus, or even an 
embryo, that had “completely proceeded in a living state” from the pregnant person be 
considered born? Or would the fetus only be considered born on emerging from the 
ectogenetic incubator? I do not address these questions here, as I am seeking to grapple 
with the possible implications of this technology for abortion regulations as they are 
currently constructed to apply before birth. But more research is need on this 
importantly intersecting question, some of which has already begun to be addressed 
elsewhere (Romanis 2018).   
 A final but quite significant point here is that while there is no federal 
governance around viability, there are ongoing provincial restrictions and medical 
guidelines which limit abortions to those occurring prior to viability. These restrictions 
are largely due to the availability of expert care to provide the later stage service 
(Johnstone and Macfarlane 2015). In some instances, pregnant people need to travel to 
from their home province to another part of Canada in order to access the procedure, 
and a small number of pregnant people are referred to clinics in the United States 
(Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada 2017). Further, the Canadian Medical Association 
clearly affirms in its policy that physicians must consider fetal viability, and that 
“elective termination after viability may be indicated [only] under exceptional 
circumstances” (2). In Canada, “More than 90 percent of abortions are performed during 
the first trimester and only 9 percent between twelve and twenty weeks of gestation” 
(Johnstone and Macfarlane 2015, 107), with “approximately 0.4 percent of abortions 
each year” (ibid) occurring after viability. The Canadian Medical Association’s policy 
to allow for elective termination after fetal viability only in exceptional circumstances 
then, reflects that a person presenting for an abortion after viability is already an 
exceptional occurrence. While some physicians may be reluctant to offer the procedure 
if artificial wombs allowed fetuses to be medically viable at an earlier stage in gestation, 
the further back viability shifted, the larger a portion of the population might be 
impacted if the CMA retained guidelines limiting abortion after viability. Given the 
recognition of abortion in Canada as an essential health service, it may be possible that 




abortion after medical viability. It is of course also possible that they would not do so, 
in which case access to abortion might be significantly impacted.   
 
CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, I have addressed two interrelated challenges that scholars have proposed 
ectogenesis will present for abortion law. First, I analysed the contention that 
ectogenesis will undermine abortion rights by negating a defence for abortion based in 
bodily autonomy. I tentatively demonstrated through a close look at abortion law in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, that contrary to the universalizing 
claims made in some of the American literature on ectogenesis (Favole 1979, Goldstein 
1978, Tribe 1990, Kaczor 2005, Reiber 2008, Sander-Staudt 2006, Schultz 2010), this is 
unlikely to hold true across all three of these jurisdictions. Looking at the narrow 
interpretation of abortion as protected through a right to privacy with reference to the 
physical body in the United States, I have agreed with American scholars who argue 
that the way that ectogenesis undermines a defence based in bodily autonomy will pose 
a threat to abortion protections. I go further, however, to make the claim that significant 
attacks on bodily autonomy in abortion decisions before fetal viability have already 
been allowed in the context of the United States. Understanding that ectogenesis is 
likely to worsen this reality rather than introducing a novel threat to autonomy-based 
protections is necessary for assessing the suitability of proposed frameworks for 
ectogenesis and abortion, which I will turn to in the following chapter. Considering the 
United Kingdom, I have suggested that while UK scholars are right to contend that the 
paternalism of the Abortion Act 1967 is outdated and problematic (Sheldon 2016, 
Alghrani 2008 among others), consideration of the Act as written as well as how it has 
been applied in medical and legal practice in recent years suggest that artificial wombs 
are unlikely to present a challenge for abortion law based on a threat to bodily 
autonomy. Looking finally to the Canadian context, I argue that contrary to the 
suggestion made in the limited Canadian literature on artificial wombs (Overall 2015, 
Blahuta 2017), a challenge to bodily autonomy-based protections is unlikely to 
undermine abortion rights in Canada, as Canadian jurisprudence articulates the abortion 
right with broader reference to liberty. In the second part of this chapter, I considered 
the proposed challenge of the shift introduced by ectogenesis to medical viability 
resulting in a corresponding restriction of abortion rights. Through analysis of 




introduced by artificial wombs is very likely to result in a reduction of abortion rights, 
as both demonstrated medical developments in this area and contentious scientific 
claims have already been used to block abortion access near viability. By contrast I have 
suggested in the United Kingdom, while the connection between abortion rights and a 
gestational time limit is worrying and potentially leaves abortion open to attack, 
precedent is to resist limiting abortion rights based on a lowered legal limit, and to 
contextualize scientific developments in research on medical viability alongside their 
possible impact on pregnant people. Finally, I considered that in Canada, where no 
federal limitation is set through fetal viability, ectogenesis is unlikely to result in an 
attack on abortion rights in this way. My analysis here lays the groundwork for my 
assessment of proposed frameworks for governing ectogenesis and abortion which 
retain the status quo (protections based in bodily autonomy and viability) against a 
feminist ethics of care. Given the malleable, fictive, and contingent ways in which 
“bodily autonomy” and “fetal viability” have been constructed to articulate abortion 
rights, can any framework for ectogenesis and abortion that retains these limitations 





















4. ASSESSING FRAMEWORKS THAT RETAIN THE STATUS QUO FOR 
ATTENTION TO RELATIONALITY AND CARE 
Bioethical and legal scholars have suggested several possible frameworks for 
addressing the problems that they conclude ectogenesis will pose for regulating abortion 
with reference to bodily autonomy and fetal viability. In what follows, I consider each 
of these proposed frameworks within the respective contexts of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada against a feminist ethics of care. I will begin by 
unpacking the suggestion that ectogenesis will mark the end of abortion rights (Abel 
1974, Favole 1979, Goldstein 1978, Singer and Wells 1984, Cohen 2017, Blahuta 2017, 
Abecassis 2016, Randall and Randall 2008). I will then consider two further proposals. 
Firstly, that abortion rights could continue to be protected after the introduction of 
ectogenesis through a redefined argument based on bodily autonomy (James 1987, 
Alghrani 2007/2008, Jackson 2008, Overall 2015,Kendal 2015, Langford 2017), and 
secondly that they could continue to be protected by altering the definition of “viability” 
in abortion law (Lupton 1997, Son 2005, Raskin and Mazor 2006, Alghrani 2007/2008, 
Abecassis 2016).  
As I have argued in chapter two,  I regard a care analysis as a practical tool with 
which to centralize a particular set of concerns: namely, the health of the pregnant 
person, and consideration of relationships between fetus, progenitors, machine, and 
others. I am mobilizing this praxis strategically to assess the efficacy of given 
frameworks according to whether they sufficiently acknowledge and address these 
concerns. Several of the frameworks I analyze in this project, particularly proposals to 
redefine bodily autonomy and/or fetal viability to maintain the status quo of abortion 
regulation have important strategic merits. But before proceeding, I want to reiterate 
that this normative aspect of my project is intended to go beyond considering what is 
simply strategic to speculate on what might be ideal from a relational feminist 
perspective, regardless of the potential difficulty of realizing these aims.  
 
4.2 ECTOGENESIS AS THE END OF ABORTION  
There is an important nuance between scholarship where authors come to the conclusion 
that ectogenesis will inevitably result in a total ban on abortion (Randall and Randall 
2008, Cohen 2017, Abecassis 2016, Blahuta 2017), and scholarship in which authors 




1978, Singer and Wells 1984, Welin 2004, Reiber 2010, Kaczor 2005 ). Many scholars 
in the first group explicitly state that this kind of ban would be morally problematic and 
have a grave impact on people’s lives. Nevertheless, they suggest that it would likely 
occur and leave questions of how it might be prevented unanswered (Cohen 2017, 
Randall and Randall 2008, Abecassis 2016). The second group, by contrast, take the 
position that ectogenesis as an alternative to abortion would be beneficial and may even 
be useful for justifying scientific research on this technology (Blackshaw and Rodgers 
2018, Mathison and Davis 2017, Singer and Wells 2006, Reiber 2010, Kaczor 2005, 
Welin 2004). I acknowledge these differences to ensure I am not attributing scholarly 
intent to promote an anti-feminist position where there is none, but I ultimately contend 
that regardless of whether or not scholars believe it to be a positive outcome, a 
framework in which ectogenesis resulted in a ban on abortion with the possible use of 
the technology as an alternative fails to attend to both care and relationality and is an 
unequivocally unacceptable outcome. 
In this I am aligned with Jackson (2008), and other feminist scholars (Overall 
2015, Cannold 2006, Langford 2008) who insist that abortion must first and foremost be 
understood in relation to pregnant people’s health and rights. These scholars reject the 
way that consideration of ectogenesis as a possible “solution” to abortion frames the 
procedure as a moral problem that may eventually be circumvented by technology 
rather than as an essential medical service. As Jackson writes, speculation about the 
impact of this technology needs to remain tethered to the reality that “where abortion is 
illegal or unavailable, women do not continue their unwanted pregnancies, but resort 
instead to backstreet and unsafe abortion practices” (2008, 363). A ban on abortion, or 
the forced alternative of an artificial womb, would not result in an “end” to abortion, but 
in increased or introduced criminalization of women caught seeking the procedure and 
as Jackson warns, a possible increase in abortion sought through unsafe means.  
As Langford writes, “the argument that ectogenesis can ‘solve’ the abortion 
‘problem’ promotes the patriarchal notion that pregnant women are foetal incubators 
rather than people, as it is assumed that the foetus can simply be transferred from one 
incubator (a woman) to another (a fake womb)” (2008, 267). In making this proposal, 
scholars presume that the only legitimate reason a pregnant person could have for 
seeking abortion is a wish to physically end a pregnancy. Based on this assumption, 




will be available as an alternative to provide recourse for the reason (ending a physical 
pregnancy) that people have for seeking the procedure. Alison Jagger writes of a 
feminist ethic of care that “rather than validating its responses by reference to general 
principles, care reasoning is likely to take the form of a narrative in which the concrete 
details of specific situations become intelligible in the context of people’s ongoing lives 
and relationships” (1995, 180). With regard to regulating abortion, then, this means 
having frameworks in place that are flexible and adaptable, shaped by awareness that 
different circumstances produce different needs, and not constructed around the 
assumption that there is only one universal explanation as to why a person would seek 
abortion. A legal framework that presumes otherwise is not sufficiently attentive to care 
for the pregnant person.  
This framework also fails to account for relationality. As Hendricks writes, “the 
fantasy of artificial wombs is a psychic representation of our cultural myth of individual 
autonomy” (2011, 403). In other words, by imagining that this technology will allow 
every individual to gestate “alone” from conception and suggesting that abortion law be 
revised to protect the fetus as an autonomous entity, scholars are affirming an ideology 
of a self that is unbound from human dependency. Singer and Wells are representative 
in this regard when they write that by mandating extraction to an artificial womb, 
“abortions could be done using techniques that would not harm the fetuses, and the 
fetuses, or newborn babies as they would then be, could be adopted” (2006, 12). For 
Singer and Wells, the fetus is an entity that would be a “newborn baby”, a legal person, 
if only it were removed from the mother’s womb. Ectogenesis becomes the means of 
“rescu[ing] embryos” (Reiber 2010 524) and fetuses from dependency on the mother, 
and thereby, realizing full physical autonomy.  
As Langford writes, what those who propose that ectogenesis could “replace” 
abortion forget is that “regardless of where or by whom the foetus is gestated, it remains 
dependent upon someone” (2008, 267). These proposals either ignore the fetus’s 
continued dependency on care while gestating or equate the availability of the 
technology with a sufficient replacement for any form of human care. As Aristarkhova 
(2012) aptly argues, even the most highly advanced ectogenetic incubator in which an 
embryo could be gestated through to term would ultimately require human oversight. 
But if we accept for a moment that the technology could be entirely automated, it 




relationships external to her and the fetus, relationships will be produced with and 
around the fetus as it gestates in the machine. West writes, “we do not [. . . ] spring 
upon this earth mushroom style, as fully formed, autonomous adults. Rather, all of us 
enjoy or suffer an extended period of absolute dependency upon caregivers” (2001 
1925), one that produces a relational connection (whether wanted or not) between 
ourselves and those caregivers, between and amongst these caregivers, and between 
these caregivers and the state. A framework that imagines ectogenesis as an alternative 
to abortion fails to account for relationality by not sufficiently answering the question of 
how the relationships between the fetus’s potential caregivers and the pregnant person 
who seeks an abortion will be addressed, and how the relationships between these 
caregivers and state and institutional actors will be managed.  
The proposal that an artificial womb could act as an alternative to abortion, then, 
is insufficient in any jurisdiction for its lack of attention to care for the pregnant person, 
and its failure to consider relationality and the fetus’s ultimate dependence on care. I am 
now going to turn to the proposal that abortion rights could continue to be protected 
through reference to a redefined right to bodily autonomy. On this point, it becomes 
necessary to think through what is actually meant or intended by the terms “autonomy” 
and “choice”.  
 
4.3 PROTECTING ABORTION THROUGH A REDEFINED RIGHT TO BODILY 
AUTONOMY  
After concluding that ectogenesis will challenge abortion rights by allowing a 
pregnancy to end without the death of the fetus, some scholars, writing across several 
jurisdictions, have proposed or suggested that abortion could still be protected through 
reference to a right to bodily autonomy (James 1987, Alghrani 2007/2008, Jackson 
2008, Overall 2015, Kendal 2015, Langford 2008). James observed that as of the time 
of his writing (1987) most abortions occurred early in pregnancy and were minimally 
invasive procedures. He contended that “it is safe to assume that [transferring a fetus to 
an artificial womb] would be more like a caesarean section than a first trimester vacuum 
aspiration abortion43” (87). James presumes that the fetus would have to begin its 
growth in the human womb and that ectogenesis would only be possible after a certain 
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point in a pregnancy. He places the point at which the fetus would likely be removed to 
an artificial womb at around 22 or 23 weeks, and argues that “freedom to choose or 
reject one’s own medical treatment entails the right to choose a less risky and invasive 
abortion over a more risky and invasive one” (87). Since a fetal extraction would be 
more invasive than an early stage abortion, he hypothesizes that artificial wombs could 
not act as an alternative to the procedure without undermining bodily autonomy. 
Writing more than twenty years after James, Alghrani agrees that extracting the 
fetus “would probably be akin to a caesarean section after twenty-four weeks gestation” 
(2008 315). She affirms that a requirement to use an artificial womb would remain a 
“gross violation of one’s bodily autonomy” (317) both in that a person would need to 
remain pregnant until the fetus could be extracted, and in that fetal extraction would 
necessitate an unwanted physically invasive procedure. For Alghrani, this constitutes 
grounds for a defense of abortion based in an argument for bodily autonomy. As 
Alghrani notes, as of the last several years, most abortions in the United Kingdom (and 
in the United States and Canada) occur before 14 weeks and are medical rather than 
surgical, involving the consumption or insertion of two pills (Johnstone and Macfarlane 
2015 107). If, as James suggested, fetal extraction were more invasive than a manual 
vacuum aspiration, it would certainly also be significantly more physically invasive 
than consuming two pills.  
Recognizing that references to bodily autonomy have been successfully 
mobilized in the past to stake a legal claim to abortion rights, James, Alghrani, and 
others (Jackson 2008, Overall 2015, Kendal 2015, Langford 2017) who propose 
continuing to protect abortion rights through a claim to bodily autonomy are making a 
strategic argument. By this I mean that rather than looking to possibilities such as the 
passage of new legislation (which would require significant political campaigning 
among other resources) their intention is to offer a means of moving swiftly to protect 
abortion access by giving reference to a concept with a strong precedent in existing case 
law.  
 To understand what is at stake here, and the strategic argument that these 
scholars are making, it is necessary to first unpack what “bodily autonomy” means in 
this context. With reference to protecting pregnant people from the forced alternative of 
an artificial womb, scholars (Overall 2015, Langford 2017, Kendal 2015, James 1987, 




define “autonomy” as protection from unwanted procedures on the physical body, and a 
right to choose between medical procedures that are more or less physically invasive.  
Alghrani, Overall, Kendal, Langford and James’s claims that the use of 
ectogenesis as a forced alternative to abortion would be a violation of bodily autonomy 
hinge on two assumptions. Firstly, that the process of removing a fetus to an artificial 
womb would occur after the first trimester of pregnancy (and between approximately 18 
and 24 weeks). Secondly, that as a result of this first condition, “to transfer the foetus 
intact” (Alghrani 2008, 315) from the person’s body to an artificial womb would be an 
invasive surgical procedure. Protecting autonomy in this sense, then, means protection 
from a physical attack on the body. Feminist pursuits of abortion rights have long 
revolved around an understanding that bans and restrictions on the procedure are a 
means of implementing institutional control over women’s bodies and lives. Bodily 
autonomy, then, is a deeply important feminist goal in principle. But as I will discuss 
with reference to the way that bodily autonomy has been applied in the United States, 
the deployment of “bodily autonomy” in practice often falls short of feminist aims when 
it comes to reproductive rights. Turning to how bodily autonomy is articulated in 
arguments for protecting abortion on these grounds after the introduction of ectogenesis, 
I am also interested in the intentions behind this strategy and its limitations if applied in 
practice. 
To foreground this analysis with what a feminist, relational understanding of 
autonomy might look like, I want to briefly discuss how “autonomy” is engaged with 
from a feminist care and reproductive justice perspective. As West (2017) argues, 
international feminist mobilization around abortion rights in the 1960s and 70s fought 
for autonomy in abortion decisions broadly conceived. In this context, “autonomy” was 
not simply a means of granting women a right to control their bodies, but also of 
securing the tools with which to enact this control in practice. However, as she argues of 
the United States (and as I will argue applies in different capacities in Canada and the 
UK), in achieving legal protection to abortion, the goal of autonomy in principle was 
limited to a right to decide as opposed to a right to access. As a consequence, the state is 
not required to provide the resources with which to secure an abortion in practice.  
In contrast to the Western liberal tradition in which autonomous action is 
understood in the context of “rugged individualism” (Sherwin 14), in reproductive 




confined, and enabled by personal and institutional relationships44. Ross, Derklas, 
Peoples, and Bridgewater Toure acknowledge the value of autonomy as a feminist goal 
and argue that beyond the “right to make personal decisions about one’s life” (2017, 
14), a robust protection to autonomy would entail “the obligation of government and 
society to ensure that the conditions are suitable for implementing one’s decisions” (14). 
They call for 
the right not to have children, using safe birth control, abortion, or abstinence; 
the right to have children under the conditions we choose; and the right to parent 
the children we have in safe and healthy environments (ibid).  
 
In reproductive justice discourse, then, bodily autonomy is essential, but to be 
meaningful it must be mobilized within a relational framework of positive resources 
that would allow a person to make a decision to end or to carry on with a pregnancy and 
to be provided with resources in either instance. Feminist legal scholar Sherwin 
proposes a “‘relational autonomy,’” (13), which is intended  
to invoke the socially and politically situated positions in which persons live and 
from which they may exercise (or seek to exercise) control over aspects of their 
lives that are important to them [and] to make visible the ways in which specific 
details of agent’s embodied identity, and the social practices that shape their 
experiences, may affect the degree of autonomy available to them (13).  
 
While engaging different language, this articulation of autonomy understood within a 
relational framework adopts the same core principles as the reproductive justice 
approach I have described, in retaining the importance of choice while insisting it must 
be understood in relation with others. It is with the disparate definitions of autonomy as 
a protected sphere of individual action, and autonomy as a relational concept enabled by 
resources and relations with others, that I want to proceed with assessing a framework 
for abortion and ectogenesis that protects abortion through a claim to bodily autonomy 




                                                          
44 There is a lengthy and well-established history of critique of liberal rights and autonomy in the feminist 
and critical legal literature. Critiques of these concepts borne out of the reproductive justice movement 
and feminist relational legal theory offer language and examples that I find particularly prescient to my 





In the previous chapter, I discussed the way in which abortion rights in the United 
States are protected through a limited right to privacy in relation to decisions regarding 
the physical body. Given that this right is articulated in balance with a competing state 
interest in the life of the fetus, and ectogenesis is likely to reduce state interest in the 
woman’s privacy right and increase interest in fetal life, I agreed with scholars who 
have argued that ectogenesis is likely to pose a threat to abortion protections in the 
United States (Tribe 1990, Schultz 2010, Bard 2006, and Steiger 2010 among others). 
While many of these scholars suggest that the privacy right currently sufficiently acts to 
protect bodily autonomy in abortion decisions, I also argued that the “undue burden” 
standard established in Planned Parenthood v. Casey45 and reiterated in Gonzales v. 
Carhart46 has already allowed states to intervene in bodily autonomy in significant 
ways considerably prior to fetal viability.  
Kendal is representative of scholars who make universalizing claims that 
contemporary “respect for autonomy” (2015, 73) in law and policy means that “the 
recriminalisation of abortion” (76) would not be allowed with the introduction of 
artificial wombs. But like Overall, Langford, and James, whose claims to the primacy of 
bodily autonomy are not grounded in the context of particular jurisdictions, Kendal’s 
argument here only in fact holds where “respect for autonomy” (73) sufficiently 
functions to protect abortion rights. Abortion in the US context has been protected 
through case law precedent with reference to a right to privacy that extends to making 
decisions about one’s reproductive body. The strategic appeal of a continued argument 
for abortion rights on the grounds of bodily autonomy already articulated in Roe v. 
Wade47 is evident. The proposal made by James, Overall, and others who outline the 
plausibly invasive nature of a fetal extraction procedure to suggest that a right to bodily 
autonomy could protect abortion after ectogenesis may in fact be the most 
straightforward means of holding on to abortion rights in the United States. As some 
contemporary American feminist scholars and activists have argued, while the right to 
privacy, closely tied to the physical body, may already be insufficient to protect access 
                                                          
45 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Available at 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/505/833 (accessed January 8 2019). 
46 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Available at https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-
380?mod=article_inline (accessed January 8 2019). 
47 Roe v. Wade.,410 U.S. 113 (1973). Available at https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-




to abortion for all women, continuing to protect a right to bodily autonomy as already 
articulated in case law may be the only path forward for holding on to even the limited 
rights articulated in Roe v. Wade. But I am not assessing, as James and others have 
done, what the most straightforward strategy for protecting abortion against challenges 
wrought by ectogenesis may be.  
In her own argument that abortion rights might best be protected with reference 
to bodily autonomy, Kendal asserts that “using existing medical and legal standards as 
the baseline” (2015 63) will be an effective means of establishing “a minimal threshold 
of rights for women and fetuses” (63). Kendal refers to “rights for women and fetuses,” 
as though the interests of both parties should be given equal consideration. But the 
construction of abortion rights as a balance between the rights of women and the rights 
of fetuses, as I’ve established in the previous chapter, is not the only plausible way to 
articulate abortion law. Instead, it is a construct ingrained in US case law, which has 
rendered pregnant people’s access to abortion contingent and precarious. In the United 
States, the “baseline” of  “existing medical and legal standards” has not sufficiently 
protected pregnant people in practice.  
As I argued in the previous chapter, the “undue burden standard” has already 
allowed states to justify significant interventions on pregnant people’s bodily autonomy. 
People living in states where abortion has been banned after six weeks of pregnancy, 
people in states with no abortion facilities, and those who depend on Medicaid and are 
unable to secure the funds for the abortion procedure are not provided with the enabling 
conditions for acting on autonomy. As reproductive justice activists have demonstrated, 
these constraints have most significantly impacted black and indigenous women and 
low-income women (Ross and Solinger 2017, Price 2010). With the introduction of 
ectogenesis, continued protection through a claim to bodily autonomy that was not 
accompanied with a requisite requirement that states positively provide access to 
abortion could well mean that while the law protected a right to decide in principle, in 
practice, anti-abortion states could provide fetal extraction facilities but not offer 
terminations. In this way, states could uphold their legal duty to grant a right to bodily 
autonomy. Because they were not required to provide resources to enable women to act 
on this autonomy, the result would be that some women would be forced to “choose” 
between carrying a pregnancy to term, having a fetal extraction, or attempting to seek 




As Downie and Llewellyn write, a relational approach to law means placing 
“focus [. . .] on the dynamics or characteristics of relationships that need to be supported 
and encouraged in order to foster human flourishing” (2012, 5). Human flourishing, in 
the sense of access to reproductive care including access to abortion, is in fact 
undermined in the United States by the existing lack of attention to personal and 
institutional relationships that would “need to be supported and encouraged” to actually 
enable autonomy in abortion decisions. Strategizing to protect abortion access against 
the way ectogenesis may undermine a defense of abortion rights based in bodily 
autonomy by simply redefining or asserting that physical bodily autonomy is still at 
issue would simply reinforce this limitation.  
Alghrani, James, Overall, Langford, and Kendal each build arguments for a 
bodily autonomy-based protection of abortion rights that relies on the assumption that 
ectogenesis will still entail gestation beginning in a human womb, and that the fetus 
would be extracted through a relatively invasive procedure. This is in fact an unknown 
variable. Each of these authors write before the 2017 development of the biobag. Their 
assumptions are well founded with reference to this technology, which would allow a 
fetus to grow in an artificial womb only after approximately 22/23 weeks gestation and 
would involve either early labour or a procedure akin to a c-section to transfer the fetus. 
But given that advancements in incubation technology have allowed the viability line to 
shift from 26-28 weeks in the 1960s and 70s to 24 weeks in the 1990s (Bulletti et al 
2011), to 22 weeks today, the historical progression of this research suggests that this 
line could shift still further.  
The argument for continuing to protect abortion with reference to bodily 
autonomy acknowledges care for the pregnant person to the extent of recognizing the 
importance of protecting against unwanted physically invasive procedures. In the 
United States, it also centers care to the extent of trying to hold the line on a right to 
abortion that is continuously being undermined. But as with the contemporary 
articulation of abortion rights in the United States with reference to privacy rights, the 
bodily autonomy-based framework these scholars propose leaves abortion rights 
contingent on the degree to which a convincing argument can be made that a procedure 
is physically invasive. Because this articulation of autonomy leaves abortion rights 
precarious and contingent on the development of technology, it does not sufficiently 




If a framework for ectogenesis and abortion based on a limited right to bodily 
autonomy would not sufficiently uphold a feminist ethics of care in the US context, this 
raises the question of what kinds of frameworks would. Reproductive justice activists 
emphasize the need for pursuing medical and legal apparatuses that would provide for 
“reproductive issues across the life span, including pre-and post-birth healthcare; the 
availability of sexual education, contraceptives, and reproductive technologies; and 
affordable childcare” (2017, 594). West argues for a new strategic approach to abortion 
rights, writing that “the choice rhetoric of Roe undercuts arguments for the development 
of [. . .] ‘caregiver rights’-the rights of caregivers, women and men both, to a level of 
public assistance for their caregiving work” (2017, 1411). In chapters five and six, as I 
take up the broader questions posed by ectogenesis for existing inequities in access to 
reproductive care and for its possible impact on gendered reproductive labor, I will 
consider what kinds of frameworks for the technology in the United States might meet 
these aims.  
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Alghrani is unique among scholars who make a claim for continuing to protect abortion 
through an argument based in bodily autonomy in that she specifically considers this 
possibility with reference to the UK48. On the grounds that a fetal transfer procedure 
would be invasive, she concludes that “to coerce women to continue their pregnancies 
until foetal transfer into an ectogenic chamber is possible is nothing short of a gross 
violation of one’s bodily autonomy” (317). She continues that “English law is clear 
[that a] competent pregnant woman ‘has an absolute right to choose whether to consent 
to medical treatment or refuse it’” (316). Alghrani gives particular reference to 
consistent precedent in case law protecting women from forced c-sections. Following 
Jackson, who has written on the way in which such precedent for bodily autonomy in 
reproductive decisions elsewhere in English common law demonstrates that the medical 
paternalism of the Abortion Act 1967 is in need of reform, Alghrani suggests that 
“ectogenesis will necessitate revising the legislation” (2008, 327). Other scholars also 
argue that abortion could still be protected on the grounds of bodily autonomy,but state 
their claims in general terms (James 1987, Kendal 2015, Overall 2015, Langford 2017). 
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I want to assess here how revising the Abortion Act 1967 to protect abortion from the 
challenges of ectogenesis on the grounds of bodily autonomy might uphold or 
undermine a feminist ethics of care.  
In chapter three, I argued that the potential of ectogenesis to reduce the 
applicability of a bodily autonomy-based defense for abortion may not challenge these 
rights in the context of the UK. I made this claim on the grounds that as opposed to 
protecting abortion with reference to a right to bodily autonomy, the Abortion Act 1967 
was written to protect the discretion of medical professionals, whom the Act positions 
as gatekeepers to abortion. I also argued, however, that shifting medical and legal 
interpretations of the Act have meant that while not necessarily the original intention, 
contemporary application of the Act has protected autonomous action to some extent in 
practice. With this considered, the argument that abortion could continue to be protected 
from challenges introduced by ectogenesis through reference to bodily autonomy is of 
particular interest in a UK context in that as I have argued, it is not clear that 
ectogenesis would challenge UK abortion protections to begin with.   
Outside of the context of ectogenesis, many feminist legal scholars have made 
the argument that the Abortion Act 1967 requires revision. Of the way in which the Act 
dictates the circumstances under which two medical practitioners may approve an 
abortion in good faith, Jackson writes that “a woman's access to abortion is therefore 
conditional upon her reasons for wanting to terminate her pregnancy” (2000 468), a 
circumstance entirely at odds with respect for patient autonomy in other areas of law. 
But what I am interested in here is whether, given the ways that the Abortion Act 1967 
is currently interpreted and applied, a revision to articulate abortion rights through 
bodily autonomy would in fact protect greater autonomy for pregnant people in practice, 
and better prepare for the introduction of ectogenesis, or result in an even greater 
narrowing of the “reasons” a person could legitimately have for terminating a 
pregnancy.  
James presumes the invasive nature of a foetal transfer procedure in vivid detail, 
writing that “unlike an early abortion, foetal transplantation would thus require general 
anaesthesia as well as a surgical incision through the abdominal wall and uterus, with all 
the risks of medical complications which accompany these more invasive procedures” 
(1987, 87). Alghrani later echoes his concerns and adds that “mandating fetal transfer 




pregnancy for twenty-four weeks [. . .] then to have to undergo invasive surgery to 
transfer the foetus” (2008, 316). Amending the Abortion Act 1967 or passing new 
legislation to defend abortion and protect against the forced use of ectogenesis on the 
grounds of bodily autonomy as it is defined in these proposals would mean articulating 
autonomy as a right to refuse unwanted, invasive medical procedures. This framework 
would acknowledge care for the pregnant person to the extent that it would guard 
against attacks on the physical body.   
As I have noted, however, the efficacy of protections to abortion articulated in 
this way would depend upon fetal extraction being more significantly invasive than 
abortion. Brassington (2009) demonstrates the limitations of enshrining abortion rights 
through a definition of autonomy so tied to the physical body. He writes that because an 
abortion requires a surgical procedure anyway, it would not infringe on a woman’s 
bodily autonomy to require her to extract a fetus to an artificial womb rather than 
terminating it. Brassington’s claims are undermined somewhat by the reality of 
contemporary abortion practices. According to data released in 2017 by the Department 
of Health and Social Care, “over 90 percent of [. . . abortions] are carried out at 13 
weeks or earlier” (BMA 2017) in England, Scotland, and Wales, and a majority of these 
procedures are medical, not surgical. Brassington is misguided here in that consuming a 
pill and having a surgical fetal extraction operation are not comparably invasive. In 
addition, as Alghrani argues (though not with reference to Brassington’s work), case 
law regarding patient autonomy protects a right to choose between more and less 
invasive medical procedures, and to refuse medical treatment or intervention (2008, 
316). With both of these significant limitations acknowledged, Brassington’s argument 
does demonstrate that if the Abortion Act 1967 were revised to articulate abortion rights 
through bodily autonomy defined in relation to physical procedures, or new legislation 
were passed to this effect, a fetal extraction would need to remain invasive in order to 
protect a person’s choice to elect to abort rather than use an artificial womb. If 
technology evolved to the point that fetal extraction and medical abortion were in fact 
comparable, as Brassington suggests, a piece of legislation that enshrined abortion 
protections on these grounds would fail to guarantee access to the procedure.  
This strategy then, may still result in the circumstance that Jackson argues 
constitutes a failing in the contemporary Act, that is, “the assumption that a woman's 




interest” (2000 468) and that “a woman’s access to abortion should depend upon 
whether or not those reasons are acceptable.” (2000 468). As Jackson concedes, the 
current application of the Abortion Act 1967 suggests that medical practitioners tend 
toward broad interpretations of the social grounds for granting abortion, accepting 
numerous “reasons” as acceptable for granting termination. By contrast, revising the 
legislation to enshrine a right to bodily autonomy “concerning medical procedures” 
(James 1987, 87), as the key means of protecting abortion access in fact limits the 
acceptable reasons for seeking an abortion to one.49 In this sense, this strategy could in 
fact undermine current attention to care for the pregnant person by narrowing the 
justifications for abortion access.  
So long as an argument could be made that the procedure was invasive, pregnant 
people could give reference to this while in fact seeking abortion for other reasons, such 
as the desire to avoid genetic parenthood or a relationship with another progenitor. But 
as Sherwin argues, a relational feminist perspective on abortion demonstrates that the 
application of universal “rules for determining when abortion is morally justified” 
(Sherwin 1991 329) constitutes a failure to recognize that “women have abortions for a 
wide variety of reasons” (328). A feminist infrastructure would provide resources that 
would enable a person to seek abortion or carry a pregnancy to term; but would 
acknowledge her as “the only one able to weigh all the relevant factors” (329) and 
arrive at a decision.  
Sherwin invites us to consider “what people really seek under the label 
‘autonomy’” (16). As I’ve noted in the introduction to this chapter, in thinking about 
abortion rights, I follow a feminist relational approach that does not reject “autonomy” 
entirely, but orients toward a way of articulating it that goes beyond protecting an 
individual sphere of non-intrusion. I would argue that a feminist relational approach 
demonstrates that it is not only a right to avoid invasive medical procedures that people 
                                                          
49To be very clear: the authors whom I am responding to here, as I show with reference to their work in 
this chapter, are contending that a fetal extraction would be a physically invasive procedure. On this basis, 
they then suggest that articulating the abortion right through bodily autonomy, understood as a right to 
avoid or refuse physically invasive procedures, would protect abortion rights after ectogenesis. As I 
discuss further in the following chapter, my issue with this strategy is not that protecting autonomy is an 
ineffectual means of articulating the abortion right, but rather, that the definition of autonomy offered by 
these authors (namely, a right to avoid physically invasive procedures) is not broad enough to sufficiently 
protect access because it provides limited reference to physical security. I am arguing that this could pose 
a challenge should the fetal extraction procedure one day become minimally physically invasive, and that 
autonomy would need to be articulated in a broader sense in order to offer sufficient protections to 




seek when fighting for autonomy in relation to abortion decisions. In an effort to 
consider what kinds of revisions to abortion legislation might actually uphold a feminist 
ethics of care with the introduction of ectogenesis, it is useful to look toward 
contemporary feminist critiques of the Act and toward a more robust, contextual 
feminist definition of “autonomy.” Jackson emphasizes not just “a right to be free from 
unwanted intrusion, but [. . .] the idea that individuals should be able to pursue their 
own goals according to their own values, beliefs, and desires” (2000, 469). In order to 
be able to enact autonomy in pursuit of these goals, they must also be provide with the 
resources with which to do so.  
Where the arguments made by James and others as to the bodily invasiveness of 
an ectogenic transfer would protect autonomy in an individual sense, Jackson suggests 
that this form of autonomy is already protected in the UK in that current practice means 
many doctors regard the abortion decision as correctly falling with women. But it is a 
relational understanding of autonomy that needs to be accounted for: she argues that the 
Act’s continued “entrench[ing of] deference to medical opinion” (Jackson 2000, 471) 
primarily reduces the autonomy available to “disadvantaged women (471). Jackson 
argues that this occurs through the Act’s lack of attention to the ways in which 
relationships outside the pregnant person’s control (such as living in an area with 
medical practitioners that are particularly resistant to providing abortion, or facing 
language or travel barriers that stop them from pursuing a second opinion if initially 
refused) are integral to being able to enact autonomy in the abortion decision.  
UK abortion law, then, could be updated to better attend to relationships and to 
care for pregnant people by protecting a broader notion of relational autonomy, as well 
as the means to realize it. A revision of the Abortion Act 1967 to protect abortion rights 
on the grounds of bodily autonomy would further a cause of putting abortion in the 
language of pregnant people’s rights to control their bodies, emphasizing that the 
decision should rightfully be in their and not those of doctors, and potentially offering a 
clear articulation of abortion rights after ectogenesis. But this framework also 
significantly reduces the reasons considered legitimate for seeking an abortion, and 
makes a right of access contingent on fetal extraction always remaining more invasive 
than medical abortion. In chapter six, drawing on Sheldon’s work in particular I will 
give greater consideration to what kinds of reforms ahead of the introduction of 





I established in chapter three that there is precedent to protect abortion on the grounds 
of a right to security of the person (referring quite specifically to control over one’s 
body) in Canada. I also argued, however, that there is well-established precedent in case 
law for protecting the procedure with reference to a right to liberty, broadly defined as 
protecting a pregnant person’s “dignity and worth as a human being.”50As I have argued 
in chapter three, the continued applicability of protection to abortion on these grounds 
indicates that ectogenesis is unlikely to pose a challenge to abortion based on the way it 
may weaken an argument based in bodily autonomy.  
With the introduction of ectogenesis, a continued protection to abortion with 
reference to both liberty and security of the person would potentially allow for the 
procedure to still be accessed on broadly interpreted grounds. These might include a 
desire to not be a genetic parent, a desire to physically end a pregnancy, and a desire to 
avoid constituting a relationship of care or dependency. Downie argues of the 
contemporary state of abortion rights in Canada that “very strong statements have been 
made by the Supreme Court of Canada about women’s reproductive autonomy (albeit 
based on a liberal individualist conception of autonomy)” but that “security in the 
reproductive realm for women is at best tenuous and at worst absent for many” (2012, 
226). I agree with Downie that greater access to reproductive care is needed on a 
province to province basis, and I will discuss this further in what follows. But in fact, I 
would argue that there is legal precedent in the Canadian context for an understanding 
of autonomy in reproductive decisions that is relational, not individualist.  
In her original decision in R v. Morgentaler, Justice Wilson emphasized that, “an 
individual is not a totally independent entity disconnected from the society in which he 
or she lives. Neither, however, is the individual a mere cog in an impersonal machine in 
which his or her values, goals, and aspirations are subordinated to those of the 
collectivity”.51 Here, and in her articulation of a right to “liberty”, Wilson presents 
autonomy as individual action that is shaped in relation to others. This interpretation 
may move further toward articulating the kind of relational autonomy that reproductive 
justice and care scholars have argued for. In Downie and Kaposy’s review of “choice” 
and relationality in Canadian judicial decisions pertaining to  reproductive decision-
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making, they found that while there are a number of instances in which judges rely 
heavily on the notion of reproductive choice divorced from questions of access, there 
are also a number of cases in which “choice” is understood as shaped, limited, and 
enabled in relation to one’s personal and institutional relationships. Kaposy and Downie 
emphasize the importance of continued precedent for such relational interpretations of 
reproductive autonomy.  
In Canada, a move to protect abortion with the introduction of ectogenesis on 
the grounds that fetal extraction would be invasive and “abortion would remain a 
necessary alternative to ensure respect for bodily integrity” (Kendal 2015, 76) would 
fall short of care for the pregnant person and acknowledgement of relationality. In the 
Canadian context, arguments made for protecting abortion on the broader grounds of 
liberty, with reference to a relational understanding of autonomy, would go further in 
protecting multiple, contextual reasons for seeking abortion instead of ectogenesis, and 
in recognizing the relationships that may shape or enable these reasons.  
Downie, MacFarlane and Johnstone and others argue that greater changes must 
be made with regard to protections to actual access to abortion and other reproductive 
health services in Canada. So long as “a positive right of access to abortion” (Johnstone 
and Macfarlane 2015, 102) remains un-engrained, attention to care for the pregnant 
person cannot be said to be entirely addressed, a problem that could worsen with the 
introduction of ectogenesis. In chapters five and six, I will take up this question of 
access.  
 
4.4 PROTECTING ABORTION RIGHTS BY REDEFINING FETAL VIABILITY52 
The final proposed framework I want to address in this chapter is the argument that the 
most suitable or most probable means of articulating abortion rights after ectogenesis 
could be through redefining the point at which a fetus could be considered viable. Some 
                                                          
52 I have emphasized in this chapter that the use of a redefined viability limit to protect abortion rights 
after ectogenesis is problematic primarily because to govern abortion access in this way is to set an 
ultimately arbitrary limit to the provision of care for pregnant people. As I have noted in an earlier 
footnote, the work of disability justice theorists on the way in which both abortion regulation and pro-
choice feminisms have engaged in eugenic discourses that ask people with disabilities to justify their right 
to exist (see Chen 2012, Kafer 2013, Saxton 2000) is an important correlate to this discourse. My 
contention here, as I argue further in the last chapter of this thesis, is that abortion should not be the 
business of criminal law. In shifting to treating abortion as a medical procedure, not a crime with 
exceptions, I believe that the critiques of disability justice scholars of the ways in which discourses on 
abortion have stigmatized people with disabilities will be vital to informing care-informed approach to 




scholars who discuss this possibility do so with specific reference to given jurisdictions 
(Alghrani [2007/2008] and Jackson [2008] in the UK, Abecassis [2016] and Son [2005] 
in the United States), while others (Lupton 1997, Raskin and Mazor 2006) propose that 
the redefinition of viability could be a universally applicable framework. At present, 
“viability” refers to the point at which a fetus has a chance of survival outside of the 
womb. Scholars who propose abortion rights be retained by redefining viability after 
ectogenesis suggest  that “viability” in law could be redefined to refer to an advanced 
gestational stage (within or outside of the pregnant person’s womb), or to the point at 
which the fetus could survive without depending upon either the pregnant person’s body 
or the ectogenic machine. Without specific reference to abortion law in context, Lupton 
writes that “the gestational period spent in the artificial uterus should be viewed as 
synonymous with time spent in an intensive care unit” (1997, 630), while Raskin and 
Nadov, again writing in general terms, hold that “the moral status of a fetus must 
gradually increase as the fetus’s development progresses” (2006, 167), regardless of 
whether it grows within a person or a machine. Before assessing a framework for 
abortion and ectogenesis that protects the procedure through the redefinition of 
“viability” in the specific context of each jurisdiction, there are some general points I 
wish to address here pertaining to the link between abortion rights and viability and how 
this impacts relationality and care for the pregnant person. 
 As Cohen and Sayeed write, methods for measuring gestational age vary within 
and across nations, and a fetus’s potential of survival outside the womb is also impacted 
by its sex, birth weight, the exposure of the mother to steroids, and the prevailing 
medical and sociocultural attitudes toward premature babies (2011, 236). As Erdman 
argues, then, the translation of viability into a legal limit is an attempt to institute a 
bright line for something that is extremely variable from a medical perspective. 
Maintaining “viability” as a determinative legal timeline should artificial wombs be 
introduced may preserve the status quo of abortion rights in jurisdictions that currently 
allow access prior to this point. But even if the term were redefined to refer to advanced 
gestational age or purported ability to survive without significant technological support, 
it would remain subject to variability in interpretation and application.  
More importantly, in legal frameworks that regulate abortion through a timeline 
of fetal development, “the ethical or moral significance of abortion is derived from 




abortion rights around scientific research on the fetus’s development and increasing 
potential for personhood, the use of viability timelines for abortion decentralize the 
health, needs, and desires, of the pregnant person. Instead, as Sheldon (1997) and 
Franklin (2014) have also argued, it frames the abortion decision as being properly 
arrived at through a medical assessment of fetal development. In this regard, the moral 
status of the fetus is determined independently of the pregnant person and impacts her 
right to terminate it. Erdman, Jaggar, Gilligan, and others who write of abortion from a 
relational perspective do not dismiss the possibility that a fetus’s moral status changes 
over the course of gestation. However, they argue that these shifts in status should only 
be understood from the perspective of the pregnant person’s perceived relationship with 
the fetus. As Victoria Browne writes, “the moral status of the fetus is not absolute and 
apprehendable from an external perspective; rather, it is relational and can only be 
determined in relation to the particular pregnant woman and her particular situation” 
(2016, 397). Bearing this in mind, by setting a universal principle establishing the moral 
status of the fetus from the outside, a limit to abortion rights based on fetal viability, 
however defined, introduces an externally constructed limitation, and fails to leave 
space for the pregnant person’s relational encounter with the fetus, or in the case in 
which the fetus may begin in an artificial womb, other caretakers’ relational 
experiences.  
Raskin and Mazor’s proposal that viability be redefined to refer to an advanced 
stage of fetal development demonstrates the way in which a viability timeline shifts 
focus from the interests of the pregnant person to the fetus as a moral entity. They write, 
“equal moral status should be applied to both kinds of fetuses” (2006, 169), meaning 
those within the pregnant person’s body and those in the artificial womb, increasing 
toward the end of gestation to ensure that “an in vivo fetus should not enjoy more moral 
weight merely because of its physical connection to a pregnant woman” (169). Raskin 
and Mazor write of abortion law without reference to a specific jurisdiction, and in so 
doing overlook that the project of balancing “conflicting legal rights” between the 
pregnant person and the fetus, on which their argument for redefining viability is based, 
is derived from an American construction of abortion rights. Giving reference now to 
the application of this framework within the context of each jurisdiction, I want to 
unpack the ways that a framework for abortion and ectogenesis that is reliant on fetal 
viability, while in some instances potentially a strategic tool, falls short of upholding a 





Like Raskin and Mazor, Steiger (2010), Schultz (2010), and Abecassis (2016) make 
arguments for reinstating viability that are shaped by the realities of an American 
context. Where Abecassis and Schultz explicitly acknowledge this context, Steiger does 
not. Steiger considers the possibility that different rules could apply to fetuses gestated 
in machines and those gestated in humans, but concludes that “it would be unfair to use 
two sets of rules for two fetuses at the exact same stage of development, simply because 
of the environment in which they are developing” (2010, 158). Instead, he argues that 
the only solution is for fetal viability to be redefined to refer to an advanced stage of 
development. Schultz comes to the same conclusion, arguing that “any other standard 
[than viability] seems inappropriate” (2010, 903). Schultz’s argument here is again a 
striking reminder of the hegemony of American perspectives on ectogenesis and 
abortion, in that to find “any other standard” than viability with which to establish 
abortion rights, one might reasonably look to other common law jurisdictions which do 
not use this standard, such as Canada. In concluding that the only reasonable framework 
to contend with the challenge posed by ectogenesis is to redefine and reaffirm fetal 
viability as a legal timeline, both Steiger and Schultz perform a curious contradiction. 
By acknowledging that a viability timeline is always subject to change as technology 
develops, they reveal it as an unstable means of protecting abortion rights. But despite 
proclaiming to want to protect these rights, they reinforce a timeline that by their own 
analysis will always leave abortion rights contingent on potentially changing and 
unstable medical and legal understandings of viability. Erdman writes that “there is no 
standard definition or mode of measurement of viability [. . . ] nor any standard of what 
probability of survival is enough” (2017, 33) to justify the refusal of an abortion. 
Viability as it would be redefined according to Steiger and Schultz to refer to an 
advanced stage of fetal development, could potentially provide more certainty than 
viability as it is now defined to refer to a chance of survival outside of the womb. But 
given the significant variation both globally and at different medical centers across 
nations in how gestational age is measured (Cohen and Sayeed 2011, Erdman 2017), 
medical judgement as to fetal development would still remain subject to interpretation. 
As Erdman explains, in some hospitals, gestational age is measured from the estimated 
date of conception, and in other hospitals, often even within the same nation, it is 
measured from the pregnant person’s last menstrual period (2017). Even allowing for 




United States, more clear and specific guidelines as to how to measure advanced fetal 
development would be required, the uncertainty of both conception date and date of last 
menstrual period would leave significant room for medical interpretation. Regardless of 
how viability is defined, so long as abortion law in the United States remains 
constructed such that undergoing the procedure after viability results in the 
criminalization of pregnant people, this kind of framework fails to sufficiently provide 
for the care of pregnant people. By vesting a limitation for abortion access in a fictive 
timeline of fetal development, the framework fails to centralize care for the pregnant 
person by making the fetus’s development, not the pregnant person’s wishes, desires, 
health, or interests, the key question in whether states should allow abortion access.  
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Jackson notes with reference to English law that one possible strategy with the 
introduction of ectogenesis might be to “define viability as a stage in fetal development 
when it can survive with minimal assistance” (2008, 364). She goes on to suggest that 
“we could say that the fetus which is developing in an artificial womb acquires 
personhood when it can be safely removed from the artificial uterine environment, but 
until then it has the same status as a fetus in utero” (364). In altering the definition of 
viability that is enshrined in the Abortion Act 1967, and the point at which the fetus 
would be considered born, this strategy would allow for the status quo to be retained. 
This would mean that prior to viability medical professionals could still perform 
abortions on social or physical grounds.  
 However, unlike Steiger, Schultz, and Lupton, Jackson acknowledges the 
problematic nature of retaining a viability timeline. She argues that in contemporary UK 
law, as in an imagined future where partial or full ectogenesis lowers viability, “if 
gestational age determines the boundaries of a criminal offence, this level of inaccuracy 
is self-evidently unsatisfactory” (2008 366). As Jackson recognizes here then, the 
viability timeline in the UK, as in the United States, falls far short of centralizing care 
for the pregnant person by criminalizing abortion that occurs after this point.  
 Of the debates over lowering the time limit during the 1990 passage of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,53 Sheldon writes that “the effect of the 1990 
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debates has been to entrench in the public-and parliamentary consciousness that 
abortion is permissible prior to viability, but should be forbidden after this point” (1997, 
113). This perception of abortion rights as inevitably linked to fetal viability is evident 
in the universalizing claims of bioethical and legal scholars that a redefinition of fetal 
viability is the only suitable framework for regulating abortion if ectogenesis is 
developed. As Sheldon argues, a focus on viability has meant that abortion has been 
understood as “primarily a medical phenonmenon [. . .] that [. . .] must fall into the 
sphere of authority of doctors to maintain both technical and decisional control over it” 
(1997, 114). While in the UK context, as Jackson suggests, redefining viability might be 
one of the most straightforward possible ways of retaining the status quo for abortion 
rights, it would in fact reiterate the contemporary medical paternalism of abortion law in 
the UK, as opposed to moving the law closer to a feminist relational articulation.  
 
CANADA 
I want to return first here to Steiger’s proposal that we should redefine viability to refer 
to an advanced stage of fetal development in order to regulate abortion after 
ectogenesis. Steiger writes that this approach is the best way to retain abortion rights 
because “it would be unfair to use two sets of rules for two fetuses at the exact same 
stage of development, simply because of the environment in which they are developing” 
(2010, 158). Raskin and Mazor similarly argue in favor of this strategy on the grounds 
that a fetus inside the womb should not be granted more protection from termination 
than one outside the womb. As I have argued, it is possible that a claim could be made 
within the context of the United States that such a strategy might be justified as an 
attempt to hold on to the unstable status quo of abortion rights in the United States. 
However, when this proposed framework is considered in the context of Canadian law, 
it is revealed for what it is. Not the only means of articulating abortion rights against a 
challenge raised by ectogenesis, but instead a constructed strategy which reinstates a 
framing of abortion as a limited right primarily tied to the status of the fetus, rather than 
as an essential medical service. 
 To introduce a framework in which abortion was limited after an agreed upon 
point in the development of both a fetus in a human womb and an artificial one in 
Canada would reduce contemporary attention in Canadian law to care for pregnant 
people and relationality. The current framing of abortion in Canada, in which precedent 




of the law, the timeline for abortion access is dictated by the pregnant person’s decision 
in relation to the fetus. That implementing Steiger’s proposed framework in Canada, 
where there are currently no criminal sanctions for abortion after viability would 
constitute reducing the law’s current emphasis on the pregnant person’s priorities and 
needs, also indicates that reinstituting such a framework within other jurisdictions (the 
UK and US) is not a strategy that centralizes care for the pregnant person. 
 As Erdman argues, as a fictive legal construct, “gestational age [. . .] proves an 
arbitrary means of regulating access to abortion and thereby runs afoul of human rights 
protection against arbitrary laws” (2017, 32). I have shown how, in the context of 
Canada, because there is no legal restriction around fetal viability, ectogenesis is 
unlikely to challenge abortion rights on this ground. In the UK and the US, I argue that 
the fact that this technology could in fact challenge abortion rights on the basis of fetal 
viability should not be taken to indicate that a new definition of “fetal viability” is 
required, but instead, to highlight that “viability” as a governing timeline is a legal 
fiction that falls short of protecting a robust, relational understanding of abortion rights. 
 Lest I risk suggesting that the abortion situation in Canada is ideal, while the 
lack of criminal sanctions means that there are no legal consequences for seeking 
abortion after fetal viability, “access is restricted by gestational limits in each province 
that cut off services between twelve (hospital abortions in New Brunswick) and twenty 
four weeks (Ontario)[. . . ]” (Johnstone and Macfarlane 2015 107). As Johnstone and 
Macfarlane note, in these circumstances, “The gestational age at which abortions are 
available in each province is not limited by law but, rather, by the discretion of 
physicians [. . .] funding regulations, and the availability of facilities” (2015, 107). The 
law does not provide for positive rights to abortion access, and therefore barriers based 
on finances, proximity to a clinic offering abortions, and regulations within given 
provinces remain in place. While Johnstone and MacFarlane as well as Downie 
acknowledge, as I do, that Canadian abortion law is in many ways more constructed 
around care for the pregnant person than abortion law in many other jurisdictions, given 
these continued restrictions, a more relational adaptation of the law is still needed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have considered three frameworks that bioethical and legal scholars 
have either suggested are likely outcomes for abortion law following the introduction of 




technology. With regard to the first proposed outcome, a total ban on abortion or the use 
of ectogenesis as a forced alternative, I argued that in inaccurately constructing the fetus 
as an entity capable of being autonomous, and in presuming the only possible reason a 
woman may have for seeking an abortion is to physically end a pregnancy, this 
framework would fail to account for relationships of care or care for the pregnant person 
if instated in any jurisdiction.  
 I then considered two other proposed strategies, firstly, making an argument for 
protection based on bodily autonomy on the grounds that a fetal extraction procedure 
instead of an abortion involving termination would be invasive, and secondly, an 
argument for redefining fetal viability to refer to an advanced stage in fetal development 
or to the point at which a fetus could survive without depending upon either a pregnant 
person or a machine. I unpacked these two arguments in the specific contexts of 
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. I argued that the concept of 
autonomy is an important one in the feminist effort to protect pregnant people’s 
reproductive control over their bodies. But I noted that in the strategic argument made 
by some scholars for protecting abortion through reference to bodily autonomy, 
“autonomy” refers only very narrowly to a protected sphere of control over the physical 
body. I also argued that this way of protecting abortion rights leaves them contingent on 
a fetal extraction procedure always being invasive. In the context of the United States, I 
acknowledged that such a strategy for trying to protect the status quo would be 
understandable in an effort to hold the line on rights that are already under attack. But I 
also pointed to the way in which existing protections for abortion based on bodily 
autonomy, defined in narrow reference to protections from invasions on the physical 
body, have proven to be insufficient to protect abortion access thus far. Even without 
the introduction of artificial wombs, articulating abortion rights in this way has allowed 
for states to institute significant restrictions, most recently, by banning abortion at six 
weeks on the balance of competing interests in women’s bodily autonomy against fetal 
life. By rendering abortion rights always contingent on the degree to which extraction 
would be invasive, then, I argued that this strategy does not sufficiently account for care 
for the pregnant person or for relationality.  
In the context of the United Kingdom, I argued that while the Abortion Act 1967 
is outdated and problematic when assessed against feminist care ethics for the way in 
which it defers to medical paternalism, the revision that some scholars have suggested 




ectogenesis on the grounds of bodily autonomy may in fact narrow protections for 
abortion rights by reducing the legitimate reasons for a woman to access the procedure. 
In Canada, I similarly argued that such a redefinition would reduce existing attention to 
care.  
Finally in this chapter, I assessed the proposal that fetal viability could be 
redefined to refer to an advanced stage of fetal development or to the point at which the 
fetus could survive without dependency on an ectogenic machine or the pregnant 
person. Of this strategy, I argued that as feminist relational scholars have noted of 
contemporary use of a viability timeline, by associating the right to an abortion with the 
fetus’s moral status, such a framework fails to centralize care for the pregnant person. In 
the United States, as with the proposed redefinition of a bodily autonomy argument, a 
case may be made for using a redefinition of viability as a strategic means of trying to 
protect limited abortion rights against attack. In the United Kingdom, I acknowledged 
that this strategy would allow for the status quo, in which there are a range of 
justifications allowable for abortion prior to viability and fewer (maternal health or life) 
after, to be retained. But ultimately, in either jurisdiction, such a strategy of redefinition 
still means that abortion rights depend upon objective medical interpretation as to when 
viability has occurred. This contingency speaks to a failure to fully protect care for the 
pregnant person. In addition, in retaining a link between abortion rights and the fetus’s 
biological development, this framework fails to sufficiently account for relationality by 
presuming that the moral status of the fetus, which remains dependent regardless of 
whether it gestates in a woman or in a machine, can be assessed independently. Turning 
to Canada, in which there is currently no legal limit to abortion based in viability, I 
argued that introducing such a framework would significantly reduce contemporary 
attention to relationality.  
Ultimately, I have concluded that a framework based on bodily autonomy 
specifically defined in relation to the physical body, or based on fetal viability 
regardless of how it is defined, fails to sufficiently account for relationality and care for 
the pregnant person. This is both in presuming a universal, singular reason as to why a 
person would seek abortion (therefore reducing the particular ways in which an 
individual’s circumstances might impact this choice), and in failing to understand the 
ways in which the fetus can only be understood relationally as a dependent entity. In my 
introduction, I noted that this thesis takes a reproductive justice approach to abortion in 




broader questions of social justice, access to reproductive care, and rights to have and 
raise wanted children. In this chapter and the previous one, I have dealt with questions 
in relation to abortion law as written, by considering the ways that ectogenesis has been 
understood to challenge abortion protections as well as strategies for regulating abortion 
and ectogenesis. In chapters five and six, I turn to broader questions of reproductive 
stratification, and de-gendering or sharing the work of gestation, as well as possible 
frameworks for ectogenesis and abortion that would impact reproductive labor and 



























5. “DEGENDERING GESTATION” AND WORSENING STRATIFIED 
REPRODUCTION: A COMPARISON OF BROADER CHALLENGES IN ACCESS 
TO REPRODUCTIVE CARE 
Reproductive justice activists and scholars emphasize the importance of organizing and 
policymaking that understands abortion not as a standalone issue but as one among 
many vital aspects of reproductive health and care that must be protected (see Ross 
2007). In this dissertation, this means thinking beyond how ectogenesis may impact a 
right to end a pregnancy to consider how it could impact access to reproductive care, a 
person’s “right to have a child” (Ross and Solinger 2017, 9), and their ability to build 
families of their own making. In this chapter, I consider the possibility that ectogenesis 
will render gender irrelevant to distributing responsibility for gestation and the 
possibility that it will enhance existing reproductive stratification. These two 
contentions have frequently arisen in the literature, but often without reference to how 
they may be enabled or limited by contemporary law and policy. In this chapter, I will 
examine existing regulation within each jurisdiction to understand whether, how, and 
under what circumstances ectogenesis may impact the distribution of gendered labor in 
gestation or impact existing stratification in access to reproductive care. 
 
5.1 DEGENDERING GESTATION: ECTOGENESIS AS RESDISTRIBUTING 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR A GESTATING FETUS 
I want to begin by analyzing the contention that in removing gestation from the body, 
ectogenesis might effectively “degender” reproduction, and in turn, result in a 
redistribution of responsibility54 for a gestating fetus. The idea that ectogenesis will 
make gender essentially irrelevant to responsibility for the gestating fetus is often 
presented by bioethicists as a means of legitimating a contemporary anti-abortion 
narrative (Kaczor 2005, Reiber 2010). In these instances, references to equality and 
shared responsibility are used to enact discourses of fetal rescue, imagined scenarios in 
which a prospective father “saves” an ectogenetic fetus that would otherwise be 
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ectogenetic fetus. I have done this for a few reasons. I am avoiding using the term “parent” here, because 
I refer to gestation and I do not want to imply that a growing fetus is a child. I also do not wish to refer to 
“rights” unless I am specifically referring to circumstances in which the law has constructed rights for a 
person in relation to an embryo or fetus. Finally, “responsibility”, while imperfect, helps to communicate 
the complexities of caring for a fetus in gestation: one may want or not want it to be born, may terminate 
it or wish for it to grow, may ultimately end one’s relation to it, or may become a parent to the person 




terminated by a female progenitor. Even among some bioethical scholars who do not 
position themselves as anti-abortion (Brassington 2009, Randall and Randall 2008, 
Bennett 2008, Singer and Wells 2006, Coleman 2004), there is slippage between the 
proposition that the technology would allow male progenitors to assist with gestation, 
and language suggesting reproductive autonomy for women has gone too far and 
ectogenesis could beneficially limit the  “monopoly of women [. . .] deciding the fate of 
the embryo and fetus” (Welin 2004, 624).  
These arguments, which are primarily interested in increasing the reproductive 
decision-making capacities of men intersect with a recurring claim in the feminist 
literature that ectogenesis could allow women to share the physical and social 
consequences of gestating a pregnancy. The potential of an artificial womb to someday 
contribute to “the freeing of women from the tyranny of their reproductive biology by 
every means available, and the diffusion of childbearing and childrearing role to the 
society as a whole” (Firestone 1970, 206), has continually resurfaced in feminist 
engagements with this technology (Oakley 1984, Murphy 1989, Kamm 1992, Woolfrey 
2006, Sander-Staudt 2006, Smajdor 2007, Takala 2009, Kendal 2015, Overall 2015). 
Writing nearly forty years after Firestone, Smajdor argues that “the fact that women 
have to gestate and give birth in order to have children, whereas men do not, is a prima 
facie injustice that should be addressed by the development of ectogenesis” (2007, 338).  
Despite differing political aims, this strain of feminist literature arrives at the 
same end as the bioethical literature I have noted above: a claim that artificial womb 
technologies could radically reorganize the relationship between men, women, and 
fetuses. What allows these two discourses to converge in a claim that artificial wombs 
may produce “gender equality” is a shared treatment of “gender” and “sex” as 
interchangeable, binary, and fixed. These works begin with the assumption that there 
are two categories of person, “men”, and “women”. Women, and not men have the 
biological capacity to become pregnant, and thus it is only in creating an artificial womb 
that men will be able to share in pregnancy. Namely, this technology becomes the tool 
that will disrupt what has henceforth been a rigid division between two roles in a 
family: a woman who is the genetic, gestational, and social mother of a child, and a man 
who is the genetic and social father of a child. Ectogenesis “degenders” gestation by 
allowing it to be shared between a man and a woman, and thus, the family is reordered: 
a woman who is the genetic and social (and perhaps gestational) mother of a child, and 




important to note here that while a number of these feminist and bioethical authors are 
cautious as to what they believe the outcome of this reorganizing may be (see especially 
Murphy 1989, Woolfrey 2006), much of this scholarship concludes that it will have the 
effect of producing “true equality” (Takala 2009, 191). In other words, these scholars 
conclude that ectogenesis will produce equality within families through the sharing of 
gestation, which will in turn result in a more equal society (Smajdor 2007, Kendal 2015, 
Singer and Wells 2006, Pence 2006). 
In contrast, there is another thread in the feminist literature on ectogenesis in 
which “sex” and “gender” are understood in a different way, thus producing a different 
assessment of how the technology might impact gendered relations in gestation. We can 
understand Firestone’s work as a kind of (ambivalent) bridge between these two 
approaches. Firestone, like the scholars I’ve discussed above, takes for granted 
biological, binary understandings of sex and gender by presuming that “reproductive 
biology” (1970, 206) is an inescapable “tyranny” that produces one’s gender. But 
Firestone’s understanding of the possible role of ectogenesis in altering gendered 
relations to gestation does not end with equality between “men” and “women”.  Instead, 
artificial wombs are considered as a means through which we could achieve the 
“diffusion of childbearing and childrearing role[s] to the society as a whole” (206). 
There is a distinction here between a “gender equality” approach and what we might 
call Firestone’s “gender diffusion” approach, in which ectogenesis might one day mean 
the categories of “men” and “women” could continue to expand and perhaps one day 
disappear altogether. Lewis (2018, 2019), places herself in this lineage of thinking about 
artificial womb technology when she imagines a future that could include a “queer 
gestational commune in which ‘bio-bags’ of some kind enabled gestators to pause, 
share, transfer, redistribute, and walk away from pregnancies” (2019 b, np).  
Where the “gender equality” approach to thinking about ectogenesis’s impact on 
gestation begins with an assumption of binary gender, Lewis begins with an 
understanding of both sex and gender as fluid, socially constructed categories. Lewis 
knows well that gestation is a particularly evocative site for demonstrating the social 
construction of biological gender.The place of artificial wombs in altering gendered 
relations to gestating for Lewis, then, originates from a position in which the 
pregnancies of gender queer, nonbinary, and trans people are already recognized as 
realities that disrupt a binary understanding of human reproductive roles, and where 




a nuclear norm. Consequently, in Lewis’s writing (as in Firestone’s), artificial wombs 
are not the tool that cause gender to become irrelevant to gestation, the dismantling of 
institutions that violently enforce gender must come first. As Karaian argues, medical 
and legal institutions in many parts of the world have increasingly produced barriers to 
recognizing the healthcare needs and identities of non-binary and trans pregnant people, 
and in so doing, have demonstrated a resistance to the contemporary disruption of 
gendered relations to gestation. Karaian writes, “pregnant men engender a critical 
re(conceive)ing of the idea that sex is biologically determined, that pregnancy is 
necessary sexed as female, and that one’s sex, gender identity and identification as 
mother/father neatly align” (2013, 213). Before ectogenesis could allow us to “diffuse” 
gestation, we would need to live in a world in which institutions and individuals had 
accepted these re-conceptions of gender in pregnancy.  
As I have made clear throughout this work, this is ultimately a normative 
project, one that seeks to understand what a feminist, relational framework for 
regulating the artificial womb would look like. In this, I follow Lewis’s understanding 
of sex and gender, and share her position that in order for gestation to become a shared, 
“degendered” project, we would first need to arrive at a social circumstance in which 
the existing pregnancies of people of many sexes and genders were accepted on their 
terms. As will become clearer as I proceed in my analysis, the vast majority of literature 
on ectogenesis that argues that the technology will alter gendered relations to gestation 
instead takes sex and gender as binary, fixed categories in order to read artificial wombs 
as a tool to introduce equality. 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the language of court decisions and legislation 
addressing the frozen embryo disputes that many scholars cite as the most analogous 
existing circumstance to a case involving an ectogenetic embryo, and in which I will 
therefore ground my analysis, also frequently understand sex and gender as binary and 
fixed (see Alghrani 2007, Son 2010, Schultz 2010, Bard 2006, Reiber 2010, Pence 
2006). Frozen embryo disputes involve instances in which individuals have created 
embryos together using either their respective eggs and sperm or donor eggs and sperm. 
Generally created with the intention of implantation, it is standard procedure for clinics 
to prepare multiple embryos with the knowledge that it may take several attempts for 
one to result in a pregnancy. Leftover embryos are then deep frozen in nitrogen and 
stored in sub-zero temperatures, and can either continue to be stored, be used to attempt 




Because these cases involve an embryo that exists outside of the body, many legal and 
bioethical scholars argue that precedent in cases in which courts have established how 
responsibility for embryos should be handled where a relationship breaks down are 
indicative of how responsibility for the ectogenic fetus may be managed.   
In what follows, negotiating the different understandings of gender and how 
ectogenesis is subsequently understood to challenge gendered roles in the family I have 
described, I will explore the potential impact of ectogenesis on gendered familial 
relations to gestation. Before I continue I want to note that while I have established that 
I share Lewis’s vision of what a “degendered” approach to gestation would look like, I 
do also find it important to consider the possibility proposed by many other scholars 
that the technology could change the relational outcome of pregnancy within 
heterosexual couples. In my analysis then, I am interested in both whether precedent in 
frozen embryo cases could suggest a move toward “equal” treatment of men and 
women, and in whether there are spaces here where we might see movement toward a 
more expansive understanding of gender in gestation.55  
 
THE UNITED STATES 
While the United States Supreme Court has been petitioned to hear disputes over frozen 
embryos, it has declined to do so thus far (Cohen and Adashi 2016). As a consequence 
of this and a lack of clear federal statutory guidance, there is variation across the United 
States as to how decisions are made, with these matters being left to individual state 
Supreme Courts. Alghrani notes that while in some instances, state courts have found in 
favor of honoring previously written embryo agreements, courts in other districts have 
heard the preferences of each partner. Where no previous agreement exists, courts have 
tended to balance the interests of each party and favor the partner who does not want to 
reproduce so long as the other can have children in some other way.  
Son (2005), Schultz (2010), Steiger (2012), and Brassington (2009) each draw 
on precedent in these cases to suggest that artificial wombs will bring about the logical 
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extreme of a shift in gendered reproductive responsibility that has its roots in egg 
freezing. It is true, as these scholars argue, that US courts have tended to recognize the 
interests of both male and female progenitors who have contributed to frozen embryos. 
But while the decisions in these cases may be purportedly “gender neutral”, I will argue 
that there is little evidence to support a conclusion that gender is irrelevant here, or that 
these cases may foretell familial equality produced through ectogenetic gestation 
(Brassington 2009, Schultz 2010, Steiger 2010). The limitations of a broader expansion 
in gendered relations to gestating are also made immediately clear by the fact that of the 
embryo cases heard by state Supreme Courts in the last twenty years, all have involved 
heterosexual couples. The dominance of heterosexual couples in embryo dispute cases 
and the consequent focus of ectogenesis scholars on the claim that gender will be 
irrelevant in ectogenetic gestation because “neither the genetic mother nor the genetic 
father has a greater legal right” (2009, 883), already speaks to the limits of the potential 
for ectogenesis to “degender gestation” in this context.  
Davis v. Davis (1992) was the first frozen embryo dispute to be heard in a state 
Supreme Court in the United States. After a Tennessee District Court found against 
Mary Sue Davis, who initially petitioned for the embryos she had frozen with her 
former partner Junior Davis to be donated to another couple rather than being destroyed, 
she appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court. As a matter of first impression, there was 
no preexisting statutory law, case law, or common law to inform the judges on how to 
proceed. In keeping with claims made in the ectogenesis scholarship that neither a male 
nor female progenitor would have greater rights incidental to the ectogenetic fetus, the 
Davis v. Davis court decision explicitly considered and dismissed the relevance of 
gender to determining rights to the embryos. From Mary Sue Davis, the court heard an 
argument that decision-making power should be afforded to “the female gamete-
provider in every case, because of her greater physical and emotional contribution to the 
IVF process”56. Mary Sue’s legal team emphasized that while Junior’s contribution 
involved ejaculation on one occasion, Mary Sue endured regular hormonal injections, 
the aspiration of her eggs under anesthesia, and the transfer of the fertilised embryos 
into her womb, only to experience miscarriage. 
While acknowledging Mary Sue’s ordeal, the court explicitly dismissed the 
relevance of these gendered biological processes to its decision. Instead, it resolved that 
                                                          




“none of the concerns about a woman’s bodily integrity that have previously precluded 
men from controlling abortion decisions is applicable [. . .] As they stand on the brink of 
potential parenthood, Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis must be seen as entirely 
equivalent gamete-providers”.57 This then, is a key moment in the court’s decision to 
take a “gender-neutral” approach to determining responsibility for frozen embryos. It is 
this precedent that scholars site as the grounds for gender equality in gestational 
responsibility after ectogenesis (Son 2005, Steiger 2012, Schultz 2010, Randall and 
Randall 2008).  
The Davis v. Davis court advised that in future embryo dispute cases, where 
there was a prior contractual agreement between progenitors, this should take 
precedence, and without it, the decision should be made by balancing the interests of 
each party. As Son (2005), Schultz (2010), and others conclude, this method of 
determining responsibility for an embryo is ostensibly gender neutral to the extent that 
the gender of the progenitors is not explicitly considered as a factor in assessing their 
respective interests. Here, it is important to return to how claims about the presumed 
equality between progenitors in these cases is then used to argue that “with 
extracorporeal gestation, a man could much more easily be the primary nurturer” (Pence 
2006, 78), and that as a consequence, the technology would create a challenge to  
“conventional notions of family and female nurturing (78). Examining the decision in 
Davis v. Davis, I would argue that despite the absence of direct references to the gender 
of the progenitors, gendered ideas of appropriate familial roles and “conventional 
notions of family” (ibid) shape the Court’s consideration of Junior Davis’s argument. 
Junior Davis’s desire not to have genetic children was heard by the court in the 
context of his own purported family history. He testified that as a child, “his parents 
divorced [and] his mother had a nervous break-down” following separation from his 
father. When it found in favor of Junior Davis’s interests in destroying the embryos, the 
court held that  
he clearly feels that he has suffered because of his lack of opportunity to 
establish a relationship with his parents and particularly because of the absence 
of his father [and] In light of his boyhood experiences, Junior Davis is 
vehemently opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both parents[. . 
.] he is opposed to donation because the recipient couple might divorce, leaving 
the child (which he definitely would consider his own) in a single-parent 
setting.58  







The court, then, emphasized Junior’s assertion that having grown up without a father 
himself, he would be “opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both 
parents”59. While donating the embryos would not require Junior Davis to take any 
“fathering” role, the court cites his concern that if the embryos were donated, the future 
parents could divorce and his prospective genetic child would end up in a “single-parent 
home”. Parental interests in the reproductive decision here, and presumptively in the use 
of ectogenesis, may be considered “equal” or “neutral” in the sense that the court’s 
decision is not swayed in one way or another based on physical references to a gendered 
body. But we cannot conclude from this that gendered notions of appropriate familial 
roles would be absent from consideration in establishing reproductive interests.  
What is particularly striking is the way in which though not made explicit, 
gendered parental roles are negotiated here around the imagined best interests of a 
future child. In a custody dispute involving a born child, the child’s best interests would 
be of primary concern in determining the rights and responsibilities of the child’s 
parents. Though an embryo is not a juridical person (as discussed below, this is in the 
process of changing in some parts of the United States), where courts have assessed 
progenitors’ respective interests in the use of embryos, the imagined best interests of the 
future child are close to the surface. In Davis v.Davis, the best interests of the imagined 
future child are aligned with Junior Davis’s purported desire not to have a genetic link 
with a “fatherless” offspring. If the movement of conception outside of the body in the 
form of frozen embryos is to be understood as a precursor to the movement of gestation 
outside the body through ectogenesis, precedent here suggests that gendered logics of a 
two-parent nuclear family are likely to be used to reorder the roles of those in relation to 
an ectogenetic fetus. Writing of the ways in which people in a clinical setting negotiated 
the complexities of kinship produced through IVF, Charis Thompson refers to “the 
manner in which people in this site routinely used tropes (including conservative ones 
like male eponymy) with which they were familiar from other contexts and extended 
them to cover and disambiguate kinship in this novel setting” (2005 161). While the 
courtrooms in which embryo disputes are heard differ in important ways from a clinic, 
this same use of “tropes” of what the traditional family could or should look like are 
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often drawn upon to inform decisions about rights or responsibilities toward the frozen 
embryo. In this circumstance in which social, biological, and gestational parenting roles 
are disentangled, Junior Davis’s role as a biological progenitor is then used in order to 
situate him as a future father who wishes to cede both his biological and social role 
rather than risk “his” child being born without a father figure. It is this pattern of 
“disambiguat[ing” parental relations to the frozen embryo that suggests to me that rather 
than ectogenesis undoing legal assumptions about maternal and paternal roles in relation 
to the ectogenetic fetus, these concepts are likely to shape and constitute who is allowed 
to use ectogenesis for gestation and under which conditions.  
 In Szafranski v. Dunston, heard in the Illinois Supreme Court in 2005, the court 
similarly used a “gender neutral” balance of interests test which was ultimately also 
coded with normative ideas of appropriate familial roles. Jacob Szafranski and Karla 
Dunston disputed over embryos they had created after Dunston was diagnosed with 
ovarian cancer. Following the end of their relationship, Szafranski expressed that he did 
not want the embryos used because he was “worried that no one will want to have a 
relationship with him knowing that he has fathered a child with Karla through IVF […] 
he testified that he does not “want to be a father like this” and contended that he should 
not be forced to procreate with a woman whom he does not love.”60 
The court heard that the progenitors had a prior agreement, and that at each stage 
of the fertility process Szafranski had consented to the use of his sperm and to the 
preservation of the embryos. Weighing these prior agreements alongside the fact that 
because “[Dunston] suffered ovarian failure as a result of her chemotherapy treatment 
[she] cannot have a biological child without using the pre-embryos,” the court found in 
favor of Dunston.61 By contrast to Davis v. Davis, in Szafranski v. Dunston, the court 
interpreted Szafranski as a kind of absentee father, giving particular reference to his 
preoccupation with his contemporary relationship prospects and the fact that he had 
committed to contributing his sperm to the embryos made with Dunston. In coming to a 
decision, the court emphasized that Dunston “was devastated upon learning that she 
would lose her fertility and thought about how she wants to have a child “with part of” 
her father, who passed away when she was five years old”.62 While deference to the 
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previous consent of both parties and the balancing of their interests is ostensibly non-
gendered, Dunston’s purported desire for biological children on the basis of her 
connection with her father is cited as a significant factor in weighing the balance of 
interests between the two progenitors. As opposed to destabilizing “conventional 
notions of family” (Pence 2006, 78), it may be the case that it is precisely conventional 
notions of a patriarchal lineage, rendered through biological kinship, that would inform 
how rights to an ectogenetic fetus were delineated. There is a shift in the physical 
relation of the male and female progenitor to the embryo, namely, it is not inside a 
woman, yet this does not necessarily equate to a shift in social relation to the embryo. 
Those who are considered to have an interest in it remain the genetic “father” and 
genetic “mother,” whose potential interests it seems may be weighed differently 
depending upon the claims they make to upholding a traditional lineage in relation to 
the future child.   
 The most recent embryo dispute to arise in the United States is McQueen v. 
Gadberry,63 heard by the Missouri Appellate Court in 2016, and ultimately rejected for 
review by the Supreme Court. This case is particularly significant as the first example in 
the United States of a court finding that embryos are akin to property. After a divorce, 
McQueen and Gadberry disputed over two frozen embryos they had created together, 
with Gadberry petitioning for the embryos to be destroyed and McQueen for them to be 
considered children whose best interests would be met in McQueen’s custody. Unlike in 
the previous two cases I have described, where the “best interests” of a future child were 
not explicitly discussed, McQueen argued that the embryos were not only potential 
children, but existing legal persons. Gadberry disputed that the embryos were persons, 
yet he too eluded to the best interests of a future child by maintaining that he did not 
wish to have genetic offspring with McQueen as they were not good co-parents to their 
pre-existing children. Weighing the concerns of both parties, the court resolved that the 
only fair means of resolving the dispute was to treat the embryos as a form of special 
property. As a result, the embryos would remain frozen, shared by McQueen and 
Gadberry, and “no transfer, release, or use of the frozen [pre-]embryos [would] occur 
without the signed authorization of both [Gadberry] and [McQueen]”. Though 
seemingly evident from the two progenitors previous interactions with each other that a 
resolution would not be possible, the court found that this decision was one that 
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“subjects neither party to any unwarranted governmental intrusion but rather leaves the 
intimate decision of whether to potentially have more children to the parties alone.”64  
Following significant campaigning by McQueen and others, the Mississippi 
state legislature heard a bill in 2016 that would make all embryos persons from 
conception. While this bill did not pass, in 2018, Arizona became the first state 
legislature to pass a statute dictating that where a couple is in dispute, frozen embryos 
must go to the party who “wants them to develop to birth.” Where the decision in 
McQueen v. Gadberry is “gender neutral” in that it does not establish either the male or 
female progenitor as the sole decisionmaker, Arizona Senate Bill 1393 is similarly 
“gender neutral” in that whichever progenitor wishes the embryos to live will be granted 
responsibility for them. Considered against the context of ectogenesis, a statute that 
favored whichever progenitor intended to attempt pregnancy with the embryos would be 
“degendering” in that both could have the right to implant the embryo, but neither could 
destroy it. But strikingly here, gestation, and the state control over gestation that has 
long focused on the bodies of women in America, is not “degendered”. True, either 
progenitor could bring the embryo to term, but rather than “gestation” being diffused, as 
something that anyone of any gender could do, we instead have a situation in which 
gestation can either be something that a woman does or something that an object (the 
artificial womb) does. The gendered relationship of the male progenitor to the embryo 
does not change in this scenario, nor does the relation of the state to the embryo or the 
progenitors. 
If decision-making power with the use of artificial wombs were to be 
determined based on the requirement for mutual consent established in McQueen, 
gender could be “irrelevant” to responsibility for the ectogenetic embryo to the extent 
that neither party could implant it in an artificial womb without the consent of the other. 
This is precisely what Steiger (2012), Schultz (2010), and Brassington (2009) imagine, 
a contractual model of ectogenetic pregnancy in which the fetus in the artificial womb is 
the shared property of two genetic parents. In chapter six, I will draw on a feminist ethic 
of care to critique the intersecting frameworks of protecting a right to end a pregnancy 
with reference to genetic parenthood or a property claim that these and other scholars 
propose. But what I wish to do here is simply to assess whether it is in fact likely that in 
removing pregnancy from the body, ectogenesis would remove “the biggest difference 





between the sexes [,] take away the grounds for oppression and eventually, lead to true 
equality” (Takala 2009, 191). While I agree with Schultz, Pence, and others that with 
ectogenesis, as in frozen embryo cases, the location of the embryo outside of the body 
may mean that “neither the genetic mother nor the genetic father has a greater legal 
right incidental to their bodily integrity” (2009, 883), the consequence of this is not the 
absence of gendered logics of the biological, traditional family. Consequently, I would 
argue that there is limited possibility here for ectogenesis as a means of producing 
gender equality.  
The pervasiveness of the focus on genetic parenthood in these cases, also leaves 
little room for conceptualizing what I would argue, following Lewis, reflects a true 
“degendering of gestation”: a scenario in which genetic connection and gendered 
embodiment could essentially be irrelevant to becoming the caretaker of an ectogenic 
fetus. In chapter six,  I consider a right not to be a genetic parent as a means of 
protecting abortion rights with the introduction of ectogenesis in a US context, I will 
also unpack, drawing especially on Fineman and West, the extent to which such a claim 
can be understood as “gender neutral.”   
 
CANADA 
Akin to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in McQueen v. Gadberry, the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 establishes that even when a contract exists 
stating otherwise, the use of previously frozen embryos must only occur with the 
consent of both progenitors. In addition, it bans the purchase of gametes with which to 
create embryos. The most relevant passage of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
2004 to the question of rights and responsibilities for frozen embryos is section 13, 
which specifies that: 
the human reproductive material will be used in accordance with the donor’s 
consent to create an embryo for one or more of the following purposes, namely 
            (a) the donor’s own reproductive use, 
(b) the reproductive use of a third party, 
(c) improving assisted reproduction procedures, 
(d) providing instruction in assisted reproduction procedures, 
or 
(e) a specific research project, the goal of which is stated in 
the consent  
 
A donor may withdraw consent in writing before the use of embryos. If they initially 




party, however, after the embryos are created only the party or parties that the embryos 
were made for (not the donors) need to consent to further use.   
Despite the expectation that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 would 
prevent disputes over frozen embryos, conflicts have arisen. In the 2018 case of S.H v. 
D.H,65 the court heard that a married couple (S.H. and D.H.) traveled to the United 
States to purchase donor eggs and sperm from an American clinic, paying $11,500 and 
signing a contract dictating that the embryos be treated as property. They then returned 
to an Ontario clinic to fertilise the embryos, where they signed a further contract stating 
that in the event of a relationship breakdown, the clinic should follow the wishes  of the 
“patient”, which in this context referred to a female progenitor in whom the embryos 
were to be implanted. In the initial trial over how the embryos were to be divided post-
divorce, the Ontario Superior Court ruled that despite the explicit ban on the purchase of 
gametes in the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004, “there is no law [. . .] that has 
considered how to dispose of embryos when neither party has a biological connection to 
the embryos”66. While the AHRA specified that genetic progenitors who create embryos 
together must both give consent for their use, since neither was genetically related to the 
embryos in this case, the court ordered that their previously written contract should be 
upheld. In 2019, the Ontario Superior Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
decision, emphasizing that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004 sets clear 
statutory requirements that embryos cannot be used without the consent of both parties. 
The court offered a clarification of the AHRA in finding that it “considered each spouse 
a “donor”, regardless of genetic contribution, and gave each a right to withdraw consent 
prior to an embryo’s use, creating essentially a unilateral veto by either party”67.  
In the analogous instance of an ectogenetic embryo, it would seem likely that the 
consent of both parties for whom that embryo was created would be required prior to 
implantation in an artificial womb. I have suggested that where courts use a balance of 
interests test (as in Davis v. Davis and Szafranski v. Dunsworth) to establish 
responsibility for an ectogenetic fetus, it is likely that pervasive ideas of traditional, 
patriarchal familial roles will impact judicial decisions. The use of a consent-based 
model, as dictated by the AHRA and affirmed by the decision in S.H v. D.H, may 
mitigate against this possibility by establishing a blanket rule. To this point, the decision 
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is similar to the Mississippi Court’s ruling in McQueen v. Gadberry, with both 
progenitors having the ability to give or withdraw permission for use at least prior to the 
beginning of gestation.  
But there is a significant difference here pertaining to the way that responsibility 
for the embryos is articulated. Rather than two parties having “equal” say to an 
ectogenetic embryo due to their respective genetic contributions, precedent in this 
instance would suggest that once the embryo is created, responsibility for implantation 
(and presumptively, responsibility during ectogenetic gestation) lies with the people for 
whom the embryos were made. Applying this interpretation to ectogenesis, we could 
imagine a situation in which one or more persons of any gender intentionally set out to 
create embryos and gestate them in an artificial womb. In removing emphasis from 
biological contribution and shifting it to intentionally seeking to create an embryo for 
implantation, there is greater space created here for a variation of family forms 
produced through ectogenesis. Namely, where focus is not placed on genetic 
contribution, but instead on a deliberate shared intent to create embryos, the persons in 
relation to the ectogenetic fetus need not be a heterosexual couple, nor necessarily a 
couple at all. 
  But it is important not to overstep in speculating on what this precedent makes 
possible. While de-centralizing genetic relatedness, S.H. v. D.H. still involved a married 
couple who traveled to the United States from Canada in order to purchase sperm and 
eggs. What we can read from this is the possibility that with the introduction of 
ectogenesis, couples with the financial means to do so, perhaps regardless of their 
gender, might experience a sense of equality in responsibility for gestation that would 
be supported in law. This does not, however, act as a clear demonstration that artificial 
wombs will have the effect that some predict of changing gendered familial roles in the 
family and thus addressing gender inequality in society on the whole (Smajdor 2007, 
Kendal 2015, Singer and Wells 2006, Pence 2006). At most, it suggests that shifting 
relations to gestation could be accessible to some individuals or families. 
As in the American case law, claims in the literature that artificial wombs will 
“alleviate the social injustices” (Smajdor 2007, 337) associated with gender also meet a 
limit in the ways in which gendered understandings of appropriate familial roles inform 
decisions in Canadian embryo cases. In C.C. v. A.W.,68 a 2005 case heard in the Alberta 
                                                          




Supreme Court, a woman (C.C.) had created frozen embryos using sperm donated by a 
platonic male friend (A.W.). C.C. had twins with two of the embryos, and two remained 
frozen. The initial agreement between the two parties established that C.C. intended to 
be a single mother to her two existing children, with A.W. acting only as a sperm donor. 
Prior to coming into conflict over the use of the remaining embryos, A.W. had 
successfully petitioned an Alberta court for access to the twins. In C.C v. A.W. the court 
heard C.C.’s argument that she wished to attempt pregnancy with the remaining 
embryos, and A.W.’s argument that because he had insufficient visiting time with the 
existing children, he did not want C.C. to use the remaining embryos to have additional 
children using his genetic material.  
 Despite the agreement between the parties that A.W. would act as a sperm 
donor, the court criticized C.C. for “[seeing] an extremely limited role for the father”.69 
The language of the Alberta court’s decision emphasizes an investment in a two-parent 
family with a “mother” and “father” acting in complimentary roles. The court dismissed 
C.C.’s arguments against A.W.’s involvement in the lives of the existing children, 
finding that “the smothering care that she claims that the children require can be as 
easily interpreted as the unnecessary and potentially harmful actions of an 
overprotective and controlling mother.”70 However, as to the use of the additional 
frozen embryos, the court found in favor of C.C., finding that A.W. “extended a 
courtesy” in donating his sperm, that “he knew what it would be used for”71, and that 
the embryos were C.C.’s “chattels that can be used as she sees fit.”  
 The court’s decision here is striking in simultaneously deferring to the intentions 
of the two parties as to how their previously created embryos should be used, and in 
dismissing these intentions in finding that A.W.’s biological contribution should be used 
to reconfigure the parenting of the existing children to ensure they would have both a 
mother and a father. On the one hand, the court acknowledged that determining the best 
interests of the existing children and determining responsibility for the frozen embryos 
were two separate questions. But on the other hand, the court’s decision pertaining to 
the best interests of the existing children suggests the likely outcome of the court’s 
response should a future dispute over the as-yet hypothetical offspring produced from 
the embryos arise. In this case, and according to the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 







2004, C.C. was the “person for whom the embryos were created” whose consent as to 
their use is protected according to the terms of the Act. At the very same time, the 
Alberta court’s emphasis on the need for A.W. to be granted more involvement as a 
father to the existing children created using his donated sperm suggests that should be 
apply for access to any further children born from the remaining embryos, the court 
might very likely find in his favor.  
 It is relevant to the question of whether ectogenesis could destabilize gendered 
expectations about gestational responsibility that though the Alberta court granted C.C. 
rights over the frozen embryos, it also affirmed A.W.’s access to the existing children 
created using his sperm in spite of C.C.’s intention to parent those children alone. 
Acknowledgement of initial consent and intention to determine the use of frozen 
embryos may have eliminated gendered determinations in this dispute, but it is not clear 
that A.W. would not ultimately be allowed to seek access to the embryo while it was 
gestating if, for example, C.C. used an artificial womb. What I wish to emphasize here 
is that while it is true that in moving gestation outside of the body, artificial wombs 
open “new possibilities that could upset the traditional male-dominated family 
structure” (Singer and Wells 2006, 14), their capacity to do so does not equate with 
legal regulation, or existing social norms, subsequently allowing for this to occur. C.C. 
v. A.W. is just one case, and with reference to the emphasis on intentions over genetic 
relatedness in the use of embryos, there is potential in the Canadian context for a more 
“degendered” approach to ectogenetic gestation. But I remain skeptical of the extent to 
which these cases indicate that ectogenesis could destabilize the nuclear family, and 
argue that courts may still ultimately make rulings regarding parentage that reconfigure 
such arrangements to resemble the traditional family form.  
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom is well known for the Human Ferilisation and Embryology Act 
1990, which governs the use of human gametes and embryos at authorized clinics under 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. The specificity of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE Act) which was first introduced in 1990 and 
updated in 2008, means that since the act was passed, it has been rare for embryo 




addition, the 2007 Evans v. UK case, which was heard first in a UK lower court but 
ultimately decided by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights72.  
 Schedule 3 of the HFE Act addresses the provision of consent by gamete 
providers as well as by those for whom embryos are intended. Both those who provide 
gametes, and those who the embryos are created for (sometimes the same and 
sometimes different individuals than the gamete providers) must consent to their use. 
Options are provided for the embryos to be used in treatment, donated for research, or 
stored for up to ten years (though this limit can be extended under some circumstances). 
Consent may be withdrawn by any party prior to the “use” of an embryo.  
But while the language of consent provided for in the HFE Act is purportedly 
gender neutral, the legislation is shaped by notions of how responsibility for embryos 
should be established that are rooted in retaining traditional gendered reproductive roles. 
As fertility lawyer Natalie Gamble has noted, through the 1990 passage of the HFE Act, 
“parliament sought to protect (heterosexual) parents from claims from egg and sperm 
donors, and to protect gamete donors from financial responsibility and possible 
inheritance claims” (2013, np). Consequently, the initial guidance produced by the HFE 
Act as to under what circumstances clinics should permit the preparation and use of 
embryos was constructed with the intention of reproducing a traditional, two-parent 
heterosexual family. Regardless of whether a donated embryo was used, the woman in a 
couple (presumed to be heterosexual) who gestated and gave birth to a child was the 
legal mother. In addition, under the 1990 Act, the woman’s husband was the presumed 
father of the child, again, whether or not a donor was used. The original Act recognized 
male partners of married women as parents automatically but excluded female partners 
from this recognition. With the presumption of the parenthood of surrogates, it also 
seriously undermined the parenthood of male same-sex partners. Finally, under the 
original wording of Section 13(5) of the 1990 Act, fertility clinics were required to 
consider the best interests of a child born through IVF, including considering the “need 
of that child for a father.”  
A notable counterpoint to claims made by Brassington (2009) and others that 
frozen embryos already render gender less relevant to reproductive responsibilities and 
ectogenesis will pave the way “to true equality” (Takala 2009, 191) in the family are the 
relatively limited ways that the 2008 revisions to the Act update its gendered provisions. 
                                                          




As McCandless and Sheldon argue, though the 2008 revisions were in part intended to 
acknowledge same-sex couples, and were met with criticism for taking too radical an 
approach, “these provisions equally reflect deep rooted assumptions and highly 
conservative understandings about who should count as family” (2010, 176). The 2008 
Act, for instance, retains the provision that the gestational mother is the presumptive 
legal mother at birth, regardless of whether she is acting as a surrogate and regardless of 
whether the embryo carries an intended mother’s genetic material. While, as noted, I do 
not want to speculate extensively here about parenthood determinations after the point 
when an ectogenic fetus is born, I want to flag the potentially significant issue that the 
emphasis on gestational motherhood raises here. Namely, according to the current 
stipulations of the HFE Act in cases of full ectogenesis, the gestational mother and 
therefore legal mother of the full-term fetus would possibly be the artificial womb. 
Given that this would produce a significant logical fallacy (how could the legal “parent” 
continue to take care of the fetus after birth?) the designation of mother to the birth 
parent would need to be revised. But with this noted, I argue that whether the law would 
defer to a less gendered model of gestational responsibility is unclear.  
As McCandless and Sheldon note, the 2008 revisions to the Act allow female 
partners of women who seek IVF treatment to be recognized as legal parents on 
analogous lines to male partners, and notably, the revisions amended the Section 13 (5) 
requirement that clinics consider a child’s need for a father. Instead under this section, 
clinics are now required to consider the “welfare of any child who may be born as a 
result of treatment (including the need of that child for supportive parenting).” In 
considering the disposition of frozen embryos, this change should mean that the gender 
of the potential parents or parent should not be relevant. However, in practice, the 
requirement that clinics consider a child’s need for “supportive parenting” in the context 
of ectogenesis could retain significant gendered barriers to the implantation of the 
ectogenic embryo.  
Based on the current provisions of the HFE Act whether a single man, two 
fathers, a single woman, or a group of more than two would be able to take 
responsibility for gestating an ectogenetic fetus would be open to potentially gendered 
clinical interpretation of whether these parties could provide supportive parenting. 
Smajdor, Bennett, Brassington and others suggest that ectogenesis may mitigate the 
alleged “desire of women to be able to reproduce as men do” (Smajdor 338). They go 




between cis-gendered, heterosexual men and women by allowing such couples to 
choose to gestate using an artificial womb. But given the provision for clinics to 
consider “supportive parenting”, it could well be that cis-gendered, heterosexual women 
would be most likely to be proscribed from elective use of an artificial womb. As 
Smajdor notes, the idea of ectogenesis having merit simply because it could provide 
women with an alternative to pregnancy has been continually dismissed by both 
scientists and ethicists. Smajdor (2007) and Kendal (2015), who are each adamant that 
the technology could produce gender equality, themselves note that this dismissal is 
likely associated with deeply ingrained cultural investment in gestational motherhood as 
a social good. Rather than ectogenesis acting as a means of disrupting this narrative, I 
would argue based on contemporary law that the narrative of the gestational mother as 
the “true” mother that Kendal and Smajdor note is in fact likely to shape how and 
whether ectogenesis is permitted. Given the sanctity of gestational motherhood in UK 
law73, it seems likely that unless a woman could not physically gestate or give birth, a 
desire to simply “reproduce as men do” (340) by using an artificial womb might in itself 
be seen as an absence of “supportive parenting”. It may also be unlikely that ectogenesis 
would grant men the ability to “be the primary nurturer” (Pence 2006, 78) or to 
intervene in a pregnancy that would otherwise be terminated as some bioethicists have 
purported (Welin 2004, Brassington 2009). Given that clinics are required to consider 
“supportive parenting” of the future child, there may be concerns that a fetus that was 
unwanted by a pregnant person and transferred into an artificial womb under the care of 
another progenitor would be born into emotionally fraught circumstances. To be clear 
here, I am not seeking to make a judgement about the requirement for clinics to consider 
supportive parenting, but simply to consider how it might be applied in the use of 
ectogenesis. Thompson notes of the decisions taken by clinical practitioners in a US 
IVF clinic about whether to offer individuals treatment were in part shaped by “the 
baby-centered heterosexual nuclear family [. . . ] that is normative for the society in 
which these clinics are positioned” (2005 92). Following Thompson, I would argue that 
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the families that emerge in these contexts and are likely to emerge through ectogenesis, 
cannot simply be said to be uniformly forced into a nuclear norm. There is of course 
agency on the part of individuals seeking fertility treatments, clinical practitioners, 
judges, and other parties that are involved here. But what I wish to emphasize is that 
traditional narratives of family and the gendered relations that structure those narratives 
are likely to inform who is allowed to use ectogenesis. Lest I imply that what is 
“normative for the society” (Thompson 2005, 92) in which the US IVF clinic is 
positioned is interchangable with what is normative for the UK society in which UK 
clinics must consider the need of a child for “supportive parenting,” as I have 
emphasized throughout this thesis, there are important distinctions between the 
constraints of each of these contexts. But in each setting, normative social ideals as to 
appropriate gender roles in a family and how that family should be formed, inform the 
conditions under which use of ectogenesis is likely to be permitted.  
 McCandless and Sheldon write, “in the context of widespread political and 
cultural disagreement regarding on what grounds parents should be recognized, 
acceptance of the fact that we can have two and only two ‘real’ parents has proved a 
unifying article of faith” (2010, 190). Given that two cis-gendered men would already 
be expected to have to contract a gestational carrier, the Human Embryology and 
Fertilisation Authority might look favorably on such couples using the technology 
(rather than involving a surrogate) and being identified as legal parents during gestation. 
So too with heterosexual couples in which the woman was physically unable to carry a 
pregnancy.  
I want to turn now to the landmark Evans v. U.K. case. When Evans was 
diagnosed with ovarian cancer, she sought to preserve her ability to have genetic 
children. While given the option of freezing her unfertilised eggs, the clinic advised 
Evans that freezing fertilised embryos was a safer option, and her partner “Mr. Johnston 
reassured Ms. Evans that they were not going to split up. She did not need egg 
freezing”74. Evans and Johnston therefore produced and stored six embryos. Following 
Evans’s cancer treatment, the couple separated, and Johnston subsequently wrote to the 
clinic withdrawing his consent. Evans appealed to the High Court, which rejected her 
claims and found in Johnston’s favor, and the case went to the European Court of 
Human Rights before ultimately going to the Grand Chamber of the European Court, 
                                                          




with each court finding in favor of Johnston on the grounds that as a gamete provider he 
had the right to withdraw his consent. The case presented the first interpretative test of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act and specifically, of how and when consent 
to the use of ones’ gametes was to be required. The court weighed Evans’s argument for 
respect for private family life against Johnston’s and found that it was necessary to 
infringe on Evans’s privacy to protect fundamental rights and freedoms.  
Upholding the decisions of the lower courts,  the Grand Chamber affirmed that 
Paragraph 2(1) (a) of Schedule 3 provides for an important distinction between 
consenting for the embryos to be used by another person alone, and consenting to use 
them with “another specified person together”. While Johnston had consented for the 
embryos to be used in “treatment together” the court affirmed that because the couple 
had separated and the embryos would now be used by Evans alone, Johnston was 
entitled to withdraw consent. As I have noted in the Canadian context, the use of a 
consent-based model here could provide grounds for the gender neutral responsibility in 
ectogenesis that Bennett and others have extrapolated from it. But, returning to a theme 
I have traced throughout embryo dispute cases, normative ideas of what a father’s role 
is in a family permeate the court’s decision.  
In the decision upheld by the Grand Chamber, the court noted that “there are a 
number of possible reasons for requiring the consent of the genetic father at all stages. It 
can be said that it is important to involve the male at all stages so as to ensure that he 
will be involved in the upbringing of a child” 75. The court went on to consider Evans’s 
desire not to be a genetic father in terms of concern that having an absentee father could 
result in damage to the child, holding that “it may be that […] if the father were to reject 
the child, that could be distressing for both parties[] even without meeting the child, the 
father’s own freedom of action may be inhibited by feelings of guilt or even 
responsibility.”76 As in Davis v. Davis, the imagined impact on a future child of having 
an absentee father is plain here, and reiterates the notion that a genetic relation 
automatically begets an emotional, financial, and/or social bond. While, as Takala, 
Pence, Bennett and others imagine, ectogenesis may present the opportunity for gender 
no longer being a considered factor in gestation, existing statutory and case law on 
frozen embryos in the UK, as in Canada and the United States, would suggest that 
ectogenesis is unlikely to mean the arrival of “true equality” (2009, 191) of gestational 
                                                          





responsibility and family-making. As Zakiya Luna argues, “to be more productive 
technology users would need to align themselves more closely with the maligned 
disruptors of ideas of the family [. . .] To truly change the family we have to embrace 
the discomfort of deviance” (2018, 99). This too, can be said of ectogenesis. Truly 
“degendering” gestation would require first a “degendering”, and de-normalizing those 
institutions that currently either exclude “maligned disruptors of ideas of the family” 
entirely or reconfigure these families to more closely resemble a nuclear one. 
In the second half of this chapter, I want to turn to considering the possible 
relationship between ectogenesis and contemporary inequalities in access to 
reproductive care. Dorothy Roberts, writing in the mid-1990s, made a compelling point 
about in vitro fertilisation that I believe acts as a useful bridge here between thinking 
about gendered family relations and thinking about stratified reproduction with respect 
to ectogenesis. Roberts observed that IVF was often positioned as a means for women 
to delay reproduction in order to build their careers. She cautioned that “relying on 
expensive interventions to resolve the tension between child-raising and work destroys 
the possibility of unity in women’s struggle for fundamental change in the sexual 
division of labour” (1997, 292). Roberts emphasizes that approaching reproductive 
technologies as possible “solutions” to gender inequality is only likely to continually 
leave behind the women who are already most marginalized. The same can be said for 
an uncritical approach to ectogenesis as a tool for achieving gender inequality in and of 
itself. I have identified one strain of bioethical and feminist literature that purports that 
ectogenesis could serve to “alleviate […] social injustice” (Smajdor 2007 337) by 
negating reproductive difference between men and women. Just as this literature takes 
for granted that there are only two genders, by treating “men” and “women” as 
monolithic categories whose relations would change with the introduction of this 
technology, it also negates difference within these groups across race, class, geographic 
location, ability, and other lived realities.  
 
5.2 ECTOGENESIS AND STRATIFIED REPRODUCTION 
For the final part of this chapter, I want to turn to considering to a concern flagged by 
numerous feminist scholars, namely the possibility that ectogenesis could exacerbate 
existing social inequalities between women (Corea 1985, Rowland 1987, Kamm 1992, 
Woolfrey 2006, Sander-Staudt 2006, Limon 2016, Langford 2017). As Limon notes in 




reproductive oppression is experienced in different ways based on race, class, ability, 
sexual and gender identities, among other characteristics, the possibility that ectogenesis 
could constitute an additional reproductive “choice” for some women may mean it 
could constitute an additional danger for others. Sander-Staudt considers the history of 
“emancipatory” reproductive technologies such as birth control pills, which were also 
used coercively for population control projects directed at women labelled by the state 
as undesirable mothers. Sander-Staudt notes the same danger in ectogenesis, cautioning 
that “women who are already socially underprivileged due to race, class, sexual 
orientation, or nationality [. . . ] may be compelled to use such technologies should 
certain social institutions deem them unfit to begin or continue an organic pregnancy” 
(114).  
Each of these arguments deals with what Colen termed “stratified reproduction,” 
referring to the persistence of inequity of access to reproductive care and technologies 
across “hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, gender, place in a global economy, and 
migration status” (1995, 78). These hierarchies, which have been shaped and reinforced 
by colonialism and racism, are rooted in histories that begin well before the introduction 
of reproductive technologies such as the birth control pill. As I will discuss, they also 
live on in contemporary practices and policies in the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom.  
 Feminist scholars who emphasize that claims that ectogenesis “could [...] free 
the mother” (Adinolfi 2004, 570) must be understood in conjunction with historical and 
contemporary inequity in access to and experiences of reproductive technologies make 
an important intervention in the literature on artificial wombs. Thinking informed by a 
reproductive justice framework means not solely centering a limited right to end a 
pregnancy, but, as Ross writes, recognizing that  
for Indigenous women and women of color it is important to fight equally for (1) 
the right to have a child; (2) the right not to have a child; and (3) the right to 
parent the children we have, as well as to control our birthing options [. . .] 
(2007, 4) 
 
In the context of thinking about the impact of ectogenesis, I argue that we must explore 
in concrete ways whether ectogenesis could undermine pregnant peoples’ rights to 
continue to carry a wanted pregnancy.  
Many of the feminist scholars who express the strongest concerns about the 




the context of the United States (Corea 1987, Murphy 1989, Adams 1995, Sander-
Staudt 2006). I have come across no literature on this subject written from a Canadian 
context, but both Alghrani (2008) and Jackson (2009) briefly consider possible 
inequities in experience of ectogenesis across racialized and classed lines. I have 
identified in earlier chapters of this thesis a tendency for universalizing claims to be 
made in the American literature which do not hold true in the context of the United 
Kingdom and Canada. In feminist literature in which scholars raise concerns about the 
effect of ectogenesis on inequality in access to reproductive care, aspects of this pattern 
are evident. Most notably, scholars frequently neglect to note that the privatized 
healthcare system creates a financial stratification in the United States that is 
particularly pronounced. Yet this body of feminist literature also raises concerns about 
structural racism and its impact on access to and experience of reproductive 
technologies, an issue that is deeply relevant in the UK and Canadian context as well. 
As I will explore further in what follows, comparison here in fact draws these 
similarities to the fore. In the first part of this section, I will consider structural racism in 
reproductive care in each of these nations. While dealing with medical institutions and 
not with the law, I want to include this engagement here because it is relevant to broader 
questions of how artificial wombs may worsen, have no impact on, or improve existing 
inequalities in care.  
In the second part of this section, I turn to the concern raised in the feminist 
literature that by virtue of the existence of ectogenesis, pregnant people deemed 
insufficient or problematic caretakers for their fetuses (such as women in prison and 
women who have consumed alcohol in pregnancy) would be forced to use artificial 
wombs. I explore this question with specific reference to what could be limited or 
enabled by existing laws and policies in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Canada respectively regarding intervention in wanted pregnancies.  
 
5.3 ARTIFICIAL WOMBS, STRUCTURAL RACISM, AND ANTENATAL CARE 
Beyond the claim that ectogenesis could produce greater equality, many scholars have 
also cited the health risks of pregnancy as a positive incentive for developing the 
technology (Pence 2006, Singer and Wells 2006, Smajdor 2007, Kendal 2015, Coleman 
2004). Indeed, given that so much of the social science literature on ectogenesis 
(including this thesis) deals with abortion and questions about how the technology 




importance of artificial wombs. The primary scientific and medical justification for 
these technologies has been to save the lives of extremely preterm wanted babies, and 
improve health and survival for people experiencing complications in pregnancy 
(Partridge et al 2017, Usuada et al 2017). The scientific researchers doing this work 
have identified that maternal morbidity and mortality remains high, and that when 
babies are born at the cusp of viability even survive, they frequently suffer significant 
health consequences. For these research teams, artificial wombs stand to be a revolution 
in maternal and preterm care. The feminist literature often critiques the focus of 
scientific researchers on the health of the fetus, emphasizing that ectogenesis should be 
a worthwhile goal solely for its capacity to alleviate the impact of pregnancy on 
women’s health (Firestone 1979, Smajdor 2007, Lewis 2018, Kendal 2015). Lewis and 
Smajdor each observe that the fact that the symptoms of an ordinary pregnancy can 
range from morning sickness to death should be reason enough to take research on 
ectogenesis seriously. While I agree with these scholars that the possibility that artificial 
wombs could alleviate the risks of pregnancy is a worthy goal, I would also emphasize 
firstly that the scientific literature, too, acknowledges this goal. Secondly, I would note 
that taking a relational feminist approach to thinking about pregnancy also means 
acknowledging that the goal of improving care for a prematurely born baby is also 
emphasizing the pregnant person’s needs in many instances.  
 I too want to take seriously the possible benefits of both partial and full 
ectogenesis for providing reproductive care in a wanted pregnancy. Biologist Adinolfi 
writes that beyond “free[ing] the mother from the discomfort and potential risks 
associated with pregnancy” (2004, 570), the artificial womb might be useful in 
numerous situations, such as blood incompatibilities between gestator and fetus, 
prenatal surgery, and other practices that could be dangerous for both the pregnant 
person and the wanted fetus. In what follows, I consider existing inequalities in risks 
and outcomes for pregnant people and preterm babies and argue that for artificial 
wombs to be beneficial they must be accompanied by structural and social change 









THE UNITED STATES 
Once trialed and demonstrably safe for both the pregnant person and the extremely 
prematurely born baby77, partial ectogenesis like the biobag could have the greatest 
impact on improving maternal health rates overall if made available to the women most 
likely to experience preterm birth or complications in the latter stages of a wanted 
pregnancy. As Novoa and Taylor (2018) and Matoba and Collins (2017) have 
thoroughly tracked, rates of maternal mortality and morbidity among black women in 
the United States remain unconscionably high. Novoa and Taylor write that as of 2018, 
“African American mothers are dying at three to four times the rate of non-Hispanic 
white mothers, and infants born to African American mothers are dying at twice the rate 
as infants born to non-Hispanic white mothers” (2018, np). Technologies like the 
biobag, as Adinolfi and others argue, could have significant clinical use in addressing 
these high rates of maternal mortality and infant morbidity if, firstly, the technology 
were readily available, and secondly, if it were the case that the primary cause of these 
high rates of maternal and infant morbidity was lack of access to advanced life-saving 
technologies. As to the possibility that biobags will be readily available, under current 
circumstances, the costs of staffing and equipping Neonatal Intensive Care Units 
(NICU), and for pregnant people, the cost of such care, are extremely high (Cohen and 
Sayeed 2011). In the United States, then, biobags are likely to first be available only in 
specialist care units and at high cost to the patient. Barring a change to the financial cost 
of healthcare in the United States, then, a disparity in access to the biobag along classed 
lines is inevitable. As regards morbidity and mortality among women of color but 
particularly black women in the United States, however, these disparities remain when 
studies control for income (Matoba and Collins 2017; Novoa and Taylor 2018). As 
Novoa and Taylor note in their review of the literature, these health outcomes cannot be 
solely traced to a lack of access to life-saving technologies, a fact which suggests that 
the introduction of a biobag in and of itself would do little to mitigate them. 
 While one aspect of these disparities can be traced to “significant 
underinvestment in family support and health care programs” (Taylor, Novoa, Hamm 
and Phadke 2019), which disproportionately impact black families, significant recurring 
factors are discrimination in the hospital setting and maternal stress produced by the 
persistence of structural racism. Though Firestone did not write about ectogenesis with 
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consideration of race in the United States, and indeed, discussion of racism is 
conspicuously absent from her treatise, her argument that the technology could only be 
emancipatory after a revolution is relevant here. I would argue that it may indeed be the 
case that once demonstrably safe, bio-bags should be distributed in the United States to 
ensure that the pregnant people who are currently the most impacted by maternal 
morbidity and mortality as well as high rates of preterm birth have access. This is a 
point on which significantly more research engaging both patients and medical 
practitioners should be done. But I want to emphasize here that these disparities in 
access to maternal care, given that they stem from systemic inequities, would not be 
redressed with the introduction of ectogenesis without also addressing the root causes. 
As Taylor, Novoa, Hamm, and Phadke write, “the maternal and infant mortality crisis 
cannot be adequately addressed without first understanding and then dismantling racism 
and bias in the health care system” (2019).  
  
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In contrast to the United States, the universal healthcare system in the United Kingdom 
means that access to reproductive care is broadly more consistent. But despite the low 
overall rates of maternal morbidity and mortality and as well as low rates of inequity in 
access to neonatal care overall, disparities remain along racial lines. Notably, “in 2012-
14 the risk of maternal death was much higher for black and minority ethnic 
background women compared to white women. The stillbirth rate for white women in 
the UK was 4.5, while for black women 9.2 and for Asian 7 (per 1,000 maternities)” 
(Access to Health and Midwifery 29). Further, studies which consider circumstances 
where mothers come close to death reflect rates “for African and Afro-Caribbean 
women [that are] double those for White women” (Smalls et al 2018). As in the United 
States, these disparities remain even after adjustments for socio-economic status and 
health risk factors. Research as to the causes of these discrepancies cite “disrespect from 
healthcare providers” (ibid) as well as ineffectual and insensitive communication from 
providers as key determinants.  
Since 2013, measures have been taken to address racial disparities in neonatal 
care, through targeted training of healthcare professionals, resulting in a decrease of 
maternal mortality and morbidity for African women, but this rate still remains higher 
than for white women. Particularly in the context of the United Kingdom, where NHS 




need to be accompanied by requisite structural and social changes in order to create 
change. Without such changes, as Jackson has noted, we would see a “counterpoint to 
claims that artificial gestation would benefit women as a class” (2009, 410), as it may 
be likely that there may be improvements to maternal morbidity and morality and care 
for premature babies overall, but no requisite change in these racial inequities.  
 
CANADA 
As in the United Kingdom, the public health care system in Canada means that 
disparities in access to maternal and neonatal care are not as extreme as they are in the 
United States. However, maternal morbidity and mortality in Canada are higher among 
recent immigrant populations and Indigenous women (Kolahdooz et al 2016). Morbidity 
may include “complications in pregnancy and childbirth, such as hemorrhage, 
infections, high blood pressure, ectopic pregnancy, preterm birth, unsafe abortion and 
obstructed labor” (334). A number of these health concerns are precisely those 
identified by bioethicists and scientific researchers as possible circumstances in which 
women’s health might benefit from the use of a partial or full artificial womb (Partridge 
et al 2017, Smajdor 2007, Gefland 2006, Coleman 2004). As Kohladooz writes, while 
the risk of maternal mortality and morbidity are both low overall in Canada, 
“Indigenous women in Canada have a two times higher risk of maternal mortality in 
comparison to the general Canadian population” (2016, 335) and also “experience 
higher rates of adverse outcomes including stillbirth and perinatal death, and, in some 
cases, low-birth-weight infants, prematurity and infant death” (Kohladooz et al 2016, 
335). In a review of numerous studies on the causes and possible responses to this 
disparity, Kohladooz et al note that many scholars emphasize the need to improve 
geographical access to care. Conversely, Kohladooz et al also emphasizes that 
improvement of outcomes in these circumstances is not simply reducible to the 
availability of healthcare providers or technologies, but also requires active engagement 
with the perspectives of Indigenous Canadian women, the situating of maternal services 
within communities, and cultural sensitivity to the importance of place for Indigenous 
pregnant people. In particular, Kohladooz et al note the importance of “educating 
[health care providers] to understand Indigenous history and by valuing Indigenous 
maternal traditions and prenatal knowledge” (Kohladooz et al 2016, 344).  
As in the United States and United Kingdom, then, racialized health disparities 




neonatal technologies. Instead, as Kohladooz et al suggest, in the Canadian context, 
addressing stratification in sufficient care for pregnant people is more likely to be rooted 
in contemporary issues as to the provision of culturally sensitive practices, and active 
engagement with community knowledge. The introduction of ectogenesis in this 
context, then, may be unlikely to worsen existing stratification in care, but is also 
unlikely to improve it. In addition, Kolahdooz et al emphasize, considering the present 
situation, that one particular area for improvement is for healthcare providers to 
appreciate the history of Indigenous people in Canada, include the ways that white 
Canadian institutions have used reproductive technologies to eugenic ends, have both 
removed children from Indigenous families and communities and sterilised Indigenous 
women against their will. The idea that ectogenesis “would not only free women from 
pregnancy, but [. . .] take away the grounds for oppression and eventually, lead to true 
equality” (Takala 2009, 191), which arises in much of the literature, then, is also 
inattentive to existing stratifications in reproductive care and is contextually specific.  
 Contemporary racialized disparities in preterm births and maternal morbidity 
and mortality lay bare the importance of thinking about the artificial womb as a 
technology that can only be as innovative as the social context into which it arrives. 
Roberts (1997) notes that considerations of the impact of new reproductive technologies 
that proceed only with imagining how the technology may increase healthcare choices 
centralizes a subject for whom healthcare and basic rights against discrimination and 
structural oppression are presumed to be already stable. Roberts argues that this 
tendency “operates like blinders that obscure issues of social power that determine the 
significance of reproductive freedom and control […] not by ignoring them altogether, 
but by claiming to achieve individual freedom without the need to rectify social 
inequalities” (1997, 298). The artificial womb then, can be imagined as a technology 
that could radically decrease maternal morbidity, but if it is considered only in the sense 
of its capacity to empower individual choice, rather than analyzed within the context of 
existing social inequalities, it cannot move a collective project of reproductive freedom 
forward.    
 
5.4 ECTOGENESIS AND REPRODUCTIVE COERCION  
The concerns of some feminist scholars (Corea 1985, Sander-Staudt 2006, Murphy 
2006) that ectogenesis might be forced on women considered to be “unfit” mothers are 




Coleman 2004). Yet these concerns find justification in the context of recurring 
suggestions that ectogenesis might be safer for fetuses than human pregnancy (Singer 
and Wells 2006, Reiber 2010). Kaczor writes that “partial ectogenesis may someday 
become less risky than normal gestation, since an artificial womb would not, 
presumably, get into car crashes, slip and fall, or be assaulted” (2005, 298). Similarly, 
Pence suggests that ectogenesis could be used to “change the gestational course for a 
poor baby of an alcoholic mother from being born addicted to alcohol and retarded to 
being born alcohol free and with superior nutrition and oxygenation” (2006, 82).78 
While feminist scholars have been attentive to the way such proposals might be used to 
coerce women to use an artificial womb, with the exception of a brief note in Jackson 
(2009) and Abecassis’s (2016) work there has been little engagement with precedent in 
existing law that might allow or prevent such intervention from occurring. In what 
follows, I consider the extent to which existing laws or policies might prevent or enable 
coercive use of artificial womb technology.  
 
THE UNITED STATES 
Paltrow and Flavin have tracked “more than four hundred” (2013 300) instances of 
pregnant women being detained on charges of endangering their fetuses “in forty-four 
states, the District of Columbia, and federal jurisdictions from 1973 to 2005” (300). In 
the majority of these cases, pregnant people were arrested and detained on the grounds 
that they had exposed their fetuses to harmful substances. As Paltrow and Flavin, Ross 
and Solinger, West, and others have traced, numerous states have statutes under which 
courts have been allowed to take such actions. 79 
 A Wisconsin statute, for instance, allows the state to detain people believed to be 
pregnant who “demonstrate ‘habitual lack of self-control’ in the use of alcoholic 
beverages or controlled substances” (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.193 cited in Paltrow and 
Flavin 2013). Similar statutes are also in place in Minnesota and South Dakota, and 
while not every state has statutes that explicitly apply to actions in pregnancy, Paltrow 
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as threats to their fetuses” (2011, 411), and proceed with the unsubstantiated assumption that either the 
artificial womb itself and/or those monitoring the artificial womb will provide infalliable care to the fetus.  
79 Future research could also be done to consider the relationship between discourses of preventing risk to 
foetuses by extracting them to artificial wombs to be adopted and existing practices of forced adoption. I 
do not take up this comparison here because I believe that we may learn more about what needs to be 
addressed in advance of the introduction of artificial wombs by focusing on the forms of legally permitted 




and Flavin also identify increasing use of statutes intended to protect older children in 
order to criminalize pregnant people for harming their fetuses. While drugs or alcohol 
are cited as the primary issue in these cases to justify detention, other activities were 
also referenced as concerns for medical practitioners and police, such as the 
presumption that the pregnant person had not actively sought prenatal care or “gave 
birth at home or in another setting outside a hospital” (ibid). As Ross and Solinger 
(2017) aptly demonstrate, criminal cases like these actively target poverty: a lack of 
seeking prenatal care, for example, in the privatized healthcare system of the United 
States, speaks to a lack of resources with which to enable someone to seek such care. 
Were a wealthy person to drink or use drugs and give birth at home, it is unlikely that 
the police would become involved. Cases involving drug use in particular are 
disproportionately targeted at low income pregnant people, and widely disparate 
according to race:  
Overwhelmingly, and regardless of race, women in our study were economically 
disadvantaged, indicated by the fact that 71 percent qualified for indigent 
defense. Of the 368 women for whom information on race was available, 59 
percent were women of color, including African Americans, Hispanic 
American/Latinas, Native Americans, and Asian/Pacific Islanders; 52 percent 
were African American (Paltrow and Flavin 2013 311) 
 
While scholars such as Pence and Gefland speculate about the possible uses of the 
technology to preserve the health of the fetus from a mother who may expose it to 
“harm”, they do so without reference to the ways in which existing statutes such as 
those traced by Paltrow and Flavin already allow the state to intervene in such cases. To 
return to the concerns of Sander-Staudt, Woolfrey, and others that ectogenesis could 
result in some women being coerced to use the technology, the application of statutes to 
arrest and detain a pregnant person is not interchangeable with enforced extraction of a 
fetus to an artificial womb for the duration of the fetus’s gestation. But the legally 
permitted detention of pregnant women for actions against their fetuses in the United 
States does present a precedent for the possibly coercive use of ectogenesis that some 
feminist scholars identify.  
 A particularly prescient example here is the case of Martina Greywood, an 
Indigenous woman who was arrested and detained in North Dakota on charges of 
exposing her pre-viable fetus to toxins. While awaiting trial, Greywind sought an 




was no longer relevant.80 To return to the concerns that Murphy and Corea express over 
ectogenesis being used coercively, if a woman such as Greywind were arrested for 
exposing a previable fetus to harm, she could be informed that the charges may be 
dropped should she allow the fetus to be extracted to an artificial womb. In this 
instance, the introduction of artificial wombs could raise a very real probability in the 
United States not of fetuses being forcibly extracted from women’s bodies, but as in the 
Greywind case, of a pregnancy being ended by “choice” by a person who would face 
substantive criminal charges if they did not comply.  
 Equally, as Smith notes of a review of drug rehab centers in the United States, 
“two-thirds of drug treatment centers would not treat pregnant women” (2017, 158), 
and, as Paltrow and Flavin tracked, many such centers are the sites of pregnant women 
being referred to the police. In contemporary situations in which a drug or alcohol-using 
pregnant person has sought rehabilitation, she risks being criminalized and detained. In 
the future, the use of an artificial womb may be offered as a means of receiving 
treatment and avoiding criminalization. Where a pregnant person may need to consent 
to such an exchange, given that the choices would be between criminalization without 
treatment and fetal extraction, the situation would remain coercive. Based on existing 
precedent, this kind of coercion would not be circumscribed by US law, as it would 
involve no forced bodily procedure, and would uphold state statutes targeting drug use 
in pregnancy. What is also significant here, however, is that as I have previously argued, 
at least in its initial stages, the artificial womb is likely to be costly and not widely 
available. The purpose of considering these questions then, should be to identify that 
there is a clear contemporary context that would allow artificial wombs to be used in 
coercive ways with the approval of the law, in order to address these limitations well 
before the technology arrives.   
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom, there are no statutes to allow the state sanctioned surveillance 
and punishment of pregnant people for consuming substances that may harm their 
fetuses. Strong precedent has been established against attempts to criminalize pregnant 
women for actions against fetuses. Most recently, in 2014, CP v. First Tier Tribunal 
and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority was heard by the Court of Appeals. This 
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case involved a claim made on behalf of a six-year-old girl who had fetal alcohol 
spectrum disorder against her mother for injuring her in utero. Beginning with the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, “which refused the claim on the grounds 
that she had not been a victim of violence”81 the case continued to the Court of Appeal, 
where the court affirmed CICA’s stance. The Court of Appeal established that the case 
was not analogous, as the claimants argued, with Attorney Generals Reference (No.3 of 
1994). In this case, a man stabbed his pregnant girlfriend, resulting in significant 
injuries to the woman and the premature birth of her baby, who died shortly after birth. 
In Attorney General’s Reference, harm was caused to a person (the pregnant woman) 
resulting in the death of a person (the baby born prematurely, who later died due to 
injuries caused in the stabbing). The court in C.P. v. CICA clearly establishes this as 
distinct from the circumstances of harm caused by drinking in pregnancy, noting that 
“an essential ingredient of the offence […] is the infliction of grievous bodily harm in a 
person. Grievous bodily harm to a foetus will not suffice” (19). The court also 
considered the claimant’s argument that an offence had been committed under Section 
58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, referring to the prohibition against a 
woman administering poison to herself with the intent of causing miscarriage, and 
found that this did not apply because the pregnant person had not consumed alcohol 
with the intention of having a miscarriage. The court took a firm position that “in 
English law women do not owe a duty of care in tort to their unborn children” (19). As a 
test case that was an attempt to establish a crime of consuming toxins while pregnant, 
C.P. v. CICA instead had the effect of establishing a clear precedent against treating 
such actions as a crime. The possibility that because “artificial wombs [. . . ] wouldn’t 
be threatened by irresponsible introductions of alcohol or illegal drugs” (Rosen 2003, 
72), some women might be forced into use, is likely to be strongly censured in the UK.  
 This does not mean, however, that coercive use of ectogenesis would not occur. 
Alghrani briefly considers the danger of drug or alcohol using pregnant women being 
forced to use artificial wombs but asserts that barring a significant change to the legal 
status of a fetus, this would be prohibited under English law. While I agree that it is 
improbable that a pregnant person would be legally ordered to have her fetus extracted 
into an artificial womb in the UK, it is necessary to think about how coercion can 
operate without requiring the force of law. In her short consideration of whether women 
                                                          




could be pressured to use artificial wombs, Jackson (2009) makes the point that if the 
technology were to come to be seen as safer for the fetus than human gestation, people 
with “a less than ideal lifestyle” (361) may find themselves placed under social pressure 
to use ectogenesis. Jackson does not consider specific examples, and in what follows, I 
explore two sites through which this kind of social pressure might operate.     
First, in the contemporary UK, the two child benefit limit on universal credit 
means that as of 2017, recipients of universal credit cannot receive additional support 
for a third or additional child born after April 2017 unless they were “born as part of a 
multiple birth [or] born as a result of a non-consensual conception (including rape) or 
conceived when [the pregnant person was] in a controlling or coercive relationship” 
(Universal Credit, 2019). In the second and third instances, a woman must also be able 
to prove she is not living at an address with the abuser at the time of making the welfare 
claim, a stipulation that significantly overlooks the realities of abusive relationships. As 
the British Pregnancy Advisory Service has stated in criticism of the credit limit, in 
many situations of abuse, women remain with abusive partners for reasons including 
financial dependency and a fear of loss of access to their children. The exceptions to the 
two child limit, which are provided to account for situations in which the birth of a child 
is beyond a woman’s control, much like the specifications permitting abortion in the 
Abortion Act 1967, do not account for the breadth of reasons why a person may become 
pregnant with an additional child, or why they may continue that pregnancy.  
As the British Pregnancy Advisory Service has argued, the welfare cap “fails to 
meet its stated aim of ensuring that individuals in receipt of welfare supports face the 
same choices about having kids as those in active employment do [and] traps families in 
poverty”. Most notably, the policy has significant implications for reproductive choice. 
It explicitly invites women to consider abortion in order to provide for their existing 
children, using the language of encouraging people “to think carefully about whether 
they can afford to support additional children” (British Pregnancy Advisory Service 
2019). The universal credit limit is distinct from American statutes in which pregnant 
people might feel coerced into using ectogenesis in order to avoid criminalization in that 
the consequences of continuing a third pregnancy do not extend to detention or 
incarceration. But, given that a number of scholars have proposed that ectogenesis could 
be used electively by women who did not wish to continue a pregnancy (Smajdor 2007, 
Kendal 2015), were policies actually in place to allow elective use, women reliant on 




would allow them to continue to receive support for their existing children while also 
not terminating a fetus. In such instances, social inequity would be a factor in 
generating pressure to use an artificial womb.  
 The second example I want to consider here is the related, non-governmental but 
judicially supported PAUSE project. PAUSE is a charity that works with women who 
have more than one child who has been removed from their care. The project “offers 
women an 18-month, individually-tailored, intensive package of support”, which they 
are able to access if  “beginning this voluntary programme, women agree to use an 
effective form of reversible contraceptive for the 18-month duration of the programme” 
(McCracken et al 2017). The PAUSE project has already been purchased by  “34 local 
authorities”, with plans to expand to coverage for women considered to be “at risk”, 
meaning, those without children who are judged by the program to be at risk of having 
children who would be taken in to care. PAUSE again works on a model of voluntary 
compliance: an agreement to use long acting birth control in exchange for support and 
rehabilitation. But given the lack of alternative broad-reaching support programs for 
women who, as many of the members of the program have, face issues ranging from 
domestic violence, homelessness, and drug and alcohol use, the voluntary choice to use 
long-acting birth control again occurs  under circumstances in which the opportunity for 
choice are limited. In this instance, there is a striking parallel between the United States 
context, in which the provision of welfare has long been associated with punitive 
measures and coercive pressure for women to use long-acting contraceptives (see Ross 
and Solinger 2017). In both contexts, this is an example of the necessity that provisions 
for choice be accompanied by resources in which to actually enact those choices in the 
absence of external pressure. As Roberts writes, we cannot solely be concerned with 
choice, we “should also be concerned about the quality of options available […] it is 
possible that all the alternatives decrease [a person’s] control over her reproductive 
health” (1997, 136). In the context of the United Kingdom practices such as the choice 
between a prison sentence or the use of ectogenesis would be likely to be roundly 
condemned, but both the two-child benefit limit and the PAUSE project should be taken 









As in the United Kingdom, Canada does not have statutes in place that criminalize 
women for the consumption of drugs or alcohol in pregnancy. In 1997, the Canadian 
Supreme Court made a decisive interpretive ruling in Winnipeg Child and Family 
Services (Northwest Area) v. G (D.F.). Winnipeg Child and Family Services sought 
permission from the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench to hold a woman (G) who was 
twenty-two weeks pregnant in treatment for glue-sniffing until she had given birth. The 
order was granted by this court but reversed on appeal, and when the case was 
ultimately appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court, the reversal was upheld. The 
Supreme Court affirmed that a fetus is not a legal person in Canada, and that to detain 
the woman would violate all women’s rights under Morgentaler’s protections to bodily 
autonomy and liberty.82 At the highest level of the Canadian justice system, then, there 
is strong precedent against criminalizing women for actions against their fetuses. There 
is also broad precedent toward affirming that a fetus is not a person until birth. Given 
this, it is likely that Canadian law would prohibit people being coerced to use the 
technology to avoid criminalization.  
  But as in the United Kingdom, existing practices that are not mandated by law 
must be considered with reference to feminist concerns that ectogenesis could be used 
coercively. I want to consider one particularly pressing example. In the recently released 
final paper of the National Inquiry Into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and 
Girls, the nonconsensual sterilization of Indigenous women is noted as a means of 
genocide, a project beginning in the 1920s by which “sterilization was viewed as a way 
to eventually eliminate the Indigenous population entirely” (Reclaiming Power and 
Place 2019, 266). As the authors of the report note, while statutory laws permitting 
forced sterilization in Alberta and B.C. were repealed in the early 1970s, these abuses 
have continued to occur throughout the country. Class action lawsuits on behalf of 
Indigenous women who have experienced tubal ligation (a sterilization procedure) 
without consent, often while in hospital recovering from the birth of children, are 
underway across Canada (Kirkup 2018, Kusmer 2018, Boyer and Bartlett 2017). Three 
of these suits have been filed against the Governments of Alberta, Sasketchewan, and 
Manitoba, with the experiences reported by claimants spanning the 1980s through to 
2018.  
                                                          




 To turn back to the question of potentially coercive uses of artificial womb 
technology, these cases are not indicative of the possibility of a situation in which a 
woman would face coercion in the form of a “choice” between criminalization and 
ectogenesis, as I suggested could be possible in the US context. Nor are they suggestive 
of the “choice” between losing vital resources and ectogenesis that I have indicated in 
the United Kingdom. However, the cases addressed in these lawsuits involve practices 
condoned within Canadian hospitals whereby many women were given false 
information about tubal ligation procedure immediately after giving birth, and many 
involve situations in which “women were denied access to their newborn babies unless 
they agreed to the procedure” (Kirkup 2018). A situation in which a woman might be 
coerced into using an artificial womb is importantly distinct here, in that this would 
involve coercive action at the beginning of a pregnancy, whereas these cases refer to 
such actions after birth. However, the significant history of coercive and forced 
sterilization of Indigenous women in Canada, and the absence of specific legislation to 
ban these procedures, suggests that practices of offering ectogenesis without provision 
of actual informed consent or under coercive circumstances could occur in Canadian 
hospitals. Where, as in many of the instances of contemporary sterilization abuse, 
hospitals could demonstrate that women had given consent (in spite of an absence of 
evidence that consent was freely given), this would be a practice that may not be 
circumscribed by law.  
 
CONCLUSION  
In her 1993 critique of feminist literature imagining a utopian future wrought by the 
introduction of artificial wombs, Alice Adams notes that this vision emerges from a 
particular situated position from which reproductive technologies are largely imagined 
to be a tool for emancipation. To Adams, this utopian rendering of a collective 
commune of degendered caretakers built around artificial wombs excises the 
oppressive, eugenic history of how reproductive technologies have been targeted to 
limit the reproductive capacities of women of color. Indeed, Adams calls our attention 
to the fact that medical and legal institutions are shaped by colonialism and white 
supremacy, such that if we fail to take up the existing inequalities and injustices that 
these institutions have produced, artificial wombs as a means of liberation will remain a 
fantasy that is only accessible to the most privileged of subjects. In this instance, these 




I have first considered the speculative position that ectogenesis will result in a 
“degendering” of gestational responsibility, and secondly, considered the possibility that 
as some feminist scholars fear, ectogenesis could reinforce inequality in relation to 
reproductive rights and care. With regard to a “degendering” of gestational 
responsibility, I considered that in the United States, the significant variation of court 
decisions as to how to resolve frozen embryo disputes suggests similar variation is 
possible with regard to assigning gendered responsibility in ectogenesis. Looking at 
instances where courts deferred to balance of interests tests, I suggested that while 
ostensibly a “degendered” approach, gendered logics of family forms still permeate 
these decisions, suggesting a significant limitation on the imagined escape from a 
nuclear family form often intimated in the literature on ectogenesis. Looking at a case 
resolved through the requirement of mutual consent, I suggested that the emphasis on 
genetic parenting might also pose limitations as to the degendering possibilities opened 
by the artificial womb. In Canadian law, I considered that a requirement of mutual 
consent emphasizing the people for whom embryos are created rather than the genetic 
progenitors may move further toward a framework that would allow for “degendering” 
of gestational responsibility in ectogenesis. However, I also noted the continued 
persistence of gendered ideas of the nuclear family, and suggested that it is unlikely in 
Canada, too, that artificial wombs would result in a challenge to this logic. Finally, in 
the United Kingdom, I argued that deference to genetic contributions as well as to 
gestational motherhood may also limit the capacity for ectogenesis to mean a challenge 
to the “prima facie injustice” (Smajdor 2007, 338) of unequal gendered responsibility 
for caregiving.  
 The idea that ectogenesis will “degender” gestation as it recurs in the feminist 
literature is very much aligned with Adam’s critique of the particular positionality that 
allows for ectogenesis to be envisaged as a tool for communizing care labor. Limon, 
critiquing Kendal’s argument to this effect, notes that “pronatalism reads like an all-
powerful ideology where women may be ‘overwhelmed’ or unable to resist the social 
pressures to have children” (2017, 211). Limon asserts that this position falls short of 
acknowledging “the diversity and complexity of women’s experiences let alone 
resistance to such discourses” (212). In particular, Limon argues that “a liberal feminist 
account that universalises women’s experiences, or assumes that pronatalism operates in 
a singular oppressive fashion, risks ignoring reproductive stratification” (2017). With 




reproductive care, I considered first the existing racialized inequities in maternal 
morbidity and mortality and preterm births across all three jurisdictions. I argued that in 
each jurisdiction, these continued inequities even after controlling for financial 
differences and pre-existing health risks demonstrate the need for structural and social 
change in order for artificial wombs to have the intended effect of improving 
reproductive care. Turning to the question of whether ectogenesis could be used in 
coercive ways, in the United States I argued that current legal frameworks that target 
low income women of color for criminalization for their actions during wanted 
pregnancies indicate precedent for coercive pressure to use the artificial womb. In the 
United Kingdom and Canada respectively, I argued that the absence of statutory law or 
case law precedent criminalizing women for actions against their fetuses means that 
forced fetal extraction is unlikely on these grounds. Conversely, I identified in the UK 
several instances in which coercion to limit reproduction has been is permitted and 
suggested this could occur with regard to use of ectogenesis without prohibition. In 
Canada, I similarly identified that based on existing practices, coercive use of the 
artificial womb could be allowed to occur. I have sought to show here that ahead of the 
development of ectogenesis, it is not enough to focus on ensuring that pregnant people 
will continue to be permitted to terminate a pregnancy, though this is a primary aim of 
this thesis. We must also take great care in identifying and addressing how this 
technology will impact people’s access to reproductive options during wanted 
pregnancies.  
 In the final chapter of this thesis I will turn to assessing property rights and 
rights to avoid parenthood, as well as the possibility of decriminalized and deregulated 
abortion access as means of continuing to protect abortion after ectogenesis. Returning 
to thinking about ectogenesis and the regulation of abortion, I will argue that the best 
means of protecting abortion from challenges posed by ectogenesis is to focus on 
decriminalization and open access. But what I have sought to show in this chapter is the 
need for significant, structural, systemic change in the provision of reproductive care, 
and in the relational autonomy granted to pregnant people during wanted pregnancies. I 
have sought to emphasize that this technology cannot straightforwardly be read as it is 
in much of the literature as a means of simply enhancing already existing control over 
reproductive choice. I believe that these issues are importantly interconnected, as I will 
note in chapter six. With this said, this thesis is ultimately focused on abortion. What I 




work on how this technology could best be mobilized to benefit the health of pregnant 



































6. REGULATING ABORTION AFTER ECTOGENESIS THROUGH PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, GENETIC PARENTHOOD, OR FULL DECRIMINALIZATION 
Irina Aristarkhova writes, “the necessity to work with the legal framework that exists [. . 
.] does not diminish the need for a new framework” (2012, 112). Aristarkhova works 
from outside the disciplinary constraints of doctrinal legal theory, and calls for a critical, 
feminist approach to law. By contrast, the literature on ectogenesis and abortion that 
emerges from legal scholarship is frequently preoccupied with accepting the law as it is 
rather than exploring law as it could be.  
There is an obvious explanation for this focus. It is practical to emphasize swift 
reforms that might be made in anticipation of this new technology, rather than more 
major changes that could leave a lag between the arrival of the artificial womb and 
sufficient regulation. If the majority of the bioethical and legal literature took up legal 
questions posed by partial artificial wombs such as the biobag, which are currently in 
development, this explanation would hold. These technologies present an immediate 
possibility that the latter half of human gestation could occur outside the body. In the 
face of this technological progress, which is predicted to be ready for human trials 
within the next several years, it is strategically sound to focus on minor changes to 
ensure this development does not challenge abortion rights. Yet the vast majority of the 
literature does not address the urgent reality of partial ectogenesis. It addresses the 
distant and currently speculative possibility of full ectogenesis. There is a contradiction 
here, then. Even as this body of literature imaginatively explores the hypothetical 
subject of full ectogenesis, it does not apply imagination to the law, remaining instead 
deeply mired in the constraints of contemporary legal practices. This reflects less a 
practical restriction that arises from a need to focus on imminent challenges, and more 
an inability or unwillingness to imagine new futures for abortion jurisprudence to 
accompany a futuristic technology.  
In this last chapter, I will first consider two proposals for governing ectogenesis 
and abortion that would involve a significant reform of existing legal frameworks: 
protecting abortion through a right not to be a genetic parent, and protecting the 
procedure through a property right. Since these two proposals are substantially 
interlinked, I will analyse them together to avoid repetition. I will argue that the use of 
these frameworks in any jurisdiction would significantly fall short of acknowledging the 
relationships inherent in gestation and ensuring care for the pregnant person. Finally, I 




and abortion: a framework for full decriminalization and the provision of positive 
protections for access to abortion. We have seen through analysis of Canadian 
regulation that artificial wombs need not pose a challenge to abortion rights when the 
law is constructed in such a way that technological advances are irrelevant to the 
protection of a vital medical service. The striking absence of an argument for 
decriminalization as a means of addressing the “problem” ectogenesis poses for 
abortion regulation, then, speaks to the way in which state governance of gendered, 
gestating bodies is taken for granted. With the assistance of perspectives from feminist 
ethicists of care and reproductive justice scholarship, I will argue that the only sufficient 
framework for guarding abortion against a challenge posed by ectogenesis is one in 
which abortion is decriminalized and freely available. To conclude this thesis, I want to 
imagine what it would look like for ectogenesis to pose no threat to abortion rights, not 
by dreaming of a different future but by considering the contemporary existing example 
of the Canadian system. If the paternalistic governance of abortion by the state can be 
imagined as a practice that has outgrown its necessity, how can we change the law as it 
is to create a framework in which new technologies do not threaten the fundamental 
needs of pregnant people? In what directions must we orient ourselves to disentangle 
the institutional forces that still undermine these needs? And, once this is established, 
what other dreams and possibilities could the artificial womb then open? 
  
6.2 PROTECTING ABORTION THROUGH A PROPERTY RIGHT OR A RIGHT TO 
AVOID GENETIC PARENTHOOD  
Building upon the purported gender neutrality precedent in frozen embryo cases, a 
number of legal scholars have argued that abortion rights might be protected after 
ectogenesis by emphasizing  a protected right not to be a genetic parent (Coleman 2004, 
Alghrani 2007/2008, Bard 2006, Son 2005, Lupton 1997, Overall 2015). Other scholars 
have suggested the closely related framework of protecting abortion through reference 
to a property right for both progenitors in relation to the ectogenetic fetus (Murphy 
1989, Bard 2006, Schultz 2010, Steiger 2010). In both instances, scholars are suggesting 
that contracts be used to determine when and under what circumstances either party 
could terminate an ectogenetic embryo or fetus. Some, like Schultz, propose that 
applying these contracts to ectogenesis would be a matter of drawing on existing 




As Ford argues in her exploration of the uses of a property right to protect 
abortion (2005), there are a number of different ways in which we might conceptualize 
an embryo and/or fetus as property. Because embryos are produced through labour (the 
production of gametes) they may be considered the property of those who generate 
them. Relatedly, because they contain the progenitors’ genetic material, they may be 
thought of as their property. Finally, Ford suggests that given the physical location of 
embryos and fetuses in a human pregnancy, we could treat them as the exclusive 
property of a pregnant person: the fetus, in a sense, occupies a physical space that 
belongs to that person. 
In the frozen embryo cases discussed in the previous chapter, such as McQueen 
v. Gadberry83 and C.C. v. A.W.84, courts have judged embryos to be property in the 
sense of these first two definitions (gamete production constituting labour, and embryos 
containing the progenitors’ genetic material). In the literature in which scholars argue 
for protecting abortion after ectogenesis by drawing on embryo dispute cases to argue 
that “embryos and pre-viable fetuses must be acknowledged as property” (Stieger 2010, 
169), it is also these two definitions of property they reference. The argument for 
protecting abortion through a property right and the argument for protecting it through a 
negative right to avoid genetic parenthood, then, are very similarly expressed in the 
literature in that both stem from an understanding of genetic contribution as the morally 
and legally significant factor in determining rights to an ectogenetic fetus. Räsänen, for 
instance, argues that “when ectogenesis becomes possible, men and women can exercise 
equally their rights not to become a genetic parent [and] their rights to genetic privacy 
and property” (2017, 702). In both instances, it is a presumed harm arising from 
unwanted genetic ties that grants “genetic parents [a right to] destroy their fetus” (700). 
 There are three key ways in which both of these frameworks fail to uphold a 
feminist ethics of care and fail to recognize the enabling and limiting relationships 
produced through pregnancy and care labor. Firstly, because they draw on precedent 
from the frozen embryo disputes which I have argued frequently reinforce nuclear, 
patriarchal ideals of the family, these frameworks presume only one possible kind of 
relational entanglement: a family in which the genetic, gestational, and social parenting 
roles are vested in just two individuals. Schultz, for instance, in making a case for a 
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shared right to avoid genetic parenthood, writes that “neither party should unilaterally 
have the right to unplug” (2010, 884) an ectogenetic fetus. Similarly, Bard argues that 
both a male and female progenitor should have a protected right to end pregnancy based 
on genetic contribution since “mothers and fathers have made biologically equivalent 
contributions” (2006, 151). And Steiger too, writes of a shared property or negative 
genetic right to determine abortion that “control over [the fetus] must stem from [a 
woman’s] interest in it as a progenitor, which is equal to that of the father” (2010, 160). 
Solely focusing on a male and female genetic progenitor who are also the prospective 
parents, the authors propose a means of protecting abortion that presumes that the only 
people who may be involved in the process of making a baby or have parental intention 
are the biological progenitors. Räsänen is representative of a number of scholars who 
make an argument for a negative right to avoid parenthood or a property right when he 
argues: 
Becoming a biological parent causes harm to the couple because of parental 
obligations towards the child [,] The couple has the interest to avoid the harm of 
parental obligations [and] Therefore, the couple has a right to the death of the 
fetus to avoid the harm of parental obligations (2017, 468).  
 
The assumption that is made here, drawing on the logic of the embryo dispute cases I 
discussed in the previous chapter, is that an unwanted biological link is an inevitable 
harm, even in instances in which no parental bond is created or intended. Son takes a 
particularly extreme position here when she writes of “the mental anguish to which a 
person would be subjected for a lifetime if he or she would be made to become a genetic 
parent” (2005, 231). As I will discuss, if someone is coerced into genetic parenthood by 
another progenitor with the intention of manipulation or emotional abuse, it is certainly 
the case that to be a genetic parent may cause them harm. But the presumption that 
genetic parenthood inevitably causes harm reinforces a particular biological view of 
gender and reproductive labor. This is a point on which I agree with Overall.  Like me, 
Overall concedes that creating space for a pregnant person to choose termination 
because they do not wish to have genetic offspring is important, but she argues against 
the assumption that the existence of genetic offspring one does not intend to care for is 
automatically damaging. Overall writes that this approach “admits of no moral process 
by which [responsibility for a fetus] may be transferred” (2015, 132). In other words, it 
insists that a biological relationship is always and inevitably an inescapable familial 




always morally require[s] a woman to assume social motherhood” (132). Enforcing a 
genetic or property-based model in ectogenesis then, would be the logical extreme of 
the pattern I have traced in frozen embryo disputes, in which a biological contribution 
comes to be understood as indicating a social, emotional, and perhaps financial 
connection. Not only does this assumption fail to reflect the diversity and complexity of 
contemporary family-making, it poses a problem for protecting abortion rights in 
situations in which the genetic parents and the gestational parent, or the genetic parents 
and the intended parents, are not one and the same.  
It is frequently the case, for instance, that a person who is approached to act as a 
gestational surrogate for an individual or a couple is neither the intended parent nor the 
genetic parent of the resulting child (Lewis 2019). Where two men commission a 
surrogate, it is possible that both partners are intended fathers but only one is a genetic 
contributor, and that the surrogate is a gestational but not genetic mother. It is possible 
also that a heterosexual couple may commission a surrogate and the embryo may be 
genetically related to the commissioning parents only. Lewis has called attention to the 
way in which surrogacy is often treated as unique from other forms of gestating when in 
fact many of the same practices occur outside these circumstances. Romantic and sexual 
relationships are frequently entangled in such a way that a person may become pregnant 
with no intention of involving the other progenitor, or the genetic progenitor and any 
additional intended parent are different people. As Ross and Solinger argue, it has long 
been true that families are built through “foster parenting, collective parenting, and 
other nuclear-family and non-nuclear family options” (2017, 208).  
In the previous chapter, I noted that in thinking about how ectogenesis could 
change gendered relations to gestation and care, I follow Lewis’s approach to gender 
and artificial wombs. In Lewis’s vision for ectogenesis, gender is not reducible to 
biological difference or binaries. Men can and do get pregnant, there are many women 
that will never or can never gestate. Uteruses can be constructed and they can be 
removed, allowing pregnancies to flourish in non-binary bodies. For Lewis (and 
Firestone), in a future in which gestation was valued as an inevitable and vital form of 
care, ectogenesis could become a potential opportunity for sharing this labor. But 
crucially, Lewis and Firestone would reject the idea that this sharing could occur simply 
by designating men and women equal rights holders to a fetus due to their genetic 
contributions. They would reject the way that this approach forecloses the many-varied 




necessary prerequisite for opening these possible relationships is first relinquishing the 
idea that “genetic motherhood […] always morally require[s] a woman to assume social 
motherhood” (Overall 2015,132). 
Like the decisions I have traced in frozen embryo disputes, a framework here 
solely focused on male and female genetic progenitors precludes imagining other 
possibilities artificial wombs might offer for family-making. But there is also a potential 
for harm caused through a distribution of the right to end gestation that does not 
acknowledge these relational entanglements. By placing sole emphasis on genetic 
contribution, the effect of ignoring the possible relationships produced through gestation 
here is that intended parents who are not genetically related to the fetus could be at risk 
of the biological progenitors “pulling the plug”. And conversely, gestational parents 
who are not genetic parents may be left vulnerable to forced gestation.  
 How would these relationships be addressed through a property or genetic 
parenthood-based framework? Most scholars who make these arguments are silent as to 
intended or gestational parents who are not genetically related to the ectogenetic fetus 
and suggest by omission that only biological parents should have rights to continue or 
terminate a pregnancy (Bard 2006, Steiger 2010, Schultz 2010). Räsänen is 
representative of another group, who explicitly suggest that genetic progenitors 
(including sperm and egg donors) should indeed be privileged over others (including 
surrogates or intended parents) in making a decision to continue or end an ectogenetic 
pregnancy (2018). This poses a significant potential limitation with regard to providing 
the pregnant person with recourse to end an unwanted pregnancy. Consider, for 
instance, a situation in which a surrogate has been commissioned to be the gestational, 
but not the genetic parent. A right to avoid genetic parenthood would protect the right of 
the commissioning parents to end her pregnancy, but it would not protect her right to do 
so.  
Some scholars, in justifying their proposed genetic or property-based 
framework, argue that if the pregnancy began in a person’s body they would either have 
an exclusive right to terminate it or alternatively, they could have it extracted to an 
artificial womb if another genetic progenitor wished to take responsibility (Schultz 
2010, Steiger 2010). But where existing abortion rights and access are likely to be 
further undermined by the introduction of ectogenesis (United States), unless significant 
changes were made, a framework to protect abortion based on genetic connection 




undermine the ability of people who were not genetically related to their fetuses to seek 
abortion.  
Additionally, surrogacy already involves significant global supply chains, with 
intending parents from places such as the US, UK, and Canada travelling to nations in 
which they may pay to have more access to and more control over the surrogacy process 
(Lewis 2019). It is entirely possible that if rights to abortion in ectogenesis were 
designated through genetic relatedness in the UK, and/or Canada, even if these 
jurisdictions retained specific protections to abortion where the fetus began in a 
person’s body, commissioning parents might seek jurisdictions where this was not the 
case in order to ensure that if a surrogate sought abortion they could have a legal claim 
to enforce transfer to an artificial womb instead. Consider that it is already true that 
surrogates working in some less heavily regulated nations have reported being 
prevented from seeking abortion and being coerced to have an abortion respectively 
(Lewis 2019). To be clear here, we can imagine it would be possible that if, as 
Abecassis (2016) suggests, new legislation were to be passed to establish specific 
guidelines, we could anticipate and clarify protections for non-genetic gestational 
surrogates and intending but non-genetic parents. But this framework is not the most 
straightforward and certain means of ensuring care for the pregnant person, or of 
ensuring the different possible relational entanglements emerging from human 
pregnancy and ectogenetic gestation are acknowledged. As I will argue later in this 
chapter, decriminalizing abortion and improving access offer a much more stable and 
ethical first step.  
 This brings me to another limitation of a framework that uses a right to avoid 
genetic parenthood or a property right to protect abortion, namely, a failure to consider 
the ways in which interpersonal relationships under such conditions may result in 
manipulation. The threat of possible coercion sits beneath the surface of a number of 
arguments made for the use of a genetic or property-based claim to protect abortion. 
Räsänen, while arguing broadly against conservative claims that ectogenesis will bring 
the end of abortion, concedes that he agrees with these scholars on one point, which is 
that fathers might intervene to stop abortion. He holds that “when it is possible to 
gestate the fetus outside the womb, the fate of the fetus is not her decision, but their 
decision” (2017, 699). A number of other scholars who argue for a right to avoid 
genetic parenthood or a property right appear to show an unsubstantiated faith that 




protect pregnant peoples’ interests in any disputes that arise (Bard 2006, Schultz 2010, 
Steiger 2010). 
 Here, it is helpful to turn to Martha Fineman, who argues that “although 
concepts of formal equality and gender neutrality are useful in defining some relations 
between adults, they are inadequate, even detrimental, in addressing the dynamics 
inherent in the family” (2017, np). When it comes to systemic inequality, to families 
operating within external structures that enforce and reproduce significant disparities in 
power, we will not arrive at equality simply by declaring that we have decided that 
everyone is to be equal under the law. This is potentially the most dangerous limitation 
of deciding to apply a framework based on genetic contribution to abortion, without 
accounting for structural inequity. 
 Ross and Solinger note that abuse remains a motivating factor in some abortions, 
referring to circumstances under which a person is coerced or manipulated 
(economically, emotionally, and/or physically) to remain pregnant or end a pregnancy 
as “reproductive violence” (2017). As they note, domestic abuse is known to increase 
during pregnancy, creating circumstances under which a pregnant person may struggle 
to access reproductive care. The British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) has also 
reported that “Pregnancy is a time when domestic abuse is more likely to start or to 
escalate, with 15% of women reporting violence during a pregnancy” (2017, 6). BPAs 
has tracked that “physical abuse is common in women seeking abortion and may be one 
factor in their decision to end the pregnancy” (6). Ectogenesis could allow a fetus to be 
removed from the body for either part or all of gestation. As Murphy notes, this raises 
the potential for abusive or controlling partners either to attempt to implant and gestate 
a fetus unwanted by the other progenitor, or to terminate a fetus in an artificial womb 
that is wanted by that progenitor. To be explicit here, it is precisely in relationships 
between heterosexual, cisgendered couples that reproductive violence, by men against 
women, has been demonstrated to increase during pregnancy (Ross and Solinger 2017). 
It has already been well documented that abuse and/or coercion is a factor in a majority 
of cases where men have attempted to file injunctions in order to stop their partners 
from securing an abortion (Kaposy and Downie 2015). The framework for abortion 
which protects a shared right between a male and female genetic progenitor to end 
ectogenetic gestation is a proposed “gender neutral” strategy of the kind Fineman 
critiques. In its lack of attention to unequal, structural power dynamics related to 




circumstances in which pregnant people are pressured into the use of an artificial womb, 
or in which one partner is able to exercise power over the other to ensure that 
ectogenesis does or does not go forward, in the name of “equal” distribution of 
responsibility.  
 I do not wish to make the paternalistic suggestion here that women need to be 
protected from ectogenesis simply because it could be manipulated for abusive ends. 
And lest I seem to be contradicting myself, I want to be clear that it is not the existence 
of a genetic connection in and of itself that I am arguing causes harm. I have already 
established that I do not believe this to be the case. Instead, it is the possibility of 
unwanted genetic parenthood constituted by the other progenitor with the intention of 
enacting reproductive violence that could constitute serious harm. What I am 
highlighting here is that a shared right to terminate or gestate a fetus based on genetic 
relatedness explicitly opens the possibility for emotional, physical, and financial 
coercion as a means of forced extermination or forced gestation.  
Undoing the association of pregnancy with women’s bodies is a precondition for 
a vision of the future in which the work of gestation is shared. The idea of using 
property rights to distribute responsibility for an ectogenetic fetus may be appealing in 
that it could seem to be a means of allowing for this responsibility to be shifted and 
transferred. And with reference to the possibility that a framework based on genetic 
connection or property rights could result in coercion or manipulation, one could make 
an argument that this is simply the trade off, the possible price that might sometimes 
have to be paid for “degendering” care for a fetus. But this is an unacceptable 
concession that again, puts the chicken before the egg in making the assumption that 
ectogenesis will produce the opportunity for “equity” in gestation and society will 
follow. Fineman argues, “we can impose all the gender equality aspirations we want in 
the family, but if the state and the market continue to operate in ways that conform to 
old gendered patterns, gender equality will be close to impossible to achieve” (2017, 
16). And similarly, we could use an “equitable” model for distributing the right to 
continue or end an ectogenetic pregnancy, but so long as the “old gendered patterns” 
(16) remain, we are sacrificing care for pregnant people to an alleged pursuit of equity 
that may never transpire. And finally, on this point, as I will argue when I turn to 
considering decriminalization and improving the accessibility of abortion: this is simply 




 The final limitation of a framework for abortion after ectogenesis based on a 
property right or a negative right to avoid parenthood that I want to address here is the 
way in which both of these proposals continue to treat abortion rights as a private sphere 
of non-intervention, rather than providing positive recourse to access. Across the United 
Kingdom, United States, and Canada, I have noted continued inequities in access to 
reproductive care. While factors shaping inequitable access to abortion differ across 
these jurisdictions, in the absence of a positively articulated protection for abortion 
access in the United States and Canada in particular, these disparities continue. To come 
back to an argument I introduced earlier in this chapter: there is a significant lack of 
imagination in most proposals for ectogenesis and abortion in that even as they imagine 
a speculative technology, they retain the existing limitations associated with 
contemporary abortion rights.  
 Criticisms of a limited, private sphere of non-interference to protect abortion 
rights have a long and prolific career in the feminist literature on abortion. Yet when it 
comes to speculating on what abortion rights could look like in the future, the 
scholarship on ectogenesis insists on reinvigorating models that many feminists have 
argued are ineffectual. Here, I argue that we should follow the criticisms made by 
reproductive justice activists and scholars as to the way in which negative rights in the 
absence of resources fail to protect the interests of pregnant people, and particularly 
impact those already marginalized. As Ross and Solinger write, a framework for 
reproductive justice is one that not only secures access to the resources to end a 
pregnancy and control one’s reproductive body, but also supports “the right to become 
pregnant, to have a child, to be a parent, and to raise that child within a safe, dignified, 
and healthy context” (2017, 167).  
 In the context of the United States, in which privatized healthcare produces 
significant issues of inequitable access to reproductive care, this is particularly 
pressing.85 Of the reproductive justice movement, Ross, Roberts, Derklas, Peoples, and 
Bridgewater Toure write, “we challenge […] how liberal ideology misused the concepts 
of rights and justice to situate responsibility for health and wellness in individual 
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choices, while ignoring the institutionalized barriers that constrict individual choices 
such as racism, homophobia, sexism, classism, ableism, or xenophobia, or more simply, 
lack of access to appropriate and comprehensive healthcare” (2017, 19). As with an 
argument for redefining viability or bodily autonomy, the benefit of a negative right to 
avoid genetic parenthood or a property right in the United States context arises from the 
fact that as some scholars trace (Schultz 2010, Son 2005, Steiger 2010) this precedent 
already exists in frozen embryo case law and is markedly similar enough to a future 
abortion case in which ectogenesis could otherwise be pushed as an “alternative” to 
termination. Given what I have already established is a high probability that ectogenesis 
will challenge abortion rights in the American context, drawing on established 
precedent is an understandable tactic for holding the line. 
 Yet, the status of Roe as a “truncation of the aspirational feminist vision of 
reproductive justice from which it was forged” (West 2009, 1422) lies in the way that to 
retain bare rights to abortion for some, continual concessions have been allowed which 
have carved away at the original goal of universal access to abortion. Consider, for 
instance, the Hyde Amendment which bans the use of federal funds for abortion. 
Renewed every year since the 1970s, reproductive justice activists have noted that 
fighting the amendment was long left off of the agenda of the mainstream movement for 
reproductive rights, out of fear that this could stir trouble for the protections carved out 
by Roe v. Wade (Ross and Solinger 2017, West 2009). As a consequence, while Roe v. 
Wade’s protection of abortion under a right to privacy remained intact, American 
women dependent on federal funds (disproportionately low income women, young 
women, Indigenous women, and women of color) were no longer able to access 
abortion.  
 I note this example because to attempt to protect abortion rights from 
ectogenesis by fighting for acknowledgement of a negative right to avoid parenthood or 
a property right, and thus re-enshrining a precarious, negative right to access would 
simply be to continue to accept a “truncation of the aspirational feminist vision of 
reproductive justice” (West 2009, 1422). It may protect abortion rights for some women 
but would do nothing to ensure protection for the many others to whom abortion is 
already inaccessible. While committing to full decriminalization of abortion and full 
accessibility may be more “aspirational” than strategic, so long as full ectogenesis, too, 
remains aspirational, accepting a framework that offers less is a pre-emptively defeatist 




I have already established in this thesis that ectogenesis is unlikely to undermine 
abortion rights in Canada. There is a need for further reforms in the Canadian context 
ahead of this technology to offer better affirmative avenues of care for pregnant people 
as a lack of positive protection to access continues to limit some peoples’ ability to 
secure the procedure. But a shared, negative right would be a step in the wrong 
direction, a movement toward contracts as opposed to towards the potential for greater 
emphasis on relational autonomy. 
 In the United Kingdom, the Abortion Act 1967, is likely to retain some 
protection to abortion. The aspects of abortion jurisprudence in the United Kingdom 
where there are potential gaps in guarding reproductive rights after ectogenesis are the 
requirements for approval of two physicians, the retention of a gestational limit, and the 
continued presence of abortion outside of these guidelines as a criminal offence. 
Attempting to protect abortion through a right to avoid genetic parenthood or a property 
right in this context would address none of these problems. As I will discuss in the next 
part of this chapter, advancing relational autonomy in UK abortion law requires a focus 
on decriminalization and escaping the paternalism of the existing Abortion Act.  
 In a 1995 study in which she interviewed women who self-identified as both 
prochoice and anti-abortion, Leslie Cannold concluded that women’s “moral meaning 
and justification of abortion radically differs from that provided by Severance theorists, 
who justify abortion on the ground that it enables women to exercise their right to 
bodily autonomy” (51). A number of later scholars have drawn on Cannold’s work to 
suggest that what women really seek in abortion is a right to the death of their genetic 
progeny (Schultz 2010, Overall 2015, Räsänen 2017). While these scholars are right to 
note that this is one possible motivation that leads people to seek abortion, there is a 
nuance to Cannold’s assessment of her data which often gets lost. Cannold wrote that 
the women she interviewed understood abortion partially as a desire not to be pregnant, 
or have genetic progeny, but also as a “sense of responsibility to their fetuses” (52). For 
the pro-choice women, having an abortion was a means of enacting responsibility: 
making the decision that the best way to care for this unwanted fetus was not to bring it 
in to the world at all. I am reminded here as well of Lewis’s careful unpacking of all of 
the ways in which a pregnant person gives of themself to the fetus, and how, with 
regard to an unwanted pregnancy, we should consider that “refusal” (2018), or “self-




 Cannold’s data pointed to the complexity of gestation and abortion: it is not 
simply not wanting to be pregnant, nor is it not wanting to be a genetic parent, nor a 
sense of property or ownership. These different experiences may all be present, or they 
may not be. A sense of belonging or dissociation, connectedness or rejection, love or 
disgust, may all shape how a person may feel toward a fetus. A relational understanding 
of pregnancy and of the desire for abortion means a recognition that all of these feelings 
may lead to someone seeking abortion. Both Cannold and Sherwin have emphasized 
something that has regrettably been unheeded in literature on ectogenesis: “theoretically 
dispassionate” (Sherwin 1991 329) moral philosophers who seek a singular justification 
for abortion are not speaking the same language as the pregnant people who seek it. 
They are not listening.  
 As a final point here, Ford argues that a property-based justification for abortion 
is a relational way of approaching the right, in that “it focuses on relationships 
surrounding an object rather than the intrinsic nature and status of the embryo itself” 
(2005, 9). I agree with this logic to some extent, in that it is a compelling means of 
turning moral and legal attention away from the often fruitless question of how we 
should understand and acknowledge the moral status of the fetus. But even so, a 
property approach to a fetus potentially reinforces the economization of reproduction. 
And more importantly, articulating the abortion right in this way is unnecessary. It 
emerges from a situated position in which abortion is understood to begin with not as a 
medical necessity, not as an essential resource, but as a moral ill that must be 
monitored, limited, justified, and ideally abolished. To this end, I want to turn to my 
argument for decriminalization, for full, accessible, and free abortion care as the best 
way of protecting abortion against challenges posed by ectogenesis.  
 
6.3 DEFENDING ABORTION THROUGH DECRIMINALIZATION AND 
UNIVERSAL ACCESS 
In the bioethical text that is often cited as the origin of the argument that ectogenesis 
poses an agreeable “solution” to abortion, Singer and Wells write that “we” protect 
abortion because forcing a woman to remain pregnant against her will is a violation of 
her autonomy, but in spite of this, “we” understand that the fetus has some moral status. 




Unless we were to change our mind about this, it is difficult to see why we 
should give this right to a woman in respect of a fetus she is carrying if her 
desire to be rid of the fetus can be fully satisfied without threatening the life of 
the fetus  (1983, 12) 
 
To reduce a lengthy analysis to a single thread: what I have sought to establish by 
considering the way ectogenesis might impact abortion rights in three specific 
jurisdictions, is that the “we” that has allegedly taken a clear stance on abortion rights is 
neither universal nor constant. Singer and Wells speak of “our minds” and “our” 
perspectives. But how “we” view gestation, women’s bodies, fetuses, and abortion, 
varies significantly across the jurisdictions of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, and has varied significantly over time. While the legislatures of each 
nation have codified particular attitudes toward abortion, these do not necessarily reflect 
the opinions of their citizens.  
 Sheldon has written extensively of the failure of parliament to take the 
opportunity to address the medical paternalism of the Abortion Act 1967 upon its review 
in 1990. By retaining abortion as a criminal offence with exceptions and neglecting to 
address the medical paternalism inherent in the legislation’s requirements, she argues 
that parliament participated in a project of “speaking from the past to govern the future” 
(2016).  Sheldon’s observation of this anachronistic approach to abortion aptly applies 
to many of the claims that arise in the literature on ectogenesis. 
 Like their predecessors Singer and Wells, the authors of the most recent articles 
proclaiming that artificial wombs foretell the end of abortion rights (Colgrove 2019, 
Blackshaw and Rodger 2018, Mathison and Davis 2018) return to one seminal 
philosophical text on abortion: Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy. In her 1971 
article “A Defense of Abortion,” Thomson drew a comparison between an unwanted 
pregnancy and the experience of one’s body being used as a life support system for a 
famous violinist. Her intent was to establish that even if we consider for the sake of 
argument that the fetus has a right to life, this would not justify forcing another person 
to use their body to sustain that life. Blackshaw and Rodger write, “according to 
Thomson’s reasoning, there is no right to the death of the foetus, and so if ectogenesis is 
available, we are morally obliged to utilize it for unwanted pregnancies rather than 
aborting the foetus” (2018, np). So too Mathison and Davis (2017), who try to prove 




have only a protected right to bodily autonomy, and no right to terminate rather than 
extract a fetus.  
 But these authors neglect the strategic nature of Thomson’s reasoning. Writing 
in 1971, Thomson spoke from a social context in which abortion rights in her home 
nation of the United States had not yet been won. In 1971, the vast majority of abortions 
were surgical, and winning the support of a bare majority to change the law was 
essential: women were bleeding to death as they sought the procedure by any means 
necessary. Between 1971 and 2019, decades of ethical, philosophical, and legal debate 
have transpired. Abortion regulations have been established in Canada, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom. The legacy of Thomson’s thought experiment, the idea 
that it is a right to physically sever a fetus from one’s body and nothing more that 
justifies abortion, has been revealed, through the example of US abortion jurisprudence, 
to be an insufficient means of protecting abortion as an affirmative right. And in Canada 
and the United Kingdom, this logic was never the primary justification used for abortion 
in the first place. 
I have traced throughout this dissertation the competing claims made by authors 
writing from bioethicial, legal, and feminist perspectives (perspectives which often 
importantly overlap) as to how abortion rights will be impacted with the introduction of 
ectogenesis. Proposals intended to guard abortion rights against challenges, while 
formulated differently in different articles, take one of a few recurring forms (a 
redefinition of bodily autonomy or fetal viability, and guarding abortion rights on 
grounds of a negative right not to be a genetic parent or a right to property). Nedelsky 
writes that when faced with a legal challenge, lawyers and legal scholars may choose 
any of a number of strategic arguments, each of which have inevitable limitations. 
These are tools that can be justified as a practical means of responding to a difficult 
legal question.  
Whichever we pick, we must proceed with an awareness of the limits and uses 
of the tool we chose. Each of the frameworks for ectogenesis and abortion that I have 
examined in this dissertation could be mobilized strategically. But one strategy for 
defending abortion against possible challenges posed by ectogenesis that has not been 
raised in the literature is the decriminalization of abortion. And to take this argument 
further, the case has yet to be made for building a framework in which safe, self-




argue that these are the best means available to us for protecting abortion against a 
challenge introduced by ectogenesis, and the best steps we can take toward a future 
where ethical discussions of artificial womb technology focus on how it may benefit 
pregnant people, not how it may strip away their rights. 
What the Canadian context should show us is that ectogenesis will only pose a 
challenge to abortion rights where these rights have been constructed as contingent, 
limited, and subject to challenges introduced by advancements in technology or changes 
of political leadership. But while the Canadian framework for abortion comes the 
closest to presenting a contemporary set of circumstances in which this technology need 
not present a challenge to abortion rights, further reform with a view to a true feminist 
relational framework for the present health of pregnant people and the future use of 
ectogenesis are needed.  
 
DECRIMINALIZATION 
Decriminalization86 is the first step toward a relational, care-based framework for 
abortion rights and ectogenesis. This would centralize care for the pregnant person by 
ensuring that regardless of whether ectogenesis lowered medical viability or made it 
possible for a fetus to be extracted without being terminated, there would be no criminal 
consequences for seeking termination. Those against decriminalization in fact 
frequently mobilize under the banner of care for pregnant people by making the claim 
that retaining abortion as a criminal offence is necessary to protect their health and 
safety. But consider that one constant, from well before the Roe v. Wade87 ruling and the 
passage of the Abortion Act 1967, has been that if a person wants an abortion, criminal 
law will not stop them from finding one, nor will the threat of injury or death. Pregnant 
people would continue to seek abortion instead of ectogenesis even if the technology 
was available and to do so put them at risk of criminalization. And today, the safety of 
modern abortion procedures quickly exposes the argument that criminal consequences 
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consequences after the gestational limit. What I am proposing is decriminalization throughout pregnancy. 




for abortion are necessary to protect women as the straw man argument that it is. As 
Sheldon argues, we have in fact long had the medical technology to allow early-stage 
abortion to occur outside of medical supervision without posing a danger to pregnant 
people. Laws that legitimate criminal consequences on the grounds of protecting health 
and safety then, are no longer serving this function, but instead serve to send the 
message that pregnant people, and women in particular, are not to be trusted with their 
own bodies. To mobilize to protect pregnant people, and those who would help them, 
the energy of policymakers ahead of ectogenesis should be directed not toward making 
minor changes to still largely paternalistic forms of regulation, but toward abolishing 
cruel and unnecessarily punitive consequences for a medical procedure that will 
inevitably be sought.  
The creators of the biobag have been clear that their research is intended as a 
life-saving technology where other forms of intervention simply would not work. And 
as feminist scholars from many varied political standpoints have firmly argued 
(Woolfrey 2006, Smajdor 2007, Kendal 2015, Firestone 1979, Lewis 2019), pregnancy 
has significant side effects, many of which are most troubling in the latter months of 
gestation, and many of which put the pregnant person’s health and life at risk. As I 
addressed in the previous chapter, care for pregnant people and for wanted, prematurely 
born babies is precisely the clinically intended purpose of artificial wombs. In these 
circumstances, ectogenesis could be useful in the ways that so many feminist scholars 
have desired: to ease pain, to treat the side effects and symptoms of pregnancy, to save 
wanted fetuses and to relieve the burden of care on the pregnant person. One effect of 
criminal consequences for abortion, particularly where they are tied to a gestational 
limit that must be determined by a medical professional, is to create a divide where what 
protects care for pregnant people in some circumstances may render them vulnerable to 
criminalization in others. For example, if the biobag is successful in sustaining the lives 
of wanted fetuses at 23 weeks of gestation, it could significantly improve reproductive 
care if doctors could offer pregnant people at serious risk of injury or death in latter 
term the option of transferring the pregnancy to ectogenesis. But so long as seeking 
abortion after viability continues to put other pregnant people at risk of criminalization 
(as it does in the US and UK), emphasizing patient care on the one hand means 
potentially undermining pregnant peoples’ rights to abortion on the other hand. 




which protecting abortion and protecting access to care in preterm birth or where 
complications arise later in pregnancy need not be incompatible.   
 Victoria Browne (2016) deftly engages the example of the work of full-
spectrum doulas to emphasize how treating abortion and birth as experiences that must 
be thought and protected together will offer a more robust framework for reproductive 
freedom. Doulas work with pregnant people throughout their pregnancies in order to 
offer emotional and physical support, as well as advocacy. A full-spectrum doula does 
this work during wanted pregnancies, but also during abortions, oftentimes working 
with the same people to care for them as they end an unwanted pregnancy and support 
them to give birth during a wanted one. Browne writes that this approach, bringing 
together the different possible experiences in reproductive life, is one that works toward 
centralizing care for and the perspective of the pregnant person in all instances. 
Decriminalizing abortion, while certainly not the only measure that must be taken, is a 
step toward divorcing ectogenesis from the discourse on abortion, and creating space 
exploring how the technology could benefit pregnant people without the specter of how 
it could end their abortion rights. In turn, it would allow us to shift our emphasis on to 
other ethical questions, such as when, and under what circumstances, people would 
have access to use of ectogenesis.  
 
ACCESS TO CARE 
If decriminalization is the first necessary step toward a framework for ectogenesis and 
abortion that centralizes care for the pregnant person, then instituting measures for 
positively protecting access to abortion and reproductive care is the first step toward 
acknowledging the relational factors that enable or restrain a person’s ability to access 
that care. Decriminalization removes the criminal consequences of abortion, but will do 
nothing to affirm access if not accompanied by a “relational conception of autonomy” 
(Kaposy and Downie 2008, 99) that “places the exercise of reproductive choice within 
an environment of positive and negative interpersonal, institutional, and social forces” 
(ibid). To protect relational autonomy in this context means moving toward frameworks 
that mobilize “interpersonal, institutional, and social forces” to offer positive protection 
for abortion services.  
 Human pregnancy demands an intimate physical, emotional, and social 




ambivalence, and sometimes with horror. In the absence of a single human who, by 
virtue of the fetus’s location, provides the sustenance it needs to survive, ectogenetic 
gestation in fact draws attention to the way that external relationships shape, harm, 
limit, protect, or allow gestation to occur. Creating an alternative to the care the 
pregnant person gives the fetus means building a medical apparatus that mimics the 
delivery of nutrients and extraction of toxins performed by the placenta, that expands 
with the fetus’s growth, and that allows it to stay safely ensconced for months until it is 
ready to come out. It means, as Aristarkhova emphasizes, engaging the (paid) work of 
numerous medical experts who can monitor the minutiae of the fetus’s movements, and 
it means finding caretakers before it emerges who will treat it as a loved baby when it 
arrives. When you spell out all of the small acts of care, whether given willingly or 
demanded, that are required to allow a fetus to gestate in this way, it is incredible that 
ordinarily we expect one person to perform these acts alone. It makes explicit that we 
presume that pregnant people should provide these resources to the fetus with the 
expectation that they need not receive outside support. And it becomes particularly 
painful to think that we would fail to provide a person with the means to refuse to 
perform these acts, that we would ask women to do this work while offering nothing in 
the way of enabling it.  
Martha Fineman writes “the concept of derivative dependency captures the very 
simple but often overlooked fact that those who care for inevitable dependents (such as 
mothers caring for children) are dependent on resources in order to successfully 
undertake that care” (2017 7). In pregnancy, a truly relational, feminist framework 
would recognize gestation as a state in which a pregnant person experiences derivative 
dependency. And it would create the necessary conditions to allow people to choose to 
undertake that care work or to refuse it.  
Ultimately, this would involve making changes to apparatuses of care provided 
before, during, and after pregnancy, but also in the course of people providing care for 
others throughout their lives. But in the immediate future, when we consider what this 
means for abortion care, it means ensuring that recourse to opt out of carrying a 
pregnancy must be accessibly and widely available. I am reminded in particular here of 
Adams and Mikesell’s position that “a robust reading of the right to choose would [. . .] 
cover a variety of [. . .] abortion experiences, including ordering abortion pills from a 




person taking an abortifacient provided by an indigenous healer, midwife, herbalist, 
curandera88 or trusted friend, instead of a doctor” (2017 327). Adams and Mikesell 
acknowledge that under current circumstances, these possible means of seeking abortion 
seem nearly impossible. But this, again, raises the question of what kind of future with 
ectogenesis we should be trying to seek.  
To bring this thesis to a close, I want to consider some examples of changes that 
could be sought in each jurisdiction in support of realizing decriminalization and 
improving accessibility ahead of ectogenesis. The intention that has driven this work 
has been to redirect the lens through which abortion and ectogenesis have been viewed. 
There are many other future projects that could emerge with the express intent of 
prescribing instructions as to how the law of abortion should change with each step 
toward the development of artificial wombs. But what I have sought to do here is to 
demonstrate that we must reorient our approach to this question away from ineffectual 
models and methods that represent the past of abortion regulation, and toward creative 
future frameworks informed by feminist care ethics and reproductive justice. I have 
endeavored to turn the discourse on artificial wombs and abortion away from an often 
singular focus on the fetus, and toward pregnant people and the inevitable structures of 
care, relationality, and reproductive labor in which they are situated. What follows is 
not a prescriptive list of recommendations, then, but rather a few proposed possibilities 
for places where we might begin a much longer project of reaching toward a feminist 
future for abortion, ectogenesis, and care.  
 
CANADA 
While artificial wombs will not pose a challenge to abortion rights in Canada in 
principle, there are still changes that must be made ahead of the introduction of both 
partial and full ectogenesis in the interest of recognizing the relational network in which 
gestation occurs, and in the interest of protecting care for pregnant people. Kaposy and 
Downie celebrate that in jurisprudence on abortion and pregnancy, there is significant 
precedent showing that judges are attentive to how access to abortion is a necessary 
precondition for choice. But they also argue that because of the relatively liberal state of 
abortion rights in Canada, there is a danger that:  
                                                          




if judges believe that women automatically have the ability to make reproductive 
choices as long as the criminal law is not prohibitive, then they will be less able to see 
the hardship created by other barriers to reproductive choice, or they may be more 
inclined to see autonomous choices being made in cases where the capacity for 
exercising autonomy has actually been restricted (2008, 303) 
 
It is precisely these “barriers to reproductive choice” that most need to be addressed in 
order to ensure that the technology would never be presented as a person’s only option 
(in lieu of abortion), and to allow for circumstances in which therapeutic use might one 
day be enabled without posing a threat to reproductive care more broadly. 
 I have discussed barriers to access to abortion care in Canada in chapters four 
and five, and so I will not repeat them here. But changes are needed in the Canadian 
context to address the inequity of access that stems from provincial differences as to 
whether abortion clinics (or hospitals that perform abortions) are available, and from 
whether travel for abortion and access to the procedure is treated as a reimbursable 
healthcare cost. Firstly, clinics or hospitals at which abortion services are provided, in 
addition to effective telemedicine89 through which to acquire abortion pills must be 
made more widely available across each province, a change that would require the 
government to treat abortion as an essential and reimbursable form of medical care. The 
realization of this goal would mean provinces covering insurance costs for each of these 
modes of access, rather than limiting reimbursement, as some provinces currently do, to 
where abortion occurs in hospital (Johnstone and Macfarlane 2015). As Johnstone and 
Macfarlane argue, we can look to the Quebec approach to abortion rights in this regard. 
While where a pregnant person may need to go to seek abortion could vary depending 
on how far advanced her pregnancy is, services are widely available and are covered 
regardless of where the procedure occurs, both for health card holders and for 
immigrants without cards.  
As a stop-gap in the pursuit of universal access, as Downie argues, the 
Interprovincial Billing Agreement (2007), which ensures that people are reimbursed for 
procedures and travel costs where they must seek medical treatment outside of their 
provinces, should be revised to include all abortion. But shifts toward positive 
protections for abortion access must also be accompanied by a concurrent move toward 
positive protections for antenatal care in provinces in which these provisions remain 
inaccessible. A “guarantee of safe and timely access to abortion services” (Johnstone 
                                                          




and Macfarlane 2015, 115), in addition to “safe and timely” provision for antenatal care 
abided by provincial governments would help to ensure that the introduction of the 
artificial womb will not produce false “choices” between forced pregnancy and 
ectogenesis. By placing “focus [. . .] on the dynamics or characteristics of relationships 
that need to be supported and encouraged in order to foster human flourishing” (Downie 
and Llewellyn 2012, 5), in this case, access to reproductive care in both wanted and 
unwanted pregnancy, these changes would allow movement toward a more relational 
approach to governing ectogenesis and abortion.  
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom, abortion must be fully decriminalized prior to the arrival of 
ectogenesis. I have argued throughout this thesis that given that some of the 
justifications for the provision of abortion under the Abortion Act 1967 would continue 
to apply after ectogenesis, and given public sentiment in favor of reproductive rights, it 
is improbable that the introduction of ectogenesis would lead to an end to abortion. But 
so long as abortion remains a criminal offence with exceptions, pregnant people and 
healthcare practitioners will remain vulnerable to criminal charges under some 
circumstances if ectogenesis is introduced. And the current political climate (the rise of 
right-wing populism) should also tell us that public support for reproductive rights, too, 
may be subject to change. Therefore, to protect against this possibility and to move 
toward a framework for abortion, ectogenesis, and human pregnancy that better 
recognizes care and relationality, abortion must first be decriminalized.  
 Secondly, and in keeping with the recommendations of providers, gestational 
limits to abortion should be removed. As the British Medical Association reports 
(2018), as of 2015, 92% of abortions in England and Wales are carried out under 13 
weeks gestation, and 80% under 10 weeks (in Scotland, those numbers are reported as 
94.7 % under 14 weeks and 72.5 % under 9 weeks respectively). Where later stage 
abortions do occur, this is frequently as a consequence of the pregnant person’s lack of 
access to services earlier in pregnancy, or significant risks to the fetus or pregnant 
person. That few people have abortions in the UK after 14 weeks speaks to the way in 
which the translation of a gestational limit in law acts as an unnecessary fiction, 
communicating that there is to be a limit to the control we allow women in particular to 




then, that more pregnant people sought abortions late in pregnancy, but would remove 
the association of abortion rights and medical viability. In so doing, we would take steps 
toward ensuring that medical changes to the fetus’s ability to survive at earlier and 
earlier stages outside of the womb would not impact abortion rights, and we would 
redirect the question of when a fetus becomes morally significant to rightfully fall with 
the pregnant person.  
 Finally, as Jackson (2000), Sheldon (2016), and others have argued, removing 
the requirement for a doctor’s approval and the narrow grounds under which this 
approval is to be granted would modernize the legislation and ensure that pregnant 
people would be protected against the (unlikely but feasible) possibility of an antichoice 
medical professional advising or pressuring them to use an artificial womb in lieu of 
abortion. Medical professionals would be free to offer abortion as a medical service 
without needing to assess whether or not, for instance, a transfer to an artificial womb 
could equally address the pregnant person’s physical or emotional well-being. While, as 
I’ve argued it remains true that physicians could still provide abortion after ectogenesis 
without running afoul of the restrictions articulated in the Abortion Act 1967, we fall 
short of upholding a commitment to ensuring that pregnant people will always have 
access to reproductive care if we assume an outdated law need not be changed because 
we hope it may still work. As Margaret Urban Walker writes, an ethics informed by 
care makes space to address the concerns of “unrepeatable individuals in what are often 
distinctive situations and relationships” (1995, 146). Where pregnancy is “repeatable”, 
in that it occurs every day, all over the world, the experience of the pregnancy is 
“unrepeatable”, the person’s processing of it involves “distinctive situations and 
relationships” that shape whether it is wanted or not. We cannot assign a “repeatability” 
rule to those experiences. The Abortion Act 1967, in continuing to require physician 
approval within parameters designated under the legislation, is an attempt to do just 
that. Removing these restrictions is a means of redirecting the discursive approach to 
abortion ahead of the arrival of ectogenesis: away from a perception of a fetus as a 
being with a moral status that only physicians are equipped to assess and protect, and 
away from abortion as something that must always be justified through prescriptive 
reasons.  
 As a final point here, as the British Pregnancy Advisory Service has recently 




Act 1967 to remove the requirement for doctors to assess whether people’s reasons for 
presenting for an abortion align with the legislative guidance is that pregnant people 
will not be safeguarded against abortion occurring without their informed consent, that 
coercion or manipulation could occur, and that particularly vulnerable people might 
require guidance. As I have outlined in the previous chapter, there are very real 
possibilities for coercive use of an artificial womb. The possibility that some 
practitioners, in some settings, may encourage abortion or the use of long acting birth 
control where these are unwanted is also real. However, it is not through liberalizing 
abortion regulation that these possibilities, which are already present, would come to 
pass, and it is not through continuing to legislate paternalism that they would be 
guarded against. Concerns that removing the requirement that physicians approve a 
person’s reasons for getting an abortion would undermine informed consent and 
safeguarding arise from a misunderstanding of the law. Safeguarding and protections to 
informed consent “are all contained in entirely separate bodies of regulation and 
legislation, which would remain firmly in place were abortion decriminalised” (BPAS 
2017). And as I have addressed in the previous chapter, the coercion that could 
potentially occur is likely to come from other social institutions. To address and prevent 
this, further research into safeguarding against coercive pressures to use artificial 
wombs should be done.  
 
UNITED STATES 
As of 2019, six states have passed bills essentially banning abortion entirely after six 
weeks of pregnancy, a measure that effectively works as a total ban given that most 
people do not know they are pregnant until well after this time (Nash, Cappello, Naide, 
and Ansari-Thomas 2019). And across a number of states, other measures have been 
taken to make the procedure all but impossible to access, through means such as the 
closure of clinics, an increase in pre-abortion counselling requirements and wait times, 
and crackdowns on requirements for parental consent where the pregnant person is 
under age (ibid). Under these circumstances, and against a renewed cacophony of 
American scholars (Blackshaw and Rodger 2018, Colgrove 2019) declaring that the 
arrival of artificial womb technology is imminent and will bring with it a solution to 
abortion, it is challenging to speculate about how the future could be different. But to 




limited strategies for a future with ectogenesis that would reiterate existing limitations is 
to ignore the decades of work by activists, communities, health practitioners, lawyers, 
and policymakers towards making abortion more accessible and sustainable, and 
abolishing criminal consequences. We must remember that the steps toward full 
ectogenesis are incremental: a full artificial womb will not land, entirely functional for 
the duration of pregnancy, in the mire of United States’s politics tomorrow. This is what 
gives us time to prepare.  
 As I have thoroughly described the barriers to abortion access in the United 
States, and established that ectogenesis poses a serious threat to abortion protections as 
they are currently articulated, I will not reiterate these points here. Instead, this is a plea 
for not ceding to the temptation, ahead of ectogenesis, to focus on making minor 
changes that will do nothing to address the fact that the status quo of abortion 
protections in the United States is insufficient: it leaves women subject to 
criminalization, and it means that “abortion services are largely unavailable” 
(Rebouche, 2011, 5) even while protected in principle. Instead, we must set our sights 
on a horizon that may feel more speculative: the abolition of all laws that criminalize 
abortion or action against a fetus by a pregnant person at any stage of pregnancy, the 
removal of viability limits, and affirmative measures to ensure the accessibility of 
abortion clinics.  
These changes may seem too big to process in the contemporary climate, so I 
want to turn here to one small example from the work of one organization of many that 
is actively working toward these measures. If/When/How: Lawyering for Reproductive 
Justice, is focused on the decriminalization and safe promotion of self-managed 
abortion. As Diaz-Tello, Mikesell, and Adams, write, in order to address the problem of 
accessibility “there is a need for both clinic-based and non-clinical abortion options” 
(2019, np), and an immediate response to the scarcity of abortion services in many parts 
of the United States is in ensuring pregnant people will not be criminalized for seeking 
abortion pills via telemedicine and self-treatment. Ahead of ectogenesis, this is one 
small (but, in the mobilization efforts required, monumental), measure that can be 
focused on to orient abortion jurisprudence toward relationality and care. Campaigning 
for self-managed abortion, rather than applying the frame that is recurrent in literature 
on abortion and ectogenesis (that abortion must be regulated and justified), offers a new 




supervision from a physician to have a procedure that they themselves can manage. It 
allows them to choose the conditions under which their abortion occurs: alone, or at 
home in the company of a loved one. It acknowledges the relational restrictions that 
shape and determine whether access is feasible: if a clinic is not available to a person, or 
if it is but it will require them to undergo lengthy approval procedures, or if for cultural 
or personal reasons they do not trust the care they will receive, it allows them to secure 
abortion on their own terms.  
To be clear: it will not be enough until pregnant people are guaranteed funding 
and access to abortion across states, and antenatal care where they wish to continue a 
pregnancy. But it does far more to centralize care for pregnant people and to 
acknowledge the relational factors that enable or interrupt abortion access than does a 
strategy that retains an unjust status quo. In New York, the If/When/How team has 
successfully, with the help of other reproductive justice organizations, seen the passage 
of the Reproductive Health Act, which strikes down criminal consequences for abortion 
and allows for self-managed abortion to occur.  
 It is true that ectogenesis will threaten abortion rights in the United States, and it 
is also true that these rights are under threat now. But organizations currently on the 
ground are using a myriad of strategies to resist this threat. Following the framework 
initially proposed by practitioners of reproductive justice, some of these groups are 
focused on fighting for positive protections to reproductive health care, including 
abortion, under a human rights claim, while others, including If/When/How, propose 
other strategies such as appealing for positive access under the federal “undue burden” 
standard, arguing that unless positive recourse to services is granted, states are placing 
an undue burden on pregnant people who seek these services.  
 Strategies for protecting abortion against challenges posed by ectogenesis, 
should not, like the proposals I have argued against in this thesis, accept the existing 
problems produced by how the abortion right has been articulated in the United States. 
Rather than looking to the past and being informed by the early severance theories of 
pro-choice activists fighting for a bare right to physical autonomy, they should be 
informed by the present-day movement for reproductive justice. The call for  “the right 
not to have children, using safe birth control, abortion, or abstinence; the right to have 
children under the conditions we choose; and the right to parent the children we have in 




2017 14), may seem a lofty goal, and it is. But if we are to speculate on what we wish a 
future, as yet uncreated technology to mean, then so too should we speculate on a future 
































CONCLUSION: Flower Baby; Capsula Mundi 
The association that is perhaps most provocatively triggered by the before-and-after 
images of the biobag is that of the sacrificial lamb. In fact, while one of the lambs used 
in the initial experiment was kept alive for a year after its gestation to ensure that it 
fared well, the rest of the group was euthanized. These creatures, extracted from their 
mother’s wombs long before their naked bodies were ready for exposure to air, have the 
distinction of being the first animals to survive growing to term from such a fragile state 
in an artificial womb. But they are not the first casualties of such experiments, and they 
will not be the last. The creators of the biobag, ever-aware of the dystopian lineage of 
ectogenesis, acknowledged when they announced the success of their study that its key 
limitation was parental perception of their baby in a plastic bag. The image of a lamb 
pressed against the polyurethane surface of the technology, its eyes looking ready to 
open, is undeniably disconcerting. The instinct that a newborn, of any species, should be 
held by someone, whether one wants to be the one holding it or not, is a sensation many 
of us might be said to share. 
 By contrast to the image of a lamb fetus entangled in a plastic organ and 
synthetic veins, I want to return to the more whimsical vision that accompanied 
Victorian speculation on ectogenesis following the introduction of the first functional 
incubators. Perhaps first inspired by the ferns that punctuated rows of babies in glass at 
the incubator baby shows, media claims circulated that it had become possible to grow a 
baby like an orchid in a hot-house. This fantasy of ectogenesis can evoke a different 
kind of cultivation: watered, fed, and whispered to by interrelated gardeners and perhaps 
the automatic features of the greenhouse itself, a baby grows amidst petals and leaves. A 
modern image is that of the organic burial pod: a Capsula Mundi. The Capsula Mundi 
marks the end of life, the encapsulation of a body in a seed to grow into a tree. But I 
want to link together these two images: Capsula Mundi, and greenhouse flower, to 
speculate on the way that the stories we tell about ectogenesis, realized and applied in 
the form of the materials used to produce it, the regulatory frameworks we build to 
govern it, the social steps we take toward shaping it, can create meanings for the 
technology that are worlds apart.  
Whether we read either of these stories (the sacrificial lamb, the baby in a 
greenhouse) as foretelling an emancipatory, unfolding future for the nature of human 
care, or as a stomach-churning harbinger of a new form of state violence, depends very 




the other depends on what we do now. The biobag, though sterile and sealed, is both a 
closed entity and a relational object. The carefully measured and monitored artificial 
amniotic fluid and the way in which it is circulated by the fetus’s own heartbeat are 
functional features designed to protect the fetus from outside contaminants. Yet there 
are other design features— “a darkfield camera allowing real-time visualization of the 
fetus within its darkened environment and the ability to play maternal heart and 
abdominal sounds to the fetus”— that are expressly designed to “allow the parent to be 
connected” (Partridge et al 2017). These elements are not to serve clinical ends, they are 
to counter familial anxieties about “having their fetus in a bag,” and to encourage these 
families to understand that while they can’t hold the fetus, it remains close to them. 
  Irina Aristarkhova (2012) notes the overconfident assumption in the literature 
on ectogenesis that fully automated artificial wombs in the absence of any need for 
human connection are inevitable. While it may be tempting to see the biobag as an 
isolating entity, we must avoid the impulse to firmly categorize it, and bear in mind the 
features of its design that emphasize that it sits within a network of essential human 
care. There need not be a contradiction between recognizing these elements of the 
biobag’s design and maintaining a degree of suspicion as to what end (replacement, 
enhancement, emancipation?) they serve. 
 Michelle Murphy beautifully demonstrates the multiple meanings a single 
technology can contain when she explores the history of manual vacuum aspirators for 
abortion (2012). Working through the extraction of menstrual blood, the device could 
be understood as a technique to simply avoid or manage one’s period, while in fact also 
acting as a self-managed early abortion technique: if a woman was in fact pregnant at 
the time of use, the device would extract the early stage fetus. Murphy traces the 
technology’s introduction and development. Initially designed by a radical feminist 
collective in 1960s New York, and referred to as ME (Menstrual Extraction), the device 
had a life as a tool for women to use on themselves with the support of other women, 
and was promoted as a technique of emancipation. But in short order, a new version of 
the same device, referred to as MR (Menstrual Regulation) had been adapted for use by 
the state in developing nations to prevent pregnancies among women who were given 
the device to use without clear explanation, and thus without clear consent, of its 
implications as an abortion inducing technology. Murphy’s argument, in her analysis of 
the twin meanings that emerge here: one, a tool for informed collective and subversive 




of technology could-by being animated in different assemblages of technique, 
discourses, and subject positions - be meaningfully said to be two different things” 
(2012, 152). This is what we must also understand of ectogenesis. What this technology 
means, what it does for the gendered reproductive body, for care labour, for abortion 
rights, is entangled with how it is “animated in different assemblages”, or more 
precisely, in what contexts it will be available for use, and what kinds of uses will be 
enabled or prohibited in law.   
 This is a question of who controls the narrative, who is allowed to write the 
story of what artificial womb technology can be made to do. In this dissertation, I have 
sought to redirect the emerging (but not novel) discourse on ectogenesis and abortion. I 
have taken a normative, relational feminist position to claim that we must begin from a 
place in which we affirm abortion as a resource that is nonnegotiable. I have argued that 
we should be attentive to the ways in which different jurisdictions have articulated the 
abortion right in order to understand that contrary to the recurring position in literature 
arising from the United States, artificial wombs need not pose an inevitable challenge to 
these rights. I argue for beginning from a place in which abortion must always be 
protected as free, accessible, easy to find, culturally sensitive, and available both as a 
clinical and as a self-administered procedure. To take a feminist approach to thinking 
through the ethics of artificial womb technology is to first ascertain that the technology 
will not undermine the provision of and access to abortion, nor will it be used 
coercively. I have explored some of the ways in which this first requirement might be 
upheld, and with regard to the second in particular, I believe there is much more work to 
be done. But it is in first addressing these concerns, in taking measures to protect 
pregnant people, that we can then turn to other areas of inquiry: to whom will the 
technology be made available, and when? What will it be made from (can it be used in 
multiple environments, or only state of the art hospitals?) Could it one day be available 
for elective use? 
 Despite the numerous possible stories we could tell about ectogenesis, legal 
scholarship has clung to and replicated what we might call the path of least imagination. 
Though often packaged with the claim that ectogenesis will change everything we take 
for granted about human reproduction, much of this literature simply reproduces the 
status quo at best, and at worst, reaches into the past to find a template for a narrative 
about the future. I am not suggesting here that we need to disregard history in order to 




far as feminist accounts of how ectogenesis might result in “true equality” that fail to 
take account of the multiple and complex ways that reproductive technologies have 
been used to enact violence against some women and of the multiple pre-existing 
inequities produced by such technologies to see that this is not the case.  
 But like the different stories we can find in the image of the lamb and that of the 
orchid baby, there are multiple ways we can read ectogenesis. And in this dissertation, I 
have argued that one of these ways of reading is to use the fantasy offered by the 
technology to imagine not a future that replicates the lack of relational attention to care 
that constitutes a limitation to present day abortion rights in some jurisdictions, but as a 
way of imagining ourselves away from such limitations. To take a critical approach to 
law is to understand how legal frameworks, too, operate as fictions (Douzinas, 
Warrington, and McVeigh 1991). Ectogenesis poses a challenge to abortion rights only 
if we accept a particular set of fictions, then. We can choose to follow the threads of 
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